Peacebuilding in Mozambique with special reference to the UN policy on landmine removal by Van Tonder, Delarey
PEACEBUILDING IN MOZAMBIQUE WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE UN POLICY ON LANDMINE REMOV AL
DELAREY VAN TONDER
Thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy (Value
Analysis & Policy Formulation), University of Stellenbosch
Supervisor: ProfWJ Breytenbach
University of Stellenbosch
December 2000
Declaration
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own original
work and has not previously, in its entirety or in part, been submitted at any university for a
degree.
11
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
111
ABSTRACT
The end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the qualitative and quantitative nature of the
UN's peace and security agenda, representing a shift from traditional peacekeeping to a broader,
more ambitious and intrusive notion of peacekeeping. This evolution was marked by an expanded
UN engagement in a broad range of intra-state conflicts and characterised by UN undertakings
towards aspects of national political and socio-economic reconstruction including the evolution
of humanitarian action.
Responding to the expanded United Nations agenda for international peace and security and at
the request of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual
foundations of the UN's role in global peace and security in his seminal report, An Agenda for
Peace (July, 1992). The Secretary General outlined five inter-connected roles that he projected
the UN would play in the fast changing context of post-Cold War international politics, namely:
preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-
building.
The UNSG described the newly defined concept of post-conflict peacebuilding as action organ-
ised "(to) foster economic and social co-operation with the purpose of developing the social,
political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying the foundations for a
durable peace."
With specific reference to landmines in An Agenda for Peace the UNSG stressed that peacebuild-
ing following civil war and internal strife must address the serious problem of landmines, which
remained scattered in present or former combat zones. The UNSG underscored that mine action
(demining) should be emphasised in terms of reference of peacekeeping operations which is
crucially important in the restoration of activity when peacebuilding is under way.
The United Nations involvement in the Mozambican peace process (1992-1995) has been inter-
preted as the culmination of a major success story in wider peacekeeping in Africa under UN aus-
pices - a category of peace operation, which included peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, peacebuilding and electoral assistance. Mozambique's peace process has subsequently
been cited as a model UN peacekeeping operation which could be adapted to post-conflict situa-
tion elsewhere.
Within the context of landmines as a threat to post-conflict peacebuilding as articulated by the
UNSG in An Agenda for Peace, the study focuses on how the United Nations implemented mine
action initiatives in operationalising the concept of peacebuilding in Mozambique. In this context,
the study reviews the UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and its capacity, responsiveness
and vision in implementing mine action initiatives, both in terms of the operational requirements
of the ONUMOZ peacekeeping mission and the development oflonger-term humanitarian mine
action programmes in Mozambique. To this end, the study views the establishment of a sustain-
able indigenous mine action capacity as a sine que non for post -conflict peacebuilding.
From this perspective, the study interprets the 1999 Mine Ban Treaty Prohibiting the Use, Stock-
pile, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction and the rights
and obligations of Mozambique as a State Party to the Treaty as the most appropriate instrument
towards the creation of an indigenous Mozambican mine action capacity to address the long-term
effects oflandmines on post-conflict peacebuilding.
In terms of methodology the approach was historical-analytical and in essence a deductive
method of research was followed.
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OPSOMMING
Die einde van die Koue Oorlog het diepgaande verandering teweeggebring ten opsigte van die
Verenigde Nasies se vredes en sekuriteits regime ter handhawing van internasionale vrede en
sekuriteit. Hierdie periode is gekenmerk deur 'n skerp toename in intra-staatlike konflikte en
gevolglik in die kwalitatiewe en kwantitatiewe aard en omvang van Verenigde Nasies vredesop-
erasies in terme van die VN Handves.
Ten einde die verantwoordelikhede van die Verenigde Nasies met betrekking tot die handhawing
van vrede en sekuriteit in die snel - veranderende konteks van die post - Koue Oorlog periode
aan te spreek, het die Sekretaris - Generaal van die Verenigde Nasies, Boutros Boutros - Gali,
in opdrag van die Veiligheidsraad die konseptuele fundering van die VN se rol verwoord in sy
pioniersverslag - Agenda vir Vrede (1992).
In sy verslag van Julie 1992 identifiseer en omskryf die Sekretaris-Generaal vyf verband-
houdende konsepte wat sou dien as meganismes ter beslegting van internasionale konflik, naam-
lik voorkomende diplomasie (preventive diplomacy), vredesingryping (peace enforcement),
maak van vrede (peacemaking), vredesoperasies (peacekeeping) en post-konflik vredeskonsoli-
dasie (post-conflict peacebuilding).
Die Sekretaris-Generaal het post-konflik vredeskonsolidasie omskryf as die "vestiging van
sosio-ekonomiese samewerking met die oogmerk om die sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese infra-
struktuur te ontwikkel ten einde hernude konflik te voorkom en ter grondlegging van langdurige
vrede".
Met spesifieke verwysing na die korrelasie tussen landmyne en post-konflik vredeskonsolidasie
het die Sekretaris-Generaal benadruk dat landmyne 'n bedreiging inhou vir die konsolidasie van
vrede na burgeroorlog en interne konflik, en veral binne die raamwerk van 'n VN vredesoperasie
in terme van 'n VN Veiligheidsraad mandaat.
Die VN se vredesrol in Mosambiek word allerweë beskou as een van die mees suksesvolle
VN vredesoperasies ooit. Die doel van die studie is gevolglik om ondersoek in te stel na die
toepassing van die konsep van post-konflik vredeskonsolidasie met spesifieke verwysing na
die Mosambiekse vredesproses en die rol van die Verenigde Nasies se Operasie in Mosambiek
(ONUMOZ). In die opsig fokus die studie spesifiek op die rol van ONUMOZ (1992-1995) en
suksesse en tekortkomings in sy vredesmandaat ten opsigte van die implementering van aksies
om die kort-en-langtermyn impak van landmyne in terme van post-konflik vredeskonsolidasie
in Mosambiek aan te spreek.
Vanuit hierdie konteks, vertolk die studie die Landmyn Verdrag (1999) en die totale verbod op
die aanwending, opgaar, produksie en oordrag van landmyne en die vernietiging daarvan as die
mees geskikte raamwerk waarbinne Mosambiek 'n inheemse vermoë tot stand kan bring ten
einde die langtermyn impak van landmyne op post-konflik vredeskonsolidasie effektief aan te
spreek.
Vanuit 'n metodologiese oogpunt word in hierdie studie histories analities te werk gegaan en
die benadering is beskrywend - verklarend van aard. Verder is die metode van ondersoek in
wese deduktief van aard.
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Problem Statement
The General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo of Mozambique, concluded
in October 1992, was negotiated at a time when global and regional politics were undergoing
dramatic and fundamental change. The end of the Cold War meant growing disinterest in con-
flicts waged for ostensible ideological reasons and the changing political equation in Southern
Africa opened opportunities for peace.
With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations agenda for peace and security rapidly
expanded. At the request of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Summit of January 1992, UN
Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali prepared the conceptual foundations of the
UN's role in global peace and security in his seminal report, An Agenda for Peace (1992). The
Secretary General outlined five inter-connected roles that he projected the UN would play in the
fast changing context of post-Cold War international politics:
• preventive diplomacy, undertaken in order "to prevent disputes from arising between
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread
of the latter when they occur";
• peace enforcement, conducted "with or without the consent of the parties in order to
ensure compliance with a cease-fire" mandated by the UN Security Council acting under
the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
• peacemaking, designed "to bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means
such as reflected in Chapter VI of the UN Charter;
• peacekeeping, established to deploy a "United Nations presence in the field, with the
consent of all the parties concerned, to monitor a truce between the parties, to negotiate
a comprehensive peace or to implement an agreed peace;"
• post-conflict peace building, organised "to foster economic and social co-operation with
the purpose of developing the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent
future violence, and laying the foundations for a durable peace."
The primary focus of this study is the concept of peacebuilding as articulated by the UNSG in
An Agenda for Peace. As a newly defined mechanism within the UN peace and security regime
aimed towards the resolution of international conflict, the study observed that there is no explicit
provision for the concept in the UN Charter. However, UN peacekeeping or peace operations
have evolved from the purposes and principles upon which the United Nations was founded.
Article 1(1) of the UN Charter clearly states that the primary purpose of the United Nations is
"(to) maintain international peace and security, and to that end, to take, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace". To this end the study argued that the concepts of UN peace operations and their execu-
tion have evolved over a period as a product of experience and experiment and adjusted incre-
mentally according to prevailing international circumstances and trends.
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2In terms of agreements ending civil war, the UNSG stressed that post-conflict peacebuilding
included disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody
and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for
security personnel and the monitoring of elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights,
reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal proc-
esses of political participation.
With specific reference to landmines in An Agenda for Peace the UNSG stressed that peace-
building following civil war and internal strife must address the serious problem of landrnines,
which remained scattered in present or former combat zones. The UNSG underscored that mine
action (demining) should be emphasised in terms of reference of peacekeeping operations which
is crucially important in the restoration of activity when peacebuilding is under way.
Against this background, the General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo
of 4 October 1992 called for the introduction of a UN presence in Mozambique, formalised
by UNSC Resolution 797 of 16 December 1992 and the establishment of the United Nations
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) with a one year timeframe which mandated ONUMOZ
to oversee the verification and implementation of the General Peace Agreement, and with spe-
cific responsibility for the cease-fire, demobilisation, formation of a national army, arrange-
ments for the formation of political parties, organisation of elections, and humanitarian action.
The GPA stressed the importance of humanitarian action being an integral component of the
peacebuilding endeavour.
As warfare in Mozambique ceased towards the end of 1992, and the GPA came into effect, it
was increasingly apparent that Mozambique's economy and infrastructure had been devastated
and massive international assistance would be required towards post-conflict reconstruction.
An estimated one million Mozambicans died during the conflict and one third of the country's
population, estimated to be 16million in the early 1990s, were up-rooted; 4.2 million were dis-
placed internally and 1.5 million became refugees in neighbouring countries. With a per capita
GDP of US $80, 60% of the population was living in absolute poverty and in critical need of
food assistance. Mozambique was producing less than 10% of its food requirements and it was
estimated that the war had resulted in the destruction of 70% of schools and 50% of clinics and
had brought about an almost total collapse in markets, making Mozambique the poorest country
in the world.
Mine warfare in Mozambique was officially brought to an end with the signing of the Rome
Peace Accords in 1992. At this stage the UN estimated that there were 2 million landmines
emplaced in the country and around 500 people were killed or maimed in landrnine incidents
each year due to the extensive use oflandmines by all sides during Mozambique's war of inde-
pendence and in the ensuing civil war. Over decades of armed conflict, the warring parties
deployed landmines to defend strategic strongholds and villages, to ambush and disrupt the
enemy and to terrorise and deny population the use of land. Landrnines were used offensively
and defensively, in all provincial territory of Mozambique. As the Mozambican peace process
unfolded it became apparent that the impact oflandmines on human security and the destructive
socio-economic implications of these weapons posed serious and costly obstructions to post-
conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.
Within the context of landmines as a threat to post-conflict peacebuilding as articulated by the
UNSG in An Agenda for Peace, the study therefore focuses on how the United Nations imple-
mented lnine action initiatives in operationalising the concept of peacebuilding in Mozambique.
In this respect the study views mine action as a multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary set of activi-
ties inclusive of mine awareness, mine field surveys and marking, training, minefield clearance
(demining) and assistance to victims. The study also distinguishes between operational and
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3humanitarian mine action. Within the peacebuilding concept the study interprets operational
demining as actions undertaken to safeguard the security of UN troops in the execution of their
peacekeeping mission. On the other hand, humanitarian mine action is viewed as comprehen-
sive, integrated and structured actions undertaken to remove landmines from the ground in order
to minimise the negative socio-economic effects of landmines on human security. Humanitar-
ian mine action is also viewed from a community-oriented, long-term peacebuilding perspec-
tive, which extends beyond the realm of a relatively brief and infrequent UN peacekeeping
mandate, and which, for the purpose of the study, is defined as activities carried out to reduce the
threat posed by landmines to individuals and communities in a mine contaminated area, includ-
ing survey and assessment, mine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance. Humanitar-
ian mine action is also interpreted as inclusive of operational mine action during peacekeeping
operations mandated by the UN Security Council as well as mine action in support of recon-
struction and development. For the purposes of the study mines or landmines are defined as a
"anti-personnel mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person
which will kill, incapacitate or injure one or more persons".
Regarding the UN's capacity to plan, organise and manage mine action in a post-conflict setting,
the study interpreted the UN's responsiveness and vision in rapidly implementing mine action
initiatives, both in terms of the operational requirements of the peacekeeping mission and the
development of longer-term humanitarian mine action programmes in Mozambique as central
to the peacebuilding concept. To this end, the study views the establishment of a sustainable
indigenous mine action capacity as a sine qua non for post-conflict peacebuilding. An indig-
enous capacity for the purpose of the study is therefore defined as the acquired capability of a
national entity to define and articulate overall mine action policy and direction, to co-ordinate
and manage a programme that is capable of addressing both the short and long-term humanitar-
ian and socio-economic implications of landmines, and to generate and allocate resources in
line with clearly identified priorities in order to ensure accountability and cost-effectiveness.
The focal point of the study, namely peacebuilding and landmines, is extended to include the
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, commonly known as the Ottawa Treaty or officially
as the Mine Ban Treaty. This international instrument, which became international law more
rapidly than any previous multilateral arms convention, is viewed by the study as the interna-
tional response to the humanitarian crisis caused by the global proliferation of anti-personnel
landmines and their long-term negative effect upon individuals and society and on sustainable
socio-economic development. The study also interprets the Ottawa Treaty from a long-term
peacebuilding perspective in Mozambique, providing an appropriate framework for the devel-
opment of an indigenous capacity towards post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.
1.2. Purpose
The inauguration of Mozambique's first democratically elected president, on 9 December
1994, brought the mandate of one of the United Nation's largest and most successful peace-
keeping operations to an end. These elections were interpreted as the culmination of a major
success story in wider peacekeeping in Africa under UN auspices - a category of peace opera-
tion, which included peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding.
Mozambique's peace process has subsequently been cited as a model UN peacekeeping opera-
tion which could be adapted to post-conflict situations elsewhere. The overall purpose of the
study is therefore to review the assumption that significant lessons remain to be learned by revis-
iting the UN operation in Mozambique, especially when the implications of such UN interven-
tions for longer term peacebuilding become apparent given the fact that Mozambique still faces
critical challenges with regard to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. The study is
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international community in its resolve to deal with threats to global peace and security, in terms
of post-conflict peacebuilding and landmines.
In this respect the application of the concept of peacebuilding in Mozambique in a post-conflict
environment is directly linked to the July 1992 UNSG report, An Agenda for Peace following a
UNSC request for an analysis and recommendations to UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali on ways
of strengthening and making more efficient, within the provisions of the UN Charter, the capac-
ity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. In this groundbreak-
ing report the UNSG specifically identified landmines as a threat to the process of post-conflict
peacebuilding and emphasised that mine action is critical in the restoration of activity when
peacebuilding is underway.
The human cost of landmines in Mozambique in terms of lives and disability, the destructive
social and economic implications of these weapons, and their obstruction to peacebuilding and
reconstruction dictate the need for prompt and effective action from the international commu-
nity for the removal and destruction of landmines and for the establishment of a national, indig-
enous capacity to do so. Instituting mine action programmes after the cessation of hostilities
where central and institutional capacity is weak or non-existent is therefore critical in maintain-
ing the momentum and consolidation of post-conflict peacebuilding and related humanitarian
activities. Of similar importance is the development of a sustainable indigenous capacity in
addressing the longer term objectives of post-conflict peacebuilding.
The study therefore seeks to identify factors which affected the development of an indigenous
mine action capacity in post-conflict Mozambique while simultaneously addressing the need for
humanitarian mine action essential for peacebuilding activities in a UN mandated peacekeeping
mission. To this end the study reviews the initiation, development, management and implemen-
tation of mine action programmes during the peacebuilding phase of the ONUMOZ mandate
while concurrently identifying the inadequacies and insights which can be inferred from the UN
peacebuilding effort in the field of humanitarian mine action. Consequently, the study analyses
goals and perspectives which influenced the initiation of landmine action after the cessation of
hostilities, taking into account political and other factors which shaped overall objectives, phi-
losophy and methodology, including the conceptualisation of the UN towards the establishment
of an indigenous mine action capacity in Mozambique. Within this context the study also deter-
mines factors which impeded the development of an institutional framework critical for policy
formulation, effective management, resourcing, implementation and accountability towards the
development of indigenous institutional structures, and a long-term, sustainable national mine
action capacity in Mozambique.
The study postulates that the Mine Ban Treaty sets a new norm in international humanitarian
law by comprehensively banning the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use
of an existing weapon in widespread use. Moreover the Treaty also provides an international
legal framework with binding timeframes and commitments towards landrnine clearance, victim
assistance and destruction of stockpiles, establishing a framework for international co-operation,
implementation and compliance. The study therefore analyses the implications for Mozambique,
as a State Party to the Treaty in terms of the legal framework including binding timeframes and
commitments to clear landmines, assist victims, destroy stockpiles, co-operate internationally
and ensure implementation and compliance. Moreover, the Ottawa process is interpreted as a
separate initiative, driven by an international coalition of NGOs, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) and like-minded states. In this context the study postulates that the
Ottawa Treaty ultimately provides a long-term implementation framework as well as substance
to the concept of post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction, and the threat of landmines to
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5this process. To this end the study regards the rights and obligations of Mozambique under the
terms of the Treaty as an appropriate framework towards the creation of an indigenous Mozam-
bican capacity to address the long-term effects of landmines on post-conflict peacebuilding.
The relevance of the Mine Ban Treaty therefore becomes applicable in this equation. To ensure
that the prohibitions of the Treaty, as a legally binding international instrument, become a real-
ity Mozambique, as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, must adopt a number of legal regula-
tory measures on the national level in order to reduce the threat of landmines to human security
and to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction underway in the country. This implies
that Mozambique must ensure that the rights and obligations contained in the Treaty are fully
implemented - a process which will require concerted and sustained long-term action, including
its right as a mine affected State to seek international assistance across the full range of mine
related activities - from assessing the extent of the country's landmine problem to preparing
mine action plans, destroying mines, building an indigenous capacity and the care and rehabili-
tation of landmine victims.
On the more specific levels of response regarding the critical need for effective mine action,
the study seeks to illustrate the difficulty of developing adequate legislative, institutional and
technical capacities and the relevance of benefiting from the Mozambican experience by ensur-
ing that pertinent lessons are incorporated in future post-conflict peacebuilding scenarios. The
purpose of the study in this context is to enhance the capacity of role-players in the planning,
development and implementation of mine action within a post-conflict peacebuilding setting,
and ultimately, the establishment of an indigenous mine action capability to address the needs
of humanitarian mine action essential for the consolidation of peacebuilding activities.
To this end Chapter U explores the concept of peacebuilding as articulated by UNSG
Boutros - Boutros Ghali in his report An Agenda for Peace to the UNSC in July 1992. From
this perspective Chapter U also briefly reviews inadequacies of traditional peacekeeping in the
aftermath of the Cold War.
With reference to the Mozambican peace process culminating in the General Peace Agreement
of October 1992 and leading to the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozam-
bique by UNSC Resolution 797 of 16December 1992, Chapter U also evaluates the mandate of
ONUMOZ, in terms of its humanitarian component, peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles.
Chapter IU assesses the Mozambican peace process culminating in the General Peace Agree-
ment (Rome Peace Accords) of October 1992. The implementation of the cease-fire, demobi-
lisation and elections are reviewed with specific focus on the problems and obstacles in the
process.
Chapter IV investigates the concept of peacebuilding and the phenomenon of landmines in
Mozambique and its impact on human security and socio-economic development. The role of
the UN and its agencies in the establishment of a national indigenous mine action capacity in
Mozambique to effectively address the long-term implications for post-conflict peacebuilding is
also reviewed. Chapter IV also analyses the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction
which was ratified by Mozambique in August 1998. This Chapter assesses the implications for
Mozambique and its rights and obligations as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, across the
full spectrum of mine-related activities in realisation of the longer term goals of peacebuilding
in a post-conflict environment.
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6In conclusion, Chapter V reflects on the purpose of the study, the problem statement and the
context of the UN operation in Mozambique, highlighting the insights and lessons which can
be distilled and analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the UN capacity towards peace-
building where the post-conflict environment is threatened by the existence of landmines. This
Chapter also reflects on the validity and acceptance of the peacebuilding concept, reviews the
research methods employed by the study, including the evaluation of UN policy in relation to
the Mozambican experience.
1.3. Research Methods
The aim of the study is a quantitative, descriptive-explanatory analysis of the concept of post-
conflict peacebuilding, as articulated by UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace
and applied in the post-conflict setting of Mozambique where landmines posed a threat to the
process of post-conflict peacebuilding. In terms of methodology the approach was historical-
analytical and in essence a deductive method of research was followed.
To this end primary and secondary sources were applied extensively. Running records and recol-
lections were also utilised and are inclusive of the following:
Books, academic journals, UN documentation and assessments, surveys, studies, official South
African government policy documentation, proceedings of international conferences, official
Mozambican government documentation, personal interviews and documentation from the
international donor community and non-governmental organisations.
Personal interviews with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mozambican Foreign Minister Dr L. Simáo, and the
National Director of the Mozambican Demining Commission (CND) in order to verify and
determine:
• the role of the United Nations and its agencies in mine action in Mozambique;
• the removal of landmines in post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction in Mozam-
bique;
• the role of the international community in mine action in Mozambique;
• the implications of the international Treaty on the banning of landmines for Mozam-
bique;
• the establishment of an indigenous Mozambican mine action capacity;
• the status of assistance to landrnine victims;
• the roles of South Africa and the international donor community in the international
landmine debate and bilateral assistance to Mozambique mine action.
In order to validate research findings a collaborative research project between the Department of
Foreign Affairs, the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), the Mozambican
National Demining Commission (CND), the S.A. High Commission in Maputo and the inter-
national donor community in Mozambique was initiated. The aim of the research project was
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to provide a report on the status of the development of an indigenous mine action capacity in
Mozambique. The following questions were inter alia incorporated in a questionnaire circulated
to selected respondents.
• Could mine action in Mozambique be categorised as successful? Why or why not?
• Should an overarching national body for mine action exist in Mozambique? What duties
and role should it have?
•What are your views on the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)? How should this focal
point of mine action contribute towards the establishment of a strong, indigenous dem-
ining capacity in Mozambique?
• Describe the performance of the Mozambican National Demining Commission (CND)
thus far. Please address CND's relationship with donors specifically.
• In which areas should Mozambique's indigenous mine action capacity be expanded.
What are the most critical priorities with regards to the restructuring of CND?
• Will Mozambique meet the objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty? If not, what can be done
to improve its chances?
•What is your assessment of assistance to landmine victims in Mozambique? What should
be done to implement nationally an effective and multifaceted victim assistance pro-
gramme?
Attendance of the Global Humanitarian Demining Conference in Washington D.C. (May 1998)
and meeting of the SADC Committee of Demining Experts (August 1998) in order to verify and
validate:
• Implications of the Ottawa Treaty for Mozambique.
• Socio-economic impact of landmines in Mozambique including the scope and extent of
the landmine problem.
• Status of mine action, victim assistance and nationallandmine survey in Mozambique.
7
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8CHAPTER TWO
PEACEBUILDING
2.1. Introduction
The concept of United Nations peace operations derives from the United Nations Charter, which
has been signed by more than 180 independent states since it was drafted in 1945. Article 1 (1)
clearly states that the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security
and, to that end, to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace.
There is no explicit reference in the UN Charter to either peacekeeping or post-conflict peace-
building. Any review therefore on the development of UN peace operations must proceed from
the assumption that these cannot be contradictory to the purpose, principles and provisions of
the United Nations, as articulated in the Charter. Article 24 confers upon the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security, and directs it to act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the UN, accord-
ing to the specific powers granted in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, of the Charter, which provide the
basic framework for UNSC action.
2.2. Boutros-Ghali'sAgendafor Peace
On 31 January 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), at the level of Heads of
State and Government, requested United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros - Ghali to
prepare, by I July 1992, an analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making
more efficient within the provisions of the UN Charter, the capacity of the United Nations for
preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:1).
The Secretary General's analysis culminated in a report entitled An Agenda for Peace. In this
report Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, stated that the era of global transition following the Cold War
was marked by contradictory trends in which regional and continental associations of states
were evolving ways of deepening co-operation. In this process however, national boundaries
were blurred and states yielded some sovereign prerogatives to larger common political associa-
tions. At the same time, fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty were experienced
and the cohesion of states was threatened by ethnic, religious, social, cultural and linguistic
strife. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:5).
The Secretary General acknowledged that the UN had been rendered "powerless" to deal with
over 100 major conflicts around the world since the creation of the UN in 1945, leaving some
20 million people dead. According to the UNSG, the 279 vetoes exercised in the UNSC during
the period up to 31 May 1990, "were a vivid expression of divisions of the Cold War period."
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992:7).
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Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali also impressed upon UN member states that in dealing with preven-
tive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping "the search for improved mechanisms and tech-
niques will be oflittle significance unless this new spirit of commonality is propelled by the will
to take the hard decisions demanded by this time of opportunity" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:3).
In this context the UNSG announced that the UNSC had emerged "as a central instrument
for the prevention and resolution of conflict and for the preservation of peace." The UNSG
also defined the macro aims to achieve this within the following framework (Boutros-Ghali,
1992:8):
• To identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and
through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before violence erupts;
• where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that have
led to conflict;
• through peacekeeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has
been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peace-makers;
• to assist in peacebuilding in its differing contexts; rebuilding the institutions and infra-
structures of nations torn by the civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful,
mutual benefit among nations formerly at war;
• to address the deepest causes of conflict namely economic despair, social injustice and
political oppression.
In terms of the aforementioned the UNSG outlined five interconnected roles that he projected
the UN would play in the fast changing context of post Cold War international politics and an
expanded UN agenda for peace and security. Doyle (1995:2) defined these concepts as follows:
• preventive diplomacy, undertaken in order "(to) prevent disputes from arising between
parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread
of the latter when they occur."
• peace enforcement, conducted "with or without the consent of the parties" in order to
ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under the
authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These military forces are composed ofheav-
ily armed, national forces operating under the direction of the Secretary General.
• peacemaking, designed "(to) bring hostile parties to agreement" through peaceful means
such as those found in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Drawing upon judicial settlement,
mediation and other forms of negotiation, UN peacemaking initiatives would seek to
persuade parties to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their differences.
• peacekeeping, established to deploy a "United Nations presence in the field, hitherto
with the consent of all the parties concerned," as a confidence building measure to moni-
tor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace
or offiials to implement an agreed peace.
• post-conflict peacebuilding, organised "(to) foster economic and social co-operation
with the purpose of building confidence among previously warring parties, developing
the social, political and economic infrastructure to prevent future violence, and laying
the foundations for a durable peace."
9
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In his report Boutros Boutros-Ghali stressed that preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-
keeping were "integrally related" and in providing the conceptual foundations of post-conflict
peacebuilding the UNSG (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:4) provided the following elucidation:
"The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-
building-action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes
before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and
preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict
peacebuilding, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples".
The UNSG stressed in An Agenda for Peace (Boutros Ghali, 1992:33) "that peacemaking and
peacekeeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts
to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of
confidence and well being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may
include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and
possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for secu-
rity personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or
strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of politi-
cal participation."
In linking the "range of efforts for peace" with post-conflict peacebuilding the UNSG pointed
out that the concept of peace building (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 33) "(as) the construction ofa new
environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid
the breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at
peacemaking and peacekeeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only
sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitar-
ian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to
avoid a crisis; post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence".
With specific reference to the linkage between post-conflict peacebuilding and landmines the
UNSG stressed in his report that peacebuilding following civil war and international strife must
address the serious problem of landmines, "many tens of millions which remained scattered in
present or former combat zones." The UNSG underscored" (that) demining should be empha-
sised in the terms of reference of peacekeeping operations and is crucially important in the
restoration of activity when peacebuilding is underway, agriculture cannot be revived without
demining and the restoration of transport may require the laying of hard surface roads to pre-
vent re-mining". In such instances, according to the UNSG, the link becomes evident between
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992:33)
On the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, the UN Secretary General on 3
January 1995 presented a position paper, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace to the UN General
Assembly (UNGA).
With regard to the aspect of post-conflict peacebuilding the UNSG confinned that the validity
of the concept had received "wide recognition". He also pointed out that peacebuilding meas-
ures "(can) also support preventive diplomacy," and included demilitarisation, the control of
small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human
rights, electoral reform and social and economic development. (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: 12).
10
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The report to the UNGA acknowledged that the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding
can however be complicated requiring "integrated action and delicate dealings between the
United Nations and parties to the conflict in respect of which peacebuilding activities are to be
undertaken". To this end the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace detailed the role of the UN in
the activities of post-conflict peace building by stating that:
"Most of the activities that together constitute peacebuilding fall within the mandate of the vari-
ous programmes, funds, offices and agencies of the United Nations system with responsibili-
ties in the economic, social, humanitarian and human rights fields. In a country ruined by war,
resumption of such activities may initially have to be entrusted to, or at least co-ordinated by,
a multifunctional peacekeeping operation, but as that operation succeeds in restoring normal
conditions, the programmes, funds, offices and agencies can re-establish themselves and gradu-
ally take over responsibility from the peace-keepers". (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:13).
Focussing on the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) within the changed nature
of United Nations operations, the UNSG acknowledged the close relationship ofNGOs with the
United Nations, "(especially) in the provision of humanitarian relief in conflict situations and in
post-conflict peacebuilding" The UNSG also stressed the necessity to devise procedures "(to)
ensure that (NGO) efforts are properly co-ordinated with those of the United Nations and its
programmes, funds, offices and agencies." (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:21).
Reflecting on the international funding of peacebuilding, the UNSG pointed out that peace-
building was critically dependent on member states' readiness to make the necessary resources
available, as peacebuilding "(can) be a long-term process and expensive - except in comparison
with the cost of peacemaking and peacekeeping if the conflict should recur." The UNSG also
acknowledged that "one lesson learned in recent years is that in putting together the peacebuild-
ing elements in a comprehensive settlement plan, the United Nations should consult the inter-
national financial institutions in good time to ensure that the cost of implementing the plan is
taken into account in the design of economic plans" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:23).
2.3. The Inadequacies of Traditional Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: The Needfor Post
Hostility Measures
According to Otunnu (1995:66) the peace-and-security agenda of the United Nations had devel-
oped gradually in phases, and from the first mission that was established in 1948 to supervise the
truce in Palestine (UNTSO), to before the launching of the first major multidimensional peace-
keeping operation in Namibia (UNTAG) in April1989, the UN organised fifteen peacekeeping
operations. Most of these operations were concerned with conflicts between states and the man-
dates of the missions consisted principally of monitoring or supervising truces, cease-fires,
troop withdrawals and buffer zones. Significantly, these were consent-based operations, marked
by adherence on the part of the peacekeepers to the principles of co-operation, impartiality, and
non-use of force except in self-defence.
Sir Brian Urquhart (1995:10) argued that peacekepping emerged in the very early years of the
Cold War as a new technique for containing conflicts and in response to a series of problems of
the Cold War world, which had not been foreseen by the founders of the United Nations. Fur-
thermore, it was a technique of using military forces in a cooperative and non-forceful way and
by a series of voluntary arrangements including voluntary acceptance by the countries whose
conflicts the UN was trying to contain, and voluntary provision of the forces that the United
Nations was using. It was, according to Urquhart "very specifically a technique which was to be
used in conflicts between states."
12
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Urquhart also pointed out that peacekeeping was to some extent the product of the paralysis
of the Security Council by the Cold War. "(It) was the opposite of the enforcement technique
which had been the great innovation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. But it was not
the peaceful settlement of disputes either, which is Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.
It lay, undescribed, somewhere between these two chapters." According to Urquhart the word
"peacekeeping" only came into use in the early 1960's as "(a) kind of useful all-purpose word
to cover this rather complicated form of activity".
Urquhart concluded that peacekeeping fulfilled two important objectives. It dealt with the power
vacuums, which had resulted from the process of de-colonization and provided some way of
containing the conflicts, which arose from those vacuums. Its other very important function was
to keep regional conflicts out of the orbit of the Cold War and the East-West struggle with its
potential for nuclear confrontation. These activities according to Urquhart were very much a
matter of maintaining international peace and security and "(thus) very well within the spirit of
United Nations Charter."
In this respect the Cold War period provided "(a) sort of framework and limits to what peace-
keeping operations could do. The limitations of peacekeeping and the essential nature and
methods of its operations were, however, fairly well understood by the members of the United
Nations, who, by and large, though sometimes with great reservations, supported these opera-
tions."
This generation of operations defined what many commentators termed "traditional peacekeep-
ing" and Otunnu (1995:66) asserted that the development of this mechanismin itself represented
a major innovation by the UN. Indeed, according to Otunnu, the very idea of peacekeeping is
not mentioned at all in the UN Charter, "although the practice was developed in the spirit of
Chapter VI of the Charter."
This situation underwent a significant change in the late 1980's and early 1990's. The end of
the Cold War, the success of an ambitious operation in Namibia, and a certain sense of triumph
emanating from the Gulf War injected a new lease of confidence in the UN, thereby creating
enlarged expectations about what the organisation could accomplish. Responding to this new
mood, the UN embarked on a more ambitious program of peace activities, with its operations
growing in number and complexity. I) In a space of only six years (1989-1995), the UN estab-
lished twenty new peacekeeping operations, seventeen within the context of conflicts within
states (Otunnu, 1995:66).
This evolution of the UN peace and security agenda (Otunnu, 1995:66) expanded UN peace-
keeping tasks to include implementation of complex peace agreements; overseeing transition to
democratic governance through supervision of previously opposing armed factions; rehabilita-
tion of collapsed state structures; provision of broader support to humanitarian missions, includ-
ing protection of "safe areas" and escort of relief convoys; and removal of anti-personnel mines
from contaminated country sides. 2)
1) Malan (1997:18) argued Ihal Cold War polllies prevenled the Security Council from fully developing ils peacekeeping potentlat. The UN Charter had envisaged unanimous
purpose prevailing In Ihe evenlof having lo keep and even enforce peace. Instead, the use of Ihe velo by permanent members In the Security Council blocked many efforts
to use the Security Council as an effective Instrument for peacekeeping. Due to the specific nature of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping activities were mainly focussed upon
dispatching troops and observer missions to discourage the Involvement of major powers In civil wars and wars aimed at achieving Independence from former colonial
empires.
2) The UNSG confirmed in a Supplemenllo An Agenda for Peace that UN peacemaking and peacekeeping acllvilies in Ihe posl-Cold War period had Increased both in terms
of the number and variety of operations conducted. UN active Involvement In preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, for example, had Increased from eleven cases In 1988,
to thirteen In 1992, lo thirty in 1995. Similarly, Ihe number of peacekeeping operalions had Increased from flve in 1988, lo eleven in 1992. This increase In peacemaking and
peacekeeping activities had generated similar increases In the number of military and civilians deployed, with the annual UN budget for peacekeeping rising from $230 million
In 1988 to $3.6 billion In 1995 (Boulros-Ghall, 1995:19).
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According to the UNSGqualitative changes in peacemaking and peacekeeping during the period
1988-1992 reflected a high incidence of intra-rather than inter-state conflict which involved
irregular forces instead of national armies, resulted in high civilian casualties accompanied by
humanitarian emergencies, and the collapse of state institutions. These new characteristics of
conflicts placed a much greater demand upon the United Nations and impelled it to respond
in a variety of ways that went beyond traditional peacekeeping. UN involvement now included
demobilisation of troops, promotion of national reconciliation, the organisation and monitor-
ing of elections, restoration of effective government, and long-term economic and social assist-
ance programmes. As a result, according to the UNSG, UN peace efforts had become "more
expensive, more complex and more dangerous" (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:19).
These developments according to Doyle (1995:2) had their roots in the striking changes in
the international system that emerged at the end of the Cold War. A new spirit of multilateral
co-operation from the USSR, beginning with President Gorbachev's reforms, met a new spirit
of tolerance from the United States. Together the two former adversaries broke the forty year
gridlock in the UN Security Council and post-Cold War co-operation meant that the Security
Council was now functioning as the global guardian of peace and security.
Within this context, Doyle argued that "at the same time, there also emerged an ideological
community of democratic values that gave specific content to the co-operative initiatives of
these years. The Vienna Conference on Human Rights (1993) and President Gorbachev's plea
before the General Assembly for "Global Human Values" signified that human rights were no
longer merely a Western, but rather a global principle of good governance." (Doyle, 1995:2)
During the post-Cold War period UN peacekeeping reflected three distinct levels or "genera-
tions" of UN Peace Operations, which, according to Doyle (1995:4), included traditional peace-
keeping or first generation peacekeeping.
Second generation operations, involved the implementation of complex, multidimen-
sional peace agreements. In addition to the traditional military functions, the peacekeep-
ers were often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which was a
long-term settlement of the underlying conflict. Taking a substantial step beyond first
generation operations, second generation multidimensional operations were based on
consent of the parties.
Third generation operations or peace enforcement extended from low-level military
operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of
cease-fires and when necessary, assistance in the rebuilding of failed states.
Doyle (1995:5) concluded that the result ofthese three "generations" operating together in the
post-Cold War world was an unprecedented expansion of the UN's role in the protection of
world order and in the promotion of basic human rights in countries tom by costly civil wars.
Self-determination and sovereignty were enhanced and a modicum of peace and rehabilitation
was introduced in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique.
The new readiness (Goulding, 1993:453) of the United States and the Soviet Union to work
together, revived opportunities for resolving regional conflicts and created a renewed demand
for UN peacekeeping. Goulding also argued that the UN operations, established during the Cold
War, fostered the gradual evolution of a body of principles, procedures and practices for peace-
keeping. Few of them were formally enacted by the legislative organs ofthe United Nations, but
they came to constitute a corpus of case law or customary practice "(which) was by and large
14
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
accepted by all concerned, though until the mid-1980s Moscow continued from time to time
to question peacekeeping's lack of legitimacy because it was not explicitly provided for in the
Charter."
Goulding (1993:456-459) identified six different types of peacekeeping of which type Five was
likely to involve enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding. This type according to Goulding
"(is) the deployment of a United Nations force in a country where the institutions of state have
largely collapsed, anarchy and lawlessness abound, the break-up of the country may be immi-
nent and some external agency is needed to put it together again." It required an integrated pro-
gramme including humanitarian relief, a cease-fire, demobilisation of troops, a political process
of national reconciliation, the rebuilding of political and administrative structures and economic
rehabilitation.
Malan (1997:22) asserted that peacekeeping operations were a necessary invention of the Cold
War, initiated during a time when the Charter provisions for dealing with inter-state conflict
(Chapter VII) were frozen by the threat of superpower confrontation and global annihilation.
The termination of the Cold War made it possible to implement the ideal of collective security
through concerted Chapter VII enforcement action. It also opened the way to negotiated settle-
ments to end proxy Cold War conflicts in developing countries, where the UN was invited to
guide former adversaries to political settlements based on compromise, rather than the more
limited goals of stabilising cease-fires, which were typical of classical peace operations. UN
peacekeeping thus embarked on a new mission: helping to end internal conflicts, where the
peace process started with a cease-fire determined by negotiated agreements, and UN peace
keepers deployed in the affected areas with the consent of the involved parties reflected in these
agreements.
Second generation multifunctional operations according to Malan (1997:23) were associated
with the ending of proxy Cold War conflicts through negotiated settlements, in which the UN or
other multinational organisations guided the adversaries to political settlements based on com-
promise, as in the case of Mozambique where the UN became involved in ending the internal
conflict through multidimensional processes which included:
• the separation of combatants;
• the disarmament of irregular forces;
• the demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified
army;
• the establishment of new policing systems; and
• the monitoring of elections for a new government.
These operations, Malan argued, had inter alia provided a basis for the reconstruction of
Mozambique, demonstrating the utility of a broader concept of peacekeeping - a concept which
combined military functions with a broad variety of largely civilian undertakings to engineer
change and fulfil the objectives of the operations.
Malan (1997:26) concluded that peacekeeping was established as a pragmatic tool, and "(was)
improvised from the very beginning." The traditional role of UN peace keepers had expanded
in scope and complexity as the constraints on intra-state conflict imposed by the East-West
confrontation had been eroded. This had created an urgent need to develop new approaches,
new skills, and new ways of dealing with practical problems and situations at the strategic,
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operational and tactical levels. The starting-point for such development had predominantly been
the concept of classical peacekeeping and its associated principles. According to Malan, the
validity of this approach was questionable "(and) perhaps the much-lauded, 'golden' principles
of peacekeeping are not principles at all, but characteristics which typify international attempts
to settle disputes during a specific historical era. To cling to these principles as a conceptual
foundation for dealing with the new world disorder is an exercise in fallacious logic. Granted,
there may seem to be no other option where the political will and resources for more effective
forms of international collective security are absent, but as long as pragmatism is predominant,
practice will continue to guide principle in a sea of conceptual confusion."
2.4. Security Council Resolution and ONUMOZ
In the course of the Mozambican peace negotiations the need to secure the services of the UN
as an impartial guarantor of the peace process emerged gradually." (UN and Mozambique,
1995:17).
On 28 May 1992 the UNSG offered the services of the UN in promoting an agreement between
the Government and Renamo, and on 1 June, President Chissano responded by outlining, in
a letter to the UNSG, the elements of the agreements signed thus far which envisaged a role
for the UN. Specifically, the two parties intended, once a peace agreement was concluded,
to formally invite the UN to participate in a commission that would supervise and monitor
compliance with the accord, and to provide assistance for the electoral process. In Pres. Chis-
sano's letter he specifically "welcomed the readiness of and the interest of the United Nations
to actively participate in the search for the so desired peace in my country bearing in mind the
evolution of the negotiation process and its next stages" (Pres.Chissano letter to UNSG, June
1992).
In June 1992, United Nations military observers joined the Rome negotiations in an expert
capacity, providing technical advice on cease-fire monitoring. By August, a United Nations
Senior Political Affairs Officer was also present. For the United Nations itself, consideration
of a peacekeeping operation in Mozambique required close study and consultation. A strong
link was needed between the peace process and the delivery of humanitarian aid; roads required
urgent repair and mine clearance; and the number of military observers would be influenced by
the quantity and location of sites at which the troops of the two sides would assemble, an issue
that had not yet been determined in Rome (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 18).
In July 1992, a number of United Nations and international agencies, including the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme
(WFP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), assisted in the preparation of
a Declaration on the Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance, which was agreed to by
the Government of Mozambique and Renamo and issued on 16 July. The declaration established
two important principles: there should be no discrimination in delivering humanitarian assist-
ance to affected Mozambicans, and there would be freedom of movement throughout the coun-
try for humanitarian personnel or goods travelling under United Nations or ICRC flags. Both
the Government and Renamo also undertook not to derive military advantage from humani-
tarian assistance operations. To follow up on the Declaration, a Committee for Humanitarian
Assistance was established in Maputo, chaired by the United Nations Special Co-ordinator
3) Initially. Renamo was more in favour of the presence of the United Nations than was the Frelimo government. which viewed the war as having had an international dimen-
sion but also had deeply felt concerns about the Implications that a United Nations presence would have in several areas relating to national sovereignty. The Government
was also concerned by the possibility that Renamo could Improve its political status as a result of such United Nations Involvement. However, consensus developed on the
need for Impartial management of the peace process.
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for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO) which included representatives of UN agen-
cies, the ICRC, neighbouring countries and major donor Governments (UN and Mozambique,
1995:18).
President Chis sana and Mr Dhlakama met in Rome on 7 August 1992 and signed a joint politi-
cal declaration guaranteeing agreement on outstanding issues by 1 October 1992. The Joint
Declaration committed the parties to "accepting the role of the international community, and
especially that of the UN, in monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the GPA, in
particular the cease-fire and the electoral process" (Joint Declaration Rome, August 1992).
On 19 August 1992, the UNSG in a "nonpaper" to Pres. Chis sana detailed the arrangements
for a UN operation to implement the GPA, which included the appointment of a UN Special
Representative and the creation of mechanisms to verify both military and civilian aspects of the
peace process. The UNSG also stated that "(it) would be desirable for a United Nations techni-
cal team to visit Mozambique in order to prepare recommendations on how the United Nations'
role should be implemented (the concept of operations) and to assess the resources required to
implement that concept." (UNSG letter to Pres. Chissano, August 1992).
President Chissano on 22 September 1992 requested United Nations financial support in the
areas of national reconstruction, reintegration of refugees and demobilised soldiers, formation
of the new national army and organisation of democratic elections (Pres. Chissano letter to
UNSG, September 1992).
It was apparent (UN and Mozambique, 1995:20) that before the GPA could be finalised and
signed, further negotiations were necessary on the issues of the security services, the police,
civilian administration and assembly areas. In last-minute talks, agreements were reached on
the security services and police matters (Protocol IV, sections IV and V), and, finally, on a
national commission on administrative matters to be formed by the two parties (Protocol V, sec-
tion III, point 9). Much of these discussions concentrated on the role of the UN. The timing
of the Organisation's arrival on the ground was critical, with both parties expressing a desire
to have a UN presence in Mozambique by 15 October, the date the cease-fire was to go into
effect. Once these outstanding issues - with the exception of the location of assembly areas-
were resolved, the General Peace Agreement was signed on 4 October by both President Chis-
sana and Mr Dhlakama in the presence of the Presidents of Botswana and Zimbabwe, senior
ministers from Kenya, Malawi and South Africa and representatives of the observers.
On the same day President Chissano requested the UNSG "(to) take appropriate action in order
to ensure the participation of the United Nations in monitoring and ensuring the implementa-
tion of the General Peace Agreement and in assisting the Government by providing technical
assistance for the general elections and in monitoring these elections." President Chis sana also
requested the UN to chair the following Commissions (Pres. Chissano letter to UNSG, October
1992).
(a) The Supervision and Control Commission for the implementation of the General
Peace Agreement, as provided for in Protocol I;
(b) The Cease-fire Commission provided for in Protocol VI, and;
(c) The Reintegration Commission, provided for in Protocol IV.
17
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In the report of the UNSG to the UNSC on the establishment of a UN operation in Mozambique
(UNSG report to UNSC, December 1992) the ONUMOZ mandate in terms of the GPA was
defined by the UNSG in the following terms:
(a) Political:
• To facilitate impartially the implementation of the agreement, in particular by chair-
ing the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and its subordinate commissions;
(b) Military:
• To monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their
demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons;
• To monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;
• To monitor and verify the disbanding of private and irregular armed groups;
• To authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and
• To provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of
the peace process, especially in the corridors;
(c) Electoral:
• To provide technical assistance and monitor the entire electoral process;
(d) Humanitarian:
• To co-ordinate and monitor all humanitarian assistance operations, in particular those
relating to refugees, internally displaced persons, demobilised military personnel and
the affected local population, and, in this context, to chair the Humanitarian Assist-
ance Committee.
Within this framework the UNSG described "three fundamental considerations" guiding the UN
operation in Mozambique in the following terms (UNSG report to UNSC, December 1992).
"The first relates to the trust placed in the United Nations by both parties, as well as by the
people of Mozambique. The agreement envisages that the United Nations will provide an impar-
tial and supportive structure to help both parties to break the vicious cycle of violence that has
caused so much suffering to Mozambique over the years.
The second consideration derives from the breadth of the responsibilities entrusted to the United
Nations under the agreement. These will require the involvement of the entire international
community, especially United Nations programmes and specialised agencies, and also bilateral
entities, intergovernmental agencies and non-governmental organisations, all of which can con-
tribute to the rebuilding and development of a peaceful Mozambique.
The third consideration relates to the geography of Mozambique and the country's current con-
dition after 14 years of civil war. It covers an area of 800000 square kilometres. It is elongated
in shape, extending about 1 800 km from north to south, 600 km from east to west in the north
and 300 km in the south. lts communications have been devastated by the war. lt has been
18
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afflicted by the worst drought in decades and food is in short supply. There is an abundance of
arms and many armed bandits operate outside the control of the armed forces of either side. Sev-
eral million Mozambicans are internally displaced or are refugees in neighbouring countries."
With reference to the operational concept of ONUMOZ the UNSG reiterated the strong inter-
relationship between the four components of its mandate. "Without sufficient humanitarian
aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the
demobilisation process might stall. Without adequate military protection, the humanitarian aid
would not reach its destination. Without sufficient progress in the political area, the confidence
required for the disarmament and rehabilitation process would not exist. The electoral process,
in tum, requires prompt demobilisation and formation of the new armed forces, without which
the conditions would not exist for successful elections." The UNSG also pointed out that these
"strong linkages" required a fully integrated approach and strong co-ordination by the UN
interim Special Representative (UNSG report to UNSC, December 1992).
In recommending the elements and dimensions of the Mozambican operation to the UN Secu-
rity Council, the UNSG stated that "(in) the light of recent experiences elsewhere, the recom-
mendations in the present report may be thought to invite the international conununity to take
a risk. I believe that the risk is worth taking; but I cannot disguise that it exists" (UNSG report
to UNSC, December 1992).
On 16 December 1992, the Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and agreed to its mandate for the political, military,
electoral and humanitarian objectives outlined in the UNSG report by a unanimous vote on
Resolution 797 (1992) (UN and Mozambique, 1995:26).
2.4.1. Humanitarian Component
The war in Mozambique, which was already one of the world's poorest nations, had
tragic consequences for its civilian population. Renamo attacks on villages and towns
often resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths, while others were forcibly evicted
from their homes. Renamo's policy of destroying the economic and social infrastructure
- including roads, factories, schools, hospitals and clinics - and disrupting agricultural
production resulted in widespread migration, malnutrition, famine and death. According
to the Africa Recovery Briefing Paper (UNDPI: 1993) out of a total population of some
16 million people, an estimated 4,5 million were driven from their homes by the decade
and half of fighting and by drought.
The 1992 peace accord set out two objectives for international humanitarian assistance
to Mozambique: to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of
people displaced by war and hunger, whether they had taken refuge in neighbouring
countries or in provincial and district centres within Mozambique. ONUMOZ's integral
component for humanitarian operations - the United Nations Office for Humanitarian
Assistance Co-ordination (UNOHAC) - was established in Maputo, with sub-offices at
the regional and provincial levels. It replaced the office ofthe United Nations Special Co-
ordinator for Emergency Relief Operations (UNSCERO), which had been responsible
for humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique. Headed by the Humanitarian
Affairs Co-ordinator, and under the overall authority of the UN Special Representative,
it functioned as an integrated component of ONUMOZ. Operational agencies and the
non-governmental aid community were asked to provide representatives to work within
UNOHAC. (ONUMOZ, 1996:4).
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UNOHAC also made available food and other relief for distribution by a technical unit
of ONUMOZ to the soldiers in the assembly areas. In order to achieve the successful
reintegration of demobilised soldiers, UNOHAC proposed a three-pronged strategy cen-
tered on identification of training and employment opportunities, vocational kits and a
credit scheme, and a counselling and referral service. (ONUMOZ, 1996:4)
As drought took hold in large areas of Mozambique, the number of internally displaced
persons needing emergency assistance continued to grow. The threat of famine and mass
starvation was particularly severe for the rapidly growing numbers of displaced persons
who sought refuge either along the protected Beira and Limpopo corridors or in neigh-
bouring countries - which were themselves feeling the effects of a drought that was
afflicting the entire sub-region. The cost of Mozambique's 1992/93 emergencyassist-
ance programme, targeted to 3.1 million people, amounted to more than $400 million?
(UN and Mozambique, 1995:13).
Security considerations severely constrained the delivery and distribution of relief sup-
plies. By late 1992, supply convoys to 74 of Mozambique's 128 districts needed armed
escorts to ensure delivery. Numerous trucks were destroyed and many drivers were
killed. Such conditions hindered any increase in relief operations." (UN and Mozam-
bique,1995:13).
The signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992 and the opening up of dis-
tricts that Renamo had controlled or held under siege prompted the spontaneous return
of large numbers of displaced persons and refugees.
Under the terms of the GPA, a Donors Conference for Mozambique was held in Rome
on 15 and 16December 1992 to address the country's humanitarian requirements and the
needs of refugees and the displaced, those in severe distress and demobilised soldiers.
Pledges in the amount of $450 million were made during and after the Conference. A
humanitarian assistance programme for 1993/94, representing a shift in emphasis from
emergency relief to reintegration and rehabilitation, was submitted at a follow-up Donors
Meeting in Maputo on 8 and 9 June 1993 under the joint chairmanship of the United
Nations and the Government of Italy. Additional pledges in the amount of $70 million
were made. In June 1993, as political tensions mounted and access to Renamo-controlled
areas became increasingly difficult, the Special Representative and representatives ofthe
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reached an agreement with Renamo
that humanitarian organisations be allowed unimpeded access to Mozambicans in need
of assistance" (UN and Mozambique, 1995:48).
Between October 1992 and December 1994, approximately 4,3 million Mozambicans
resettled voluntarily in different parts of the country, the great majority of them in their
original home areas. Of the total number, 1,6 million were refugees who returned from
camps or exile in neighbouring countries. About 200 000 were demobilised soldiers and
their dependants, who were transported to their places of choice as part of the peace
process. The repatriation of Mozambican refugees was one of UNHCR's largest Afri-
can operations and the successful accommodation of the returnees into their home areas
one of the most significant achievements during ONUMOZ. (UN and Mozambique,
1995:47)
4) At a meeting held in November 1989, the World Bank's Consultative Group for Mozambique agreed to expand the scope of the economic rehabilitation programme in order
to alleviate poverty and war-related suffering. By 1990, virtually all the major United Nations agencies were active in Mozambique, In addition to other multilateral agencies,
bilateral donors and official agencies from 35 countries and numerous external non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from 23 countries.
5) In many parts of the country where Renamo raids were most frequent, or where landmines had made road travel dangerous, air transport remained the only viable means
of providing the local population with its basic needs.
6) In addition to UNHCR activities, the WFP assisted with the delivery of food aid to some 1,2 million displaced and 1,1 million returnees and feeding schemes for the estimated
100,000 demobilised soldiers. The FAO assessed Mozambique's food production and future requirements while UNICEF, WHO and UNESCO targeted specific humanitarian
aspects.
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2.4.2. Peacekeeping Role
ONUMOZ was to monitor and verify the cease-fire, the separation and concentration of
forces of the two parties, their demobilisation and the collection, storage and destruction
of weapons; monitor and verify the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, and provide
security in the four transport corridors; monitor and verify the disbanding of private and
irregular armed groups; authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructures; and
provide security for United Nations and other international activities in support of the
peace process. (ONUMOZ, 1996:3)
ONUMOZ's verification of the arrangements for the cease-fire and other military aspects
of the peace process in Mozambique was to be carried out mainly by teams of UN mili-
tary observers at the 49 assembly areas in three military regions and elsewhere in the
field. Teams were also to be deployed at airports, ports and other critical areas, including
RENAMO headquarters. (ONUMOZ, 1996:3)
The military aspects of the United Nations operation in Mozambique was to be closely
linked with the humanitarian effort. The approximately 100,000 soldiers who were to
come to the assembly areas were to be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into civil
society. They would need food and other support as soon as the assembly areas were
established. An ONUMOZ technical unit, staffed by civilian personnel, was to assist in
implementing the demobilisation programme and to collaborate closely with UNOHAC
on the programme's humanitarian aspects. (ONUMOZ, 1996:3)
The General Peace Agreement provided for the withdrawal of foreign troops to be initi-
ated following the entry into force of the cease-fire. Simultaneously, the Supervisory and
Monitoring Commission, through the Cease-fire Commission, was to assume immedi-
ate responsibility for verifying and ensuring security of strategic and trading routes, of
which the most important were the four transport corridors. ONUMOZ was to assume
transitional responsibility for the security of the corridors in order to protect humanitar-
ian convoys using them, pending the formation of the new unified armed forces. Bear-
ing this in mind, ONUMOZ infantry battalions were to be deployed in the corridors.
(ONUMOZ, 1996:3)
2.4.3. Peacebuilding
2.4.3.1. Monitoring of Electoral Process
Under the terms of the GPA, legislative and presidential elections were to be
held simultaneously one year after the date of signature of the Agreement. This
period might be extended if warranted by the prevailing circumstances.
ONUMOZ's Electoral Division was to monitor and verify all aspects and stages
of the electoral process, which would be organised by the National Elections
Commission (NEC). The Division was to provide overall direction and main-
tain contacts with the Government of Mozambique, RENAMO, the National
Elections Commission and the main political parties.
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In addition, the Secretary General's Special Representative was to co-ordinate
technical assistance to the whole electoral process in Mozambique, which
was to be provided through UNDP, other existing mechanisms of the United
Nations system and bilateral channels. (ONUMOZ, 1996:9)
2.4.3.2. Humanitarian Aspects
Providing humanitarian assistance in the environment created by the General
Peace Agreement promoted communication needed to solidify the peace.
Humanitarian assistance committees convened by UNOHAC's Field Officers in
the provinces expanded contacts among all concerned parties. Support for the
repatriation process, the demobilisation of armed forces, emergency relief and
the restoration of essential services, and mine clearance were the main com-
ponents of the consolidated humanitarian assistance programme" (ONUMOZ,
1996:9)
During the war, nearly half of Mozambique's rural health facilities were looted,
destroyed or forced to close. After the signing of the GPA, an immediate prior-
ity was to reactivate essential health services in those rural areas to which the
population was beginning to return. By July 1994, at least 37 different agencies
and NGOs were operating in the health sector in former Renarno areas across
51 districts. Health posts in border areas were also rehabilitated to accommo-
date the reintegration of returnees. UNICEF actively supported the Govern-
ment's 1994 health budget, which covered an expansion of the health network
to include former Renarno areas. Funds were allocated to help integrate the
available health services in Renarno areas into the national health system. (UN
and Mozambique, 1995:51)
With less than half of Mozambique's children of primary school age receiv-
ing any education by the time of the ONUMOZ mission, the reopening
of schools became a major component of national reconstruction. About
1,2 million pupils and 20 000 teachers had been forced out of the schools
between 1983 and 1991. In Tete, which had suffered the most in this regard,
98% of primary schools had been closed or destroyed. After the GPA was
signed, hundreds of thousands of children returned to their home districts,
increasing demands on the available infrastructure. In the six provinces for
which UNO HAC had reliable data, more than 40 organisations were renovat-
ing or reconstructing a total of 790 classrooms by February 1995 (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:52).
2.4.3.3. Civilian Police Component
The ONUMOZ civilian police component (CIVPOL) was mandated
(ONUMOZ, 1996: 10) to monitor all police activities in the country and verify
that their actions were consistent with the GPA; monitor respect of citizens'
rights and civil liberties; provide technical support to the National Police Com-
mission; verify that the activities of private protection and security agencies
did not violate the GPA; verify the strength and location of the government
7) The International community directly contributed more than 78% of the approximately USO 650 million required to meet Mozambique needs for humanitarian assistance
during the period of the ONUMOZ mandate (UN and Mozambique 1995:54)
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CIVPOL would be a separate component of ONUMOZ under the command
of a Chief Police Observer, who would report directly to the Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary General. It would also work closely with the existing
electoral, military, humanitarian and administrative components ofONUMOZ.
Appropriate liaison arrangements would be established with the national police
at all levels, and CIVPOL would establish itself at all strategic locations
throughout the country. It would have unrestricted access to the general public,
conduct all its own investigations and, when necessary, recommend corrective
action. (ONUMOZ, 1996:10)
police forces and their materiel; and monitor and verify the process of reor-
ganisation and retraining of the quick reaction police, including its activities,
weapons and equipment. In addition, CIVPOL, together with other ONUMOZ
components, would monitor the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and
verify that political rights of individuals, groups and political organisations
were respected."
2.4.3.4. Reintegration
A major UNOHAC function, reinforced by its chairmanship of the Commis-
sion for Reintegration (CORE), was planning, organising and monitoring the
economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers. Although many
projects for demobilised soldiers were formalised under bilateral programmes
and were outside CORE's control, CORE ensured that both the Government
and Renarno were fully consulted about reintegration issues. The Reintegration
Support Scheme (RSS) for demobilised soldiers was implemented by UNDP.
2.4.3.5. UN Trust Fund
At the Donors Conference for Mozambique held in Rome in December 1992,
participating countries had committed themselves to providing additional funds
to support the democratic process in Mozambique. On 10 May 1993, the
United Nations established a Trust Fund for the implementation of the GPA,
with an initial contribution of almost $6 million from Italy. Protocol III (section
V, point 7) of the General Peace Agreement had enunciated the need to ensure
that Renarno had the facilities to carry out its political activities in all areas of
the country and envisioned that the Government would seek support from the
international community, particularly Italy, for this purpose. The Trust Fund
was the response to this requirement and proved critical to the peace process,
as it helped to finance the transformation of Renamo from a rebel force into a
political party that would be able to campaign effectively in the electoral proc-
ess (UN and Mozambique, 1995:31).
2.4.3.6. Territorial Administration
The achievement of a unified territorial administration inMozambique - a dif-
ficult issue throughout the peace process - remained to be resolved. It had been
agreed by President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama, in September 1993, that all
8) With assistance from the centre for Human Rights, CIVPOL monitors underwent an extensive human rights training programme, the first of its kind provided to a UN pollee
force (UN and Mozambique, 1995:46)
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former Renarno-controlled areas would be integrated into the State administra-
tion and that each provincial administration would have Renamo advisers. This
agreement did not lead to a resolution of problems at the district level, where
Renamo was often reluctant to cede control.
The National Commission on Administration (CNA) made little progress at
its meetings, and its work stalled when Renamo boycotted the meetings after
July 1994. The CNA was to determine which localities were under Renamo
control and to approve Renamo-nominated administrators for them. Before the
Renamo boycott, the CNA had agreed on Renamo control of five districts and
42 administrative posts, and administrators had been appointed for all of them.
The status of numerous other districts and administrative posts remained unde-
termined. (UN and Mozambique, 1995:31)
2.4.3.7. Peacebuilding and Landmines
Refer to Chapter 4. (Peacebui1ding and Landmines).
2.5. Evaluation
The end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the qualitative and quantitative nature of
the UN's peace and security agenda," representing a shift from traditional peacekeeping to a
broader, more ambitious and intrusive notion of peacekeeping. This evolution was marked by
an expanded UN engagement in a broad range of intra-state conflicts and characterised by UN
undertakings towards aspects of national political and socio-economic reconstruction and the
evolution of humanitarian action. To this end UNSG Boutros Boutros - Ghali provided the con-
ceptual foundations of post-conflict peacebuilding in anAgenda for Peace which sought to build
a political, social and economic infrastructure in societies destroyed by civil war.
The concept of peacebuilding has received widespread recognition in international conflict reso-
lution, especially as an essential and integral mechanism of the UN and international commu-
nity to bring about, maintain and consolidate peace and assist in rebuilding war-tom societies,
collapsed states and disintegrated economies.
On the political level the UNSG Kofi Anan in his report to the UNSC on the Causes of Conflict
and the Promotion of a Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa confirmed the
importance of the concept of peacebuilding in respect of the actions undertaken at the end of
a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation. The UNSG
acknowledged that the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of conflict required more than
purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peacebuilding effort was needed
to address the various factors that had caused or were threatening a conflict, including the crea-
tion or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights,
providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programmes, and creating conditions for resumed
development. According to the UNSG peacebuilding did not replace ongoing humanitarian and
development activities in countries emerging from crisis and "aims rather to build on, add to, or
reorient such activities in ways designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict and con-
tribute to creating the conditions most conducive to reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery."
(Anan, 1998:13)
9) The peace-and-securlty agenda of the UN Is a broad term which refers to the various activities being developed by the UN In response to conflict situations. These activities
include: preventive measures aimed at averting or de-escalating conflict; political, economic and social actions designed to provide the basis for long-term peace; consent-
based peacekeeping operations; provision of humanitarian assistance to population. In distress; promotion of political settlement In the context of on-going conflicts; the
use of collective diplomatic, political and economic sanctions to induce change of polley; and coercive coliective military action in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.
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The UNSG also pointed out (Anan, 1998:14) that human security was the crucial underlying
need in post-conflict peacebuilding and societies that emerged from conflict had special needs.
In order to avoid a return to conflict while laying a solid foundation for development, empha-
sis must be placed on critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating
respect for human rights, fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity, ensur-
ing the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons,
reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society, curtailing the availability of
small arms, and mobilising the domestic and international resources for reconstruction and eco-
nornic recovery.
In addition, Anan (1998: 14) stressed that prior to the end of a conflict, there must be a clear
assessment of key post-conflict peacebuilding needs and of ways to meet them. Peacebuilding
elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and integrated into the mandates of the
peacekeeping operation. When a peacekeeping operation comes to an end, the concluding
mandate should include specific recommendations for the transitional period following the
post-conflict phase.
In this context, the UNSG argued (Anan, 1998:15) that a strategic framework for post-conflict
peacebuilding provided the basis for a coherent effort by the entire United Nations system in
countries in crisis. The strategic framework would especially embrace political, human rights,
humanitarian and development activities aimed at promoting a durable peace and sustainable
development. Such an effort would encompass all partners in the United Nations system, includ-
ing the Bretton Woods institutions, as well as national authorities, donor organisations and
non-governmental organisations.
In terms ofONUMOZ and the application of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding UNSG
Boutros Boutros Ghali asserted that in Mozambique, the United Nations role went beyond
peacekeeping to the broader concern of assisting in the political evolution of a society previ-
ously riven by conflict. Reducing the level of distrust between former foes was therefore one
vital function for ONUMOZ. Helping to establish the institutional framework for the demo-
cratic process was another - not only in terms of the Electoral Law but also in achieving an
understanding on the role of the opposition in what had previously been a one-party system. The
mobilisation of resources that enabled RENAMO and new political groupings to organise them-
selves as parties and contest the elections in an effective manner was as crucial a factor as any
inmaintaining the peace process. Such peacebuilding according to the UNSG was also essen-
tial for the successful implementation of the demobilisation process (UN and Mozambique,
1995:68).
In the context of longer term peacebuilding and with specific reference to the termination of
the ONUMOZ mandate the UNSG stated that Mozambicans would need more time, with sup-
port from the international community, to entrench the democratic system they had adopted.
The same was also true of other important aspects of "nation-building" in Mozambique, includ-
ing the promotion of economic and social reconstruction, the continued integration of areas
formerly under Renamo control into the State administration, the training and provision of
equipment for the newly unified armed forces and the national police, the safe-keeping ofweap-
ons collected by ONUMOZ and the systematic removal of landmines and arms caches remain-
ing from the war (UN and Mozambique, 1995:69).
Taking into consideration the UNSG's summation and with reference to the link between peace-
building and development Whaley and Piazza - Georgi (1997:69) argued "(that) peacebuilding,
although it is not synonymous with development, is in practice very closely identifiable with
development. The reason for this is that the critical elements of peacebuilding (building up local
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capacities, strengthening civil society, restoring essential infrastructure and commercial rela-
tions) are the same elements on which a well-conceived development plan will concentrate in
such a post-conflict situation. The only essential addition is that all programmes should issue
from the needs and wishes of all parties to the conflict, and be designed in a way that involves
all parties (working together towards a common concrete goal is the universally recognised
formula for pacifying two opponents) and benefits all affected groups. In practice, therefore, the
peacebuilding component of a peace support operation should be implemented by the affected
population itself, with the support chiefly of the development support structures present in the
country."
Alden (1996:55) argued that for stability and growth to prevail in Mozambique peacebuilding,
"(as) the transition point between peacekeeping and development must move from its prelimi-
nary stages concerned with demilitarisation and elections to the long term dimensions of eco-
nomic rehabilitation, the cultivation of a vibrant civil society and other nation-building activities.
The willingness of the international community to support this transition, through selective
financial assistance, foreign investment, institutional support and capacity building both inside
the government and in the wider society, will have a determining influence on the success of
the new dispensation." Alden however warned against the corrosive impact on Mozambican
sovereignty caused by its dependency on international assistance and, increasingly, "(the) state's
indiscriminate pandering to the interests of foreign capital at the expense of its citizens."
The former SRSG to Mozambique (Ajello, 1996:16)with reference to the peacebuilding dimen-
sion of ONUMOZ acknowledged "(that) while demobilising soldiers, a gap between peace-
keeping, peace building and development emerged, as those cultures were not based on the same
assumptions and objectives and peacebuilding and development seemed to overlap." According
to Ajello development is supposed to identify "(the) proper technologies for the development of
a country and its people, and to teach them how to utilise these technologies." Peacebuilding in
Mozambique according to Ajello therefore "backfired as it created a hierarchy of who received
what as well as competition for humanitarian aid and influence."
From an academic perspective, Haugerudbraaten (1998: 17) argued "(that) despite, (or perhaps
because) of the positive reception that the notion received, the precise definition of the term
'peacebuilding' has remained unclear." As a result, there are several significant differences in its
interpretation.
Haugerudbraaten (1998: 17) assessed that an important dimension of "confusion" was already
present in An Agenda for Peace. "The Secretary General made it clear that peacebuilding con-
sisted of sustained, co-operative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and
humanitarian problems. Yet, the measures listed, included disarming, restoring order, destroying
weapons, repatriating refugees, training forces, monitoring elections, advancing the protection
of human rights, reforming institutions and promoting political participation. These measures,
for the most part associated with short to medium term international interventions, do not carry
the notion of being sustained efforts that address underlying causes to put an "achieved peace
on a durable foundation". Thus, at the very outset, peacebuilding emerged as a less than clear
concept and has remained so ever since."
Haugerudbraaten pointed out however, that diverging interpretations and use of one single term
need not present problems, provided that scholars and policy-makers recognise their existence
and take care in explaining what they are talking about. Yet, more often than not, the defini-
tions in the literature are either weakly elaborated or entirely absent. This practice can only
bring more confusion to the debates. Since these discussions form the framework and premises
for political decisions, the conceptual confusion is likely to spill over into the design and imple-
mentation of peacebuilding efforts. For the concept of peacebuilding to realise the potential that
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• The aim of peacebuilding: Is peacebuilding about removing the root causes of a conflict
or about finding ways to resolve old and new disputes in a peaceful fashion?
is widely accorded to it, it is of vital importance that the term was employed with care and
accuracy. This meant being clear about the content which is assigned to the term. Since there
were several dimensions on which the usage of the term differed, "(it) is important to specify
the particular approach to these dimensions which is adopted." (Haugerudbraaten 1998:17)
It should be acknowledged (Haugerudbraaten, 1998:18) that a comprehensive theory of peace-
building "is for now a far-flung effort, a fact which will preclude efforts to establish an authorita-
tive definition of peacebuilding for some time to come."
Haugerudbraaten (1998: 18) pointed out that the twin tendency implied by An Agenda for Peace
reflected six dimensions of the variable usage of the term peacebuilding. These dimensions are:
• The means of peace building: Do peacebuilding efforts primarily entail security, human-
itarian, economic or political intervention or all of these at the same time?
• The temporal (time) aspects of peacebuilding: Are the measures employed in peace-
building short to medium term or long-term ones? Should international involvement in
peacebuilding be a short-to-medium term or long-term effort?
• The main actors of peacebuilding: Who are the main actors in peacebuilding - indig-
enous or external actors?
• The process/action dimension of peacebuilding: Does the word peacebuilding refer
to a set of concrete actions taken or is it a generic concept that refers to an overarching,
aggregate process?
• The organisation of peacebuilding: Should peacebuilding be viewed as a top-down
or bottom-up process, as a planned and co-ordinated process, or as one that, to a large
extent, is initiated locally and pursued by a multitude of actors in their field of concern
and comparative advantage?
In terms of the means of peacebuilding Haugerudbraaten (1998:19) argued "(that) related to the
debate on the aims of peacebuilding, is the debate on what measures are the most important in
this undertaking. As long as funding for peacebuilding ventures remained scarce, programme
planners will need to consider carefully which measures to undertake. Since the chosen poli-
cies tend to feed back to analytical concepts, policy-makers effectively promote one particular
notion of peacebuilding. However, different actors pursue different practices, as is reflected in
the literature. They do not agree on the course to follow, causing further confusion about the
concept."
Haugerudbraaten (1998:20) also warned that both excessively wide and excessively narrow,
definitions of the concept of peacebuilding posed problems of their own. "A narrow definition
may exclude a number of aspects relevant to the achievement of lasting peace. A broad defini-
tion, by trying to encompass 'everything' that seems to have a connection to peaceful human
relations, runs the risk of rendering the concept superfluous, imprecise and useless for academic
purposes or as a guide to political decisions.v'" According to Haugerudbraaten, for the concept
of peacebuilding to have a distinct analytical meaning (and to inspire new thinking), "(it) needs
10) The Canadian Peacebullding co-oromatlnq Committee (CPCC) define peacebulldlng "(as) the effort to promote human security in societies mar1<ed by conflict. The
overarching goal of peacebuildlng is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security." The
definition covers peacebuilding in pre;mid-and post-conflict situations and encompasses a wide range of efforts to Increase a societies capacity to manage conflict without
resorting to violence including conflict resolution, physical, personal, and environmental security, institutional and civil capacity building. humanitarian relief and emergency
assistance, early warning, economic reconstruction, human rights, governance and democratic development, training, social reconstruction and polley development
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In terms of the temporal aspects of peace building Haugerudbraaten (1998:20) pointed out that
a major point of confusion in the literature is when activities referred to as peacebuilding com-
mence and when they end. In this regard Haugerudbraaten observed as follows:
to be separated from other concepts such as development and nation-building. These latter con-
cepts already have a long history and have proven quite elusive. Therefore, the term 'peace-
building' should not become infected with the same problems. Care must be taken not to let the
meaning of the concept' slide' towards these older terms."
"It is generally agreed that peacebuilding can take place during all the phases through which a
particular conflict may pass. One notable exception is mentioned in An Agenda for Peace, which
states that preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peace-
making and peacekeeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If
successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which can prevent
the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples. Thus, according to An Agenda for Peace,
peacebuilding sequentially follows peacekeeping."
In this context Haugerudbraaten (1998:20) asserted that the UNSG modified his position in
the 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, which suggested that peacebuilding can also
be preventive. It is thus not necessarily related to peacekeeping operations. Hence, peacebuild-
ing as a concept, from being at first a strictly post-conflict undertaking, has evolved to acquire
a broader meaning. There is also disagreement over the duration of peacebuilding activities.
The approach until now according to Haugerudbraaten had been to schedule the end of peace-
building efforts at the time of general, national elections, as was the case in Mozambique. This
has also resulted in linkages between peacebuilding and nationbuilding as well as distinctions
between short-term and long-term peacebuilding.
Haugerudbraaten (1998:21) identified two dimensions of peacebuilding. "Firstly, texts dealing
with peacebuilding tend to promote a concept that is heavily dominated by external actors. In so
far as peacebuilding conceived of in this way ignored the actions of locally based citizens and
organisations, it can be characterised as donor-biased. Donor-bias can be manifested in visions
of a grand strategy for external intervention, or in more humble but self-confident schemes for
going into communities to teach them non-violent conflict resolution.
Secondly, peacebuilding can be conceptualised either as the concrete actions taken to support
and promote peace, or as an aggregate process. This process involves a modification of social
structures (political, economic, social, cultural, psychological) through a number of broad devel-
opments, notably democratisation, economic development and demilitarisation. The adjective
'aggregate' is used to highlight the fact that peacebuilding in this sense is an outcome that
depends on the combined effect of a number of actions occurring at different levels."
With reference to the indigenous dimensions of peace building Haugerudbraaten (1998:22) con-
curred that despite the fact that most of the literature mentioned the need to obtain the consent
of the conflicting parties and the local population, "(it) does not change the impression that
peacebuilding is conceived of as being dominated by external actors." According to Haugerud-
braaten "scant attention is paid to the consideration of peace building as an indigenous undertak-
ing." The focus therefore remains on the role of the international community, whether played
by NGOs or UN agencies. In this respect, Haugerudbraaten (1998:23) concluded by identifying
two concepts of peacebuilding."
The first concept is the short-term involvement of the international community. It is character-
ised by centralism and political measures. Action is primarily undertaken by external agents,
even though attention is paid to the consent and support of the indigenous players.
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The second concept is the long-term efforts by mainly indigenous actors to promote political
and economic development, and a sustainable solution to the root causes of conflict. This entails
action in both political, economic, humanitarian and social spheres in a broad comprehensive
effort that can only be carried through by relying on a multitude of diverse actors. Inherent in
this concept's idea of diversity is the emphasis on the emergence of local NGOs and a civil
society."
Haugerudbraaten (1998:25) stressed that national ownership of the peacebuilding process was
vital for its eventual success. Moreover, "(it) is doubtful in many cases whether external,
short-term involvement can do anything but provide an enabling environment or an initial impe-
tus towards finding solutions for the root causes of conflict. The nations involved must engage in
long-term activities in a number of sectors. A great number of indigenous agents must undertake
their own tasks in a long-term process, of which the result, it is hoped, will amount to peace."
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3.1. Introduction
CHAPTER THREE
THE MOZAMBICAN PEACE PROCESS AND ONUMOZ
Establishing a basis for negotiations between the Mozambique Government and Renamo was
one of the most difficult peacemaking challenges of the late 1980s. Renamo, while politically
isolated at the international level, were still receiving clandestine help from elements of the
South African military. They were increasingly self-sufficient and continued to inflict heavy
damage on the Mozambican economy.
For the Frelimo Government, negotiation with a group it considered an externally inspired
"bandit" force bent on seizing power through terror and destruction was generally considered
an unacceptable course of action. But the devastation of the civil war, intensified by severe
drought and coupled with the military impasse, compelled a re-evaluation of this view. The
Government's economic and political reforms also enhanced the prospects of accommodation.
For its part, Renamo at a similar military stalemate, as well as organisationally weak and with
the degree of its external material support uncertain, was also being pushed towards negotia-
tions.
Tentative negotiations through Catholic Church intermediaries began in 1988 and rapidly
involved African Governments - initially Kenya and Zimbabwe, and subsequently Botswana,
Malawi and other members of the Front Line States (FLS), as well as South Africa. After indi-
rect contact was made between the Government and Renamo in late 1989, the process gained
momentum gradually and came to be supported by the efforts of Italy, Portugal, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as the
United Nations.
The first substantive agreement came on 1 December 1990, limiting the deployment of Zimba-
bwean troops supporting government forces to the Beira and Limpopo-transport corridors, in
exchange for Renamo's pledge not to attack those routes. This cease-fire soon broke down,
and several new rounds of talks ended in deadlock. Between October 1991 and March 1992,
the government and Renamo negotiators reached agreement on a number of specific political
reforms, some which had already been enacted in broad outline by the Mozambican legislature,
but were opened to further proposals by Renamo. These included the procedures for forming
and registering political parties, recognition of freedom of the press, assembly, political activity
and movement throughout the country; and the general outlines of the future electoral process.
Reflecting the severity of the 1992 drought, which threatened to plunge the country into one of
its worst famines ever, the two sides agreed on a series of guiding principles for humanitarian
assistance in July of that year. These principles pledged security for international relief person-
nel and operations and called for relief aid to be distributed freely to all Mozambicans, without
political discrimination and in all parts of the country. They also asked the UN to chair a com-
mittee, comprised of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the mediators and
observers at the Rome talks, to co-ordinate and supervise all humanitarian assistance operations
in the country.
On 4 October 1992, after 14 years of devastating civil war, Mr. JoaquimAlberto Chissano, Pres-
ident of the Republic of Mozambique, and Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, President of the Resistencia
Nacional Mozambicana (RENAMO), signed in Rome a General Peace Agreement establishing
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the principles and modalities for the achievement of peace in Mozambique. The Agreement
called for United Nations participation in monitoring the implementation of the Agreement, in
providing technical assistance for the general elections and in monitoring those elections.
Under the GPA, negotiated with the help of a number of international mediators and observers
including UN representatives, a cease-fire was to come into effect not later than 15 October
1992, referred to as E-Day. The Agreement itself and its seven protocols called for the cease-
fire to be followed rapidly by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in
certain assembly areas. Demobilisation was to begin immediately thereafter of those troops who
would not serve in the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). Demobilisation would have
to be completed six months after E-Day. Meanwhile, new political parties would be formed and
preparations would be made for elections, scheduled to take place not later than 15 October
1993. A 16 July 1992 Declaration by the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on guid-
ing principles for humanitarian assistance, a Joint Declaration signed in Rome on 7 August
1992, as well as a Joint Communiqué of 10 July 1990 and an Agreement of 1 December 1990,
formed integral parts of the General Peace Agreement.
3.2. The General Peace Agreement (Rome Peace Accords) October 1992.
The first direct meeting between delegations of the Mozambique Government and Renarno took
place from 8 to 10 July 1990 at the Convent of Sant'Egidio in Rome. The talks resulted in the
adoption of a joint communiqué on 10 July, with both sides agreeing to set aside what divided
them and to focus on what united them in their common search for an end to the war. Although
this was little more than a statement of intent to start negotiations, it was an achievement that
was immediately welcomed by the European Community, the United States and many other
Governments. By November 1990 the two sides had also agreed on four individual mediators
(UN and Mozambique, 1995:16).
Soon after the opening of formal talks, a partial cease-fire was agreed to on 1 December 1990.
Under its terms, Renamo would cease its attacks on the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors
in return for an agreement by the Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique to confine their opera-
tions to those routes. While this partial cease-fire agreement did not address the conflict that
still raged in wide areas of the country, it sought to protect the highly vulnerable corridors. The
agreement also established the precedent of a joint commission to monitor the cease-fire. (UN
and Mozambique, 1995:16)
The partial cease-fire was not a success, as Renarno, claiming that Zimbabwean troops were
operating elsewhere in Mozambique, continued to attack the transport corridors. During 1991,
progress towards a more substantial peace agreement was also slowed by Renamo's refusal to
recognise the legitimacy either of the Government or of its moves - first made in 1990 - to
institute multi-party democracy (UN and Mozambique, 1995:16).
An agenda for full peace negotiations was eventually agreed upon on 28 May 1991, specifying
six areas requiring agreement: the law on political parties, the electoral system, military issues,
guarantees, a cease-fire and a donors conference. However, the issue of legitimacy continued to
prevent any progress on these items until agreement was reached at the eighth round of talks, in
Rome on 18 October, on Protocol I, what would become the "basic principles" of the General
Peace Agreement (UN and Mozambique, 1995:16).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The first protocol settled two important issues that were to guide the negotiations over the next
12 months'!'. The first of these was the question of the Mozambican Government's legitimacy.
Renamo agreed to respect the authority and institutions of the Government, to renounce the use
of force and "to conduct its political struggle in conformity with the laws in force" after the
enactment of a cease-fire (Protocol I, point 2). In return, the Government promised to delay
legislation on any issue under discussion until after democratic multi-party elections (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:17).
Building on these "basic principles", the mediators pursued the formulation of a full peace
agreement over the next 12 months, with the increasingly active participation of the interna-
tional community and with direct assistance from the Governments of Italy and the United
States. Protocol II, on the "Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of politi-
cal parties", was signed in November 1991, and Protocol III, on "Principles of the Electoral
Act", covering such issues as freedom of the press, freedom of association and expression and
freedom of movement, as well as the principles of the country's electoral system, was signed
in March 1992. Chapter VI of the Protocol called for international assistance in the electoral
process, specifically from the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:17).
The parties then attended to the most difficult issues, including the formation of a new Mozam-
bican army and other military matters, and guarantees covering the peace process and a
cease-fire. The final four protocols (Nos. IV,V,VI and VII) were concluded only during the final
rounds of negotiation in the second half of 1992 and were signed together on 4 October 1992
(UN and Mozambique, 1995:17).
Upon the signing of the Rome peace accords on 4 October 1992, the United Nations moved
to implement one of the most extensive peacekeeping operations in its history. The Organisa-
tion was encouraged by the positive indications that Mozambicans were ready for peace after a
decade and a half of war. Despite the problems being encountered at this time in the Angolan
peacekeeping operation - important lessons from which were incorporated into ONUMOZ -
hopes for a peaceful settlement were also strongly buoyed by political reforms taking place
across the southern African sub-region, particularly developments occurring inside South Africa
(UN and Mozambique, 1995:22).
The General Peace Agreement required the United Nations to perform a comprehensive range
of tasks. The first and most urgent priority was that the Organisation undertake verification of
the cease-fire from the first day the GPAwas to come into force (Protocol VI, section I, points 5
and 6, and Protocol VI, section II). In this regard, the United Nations was required to supervise
the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambican territory, a measure that was intended to be
achieved within one month of the start of the cease-fire (Protocol VI, section I, point 10 (c)).
Of equal importance was the invitation to the United Nations to undertake the overall supervi-
sion of the peace process. This was made specific in the declared commitment of the Govern-
ment of Mozambique to "submit a formal request to the United Nations for its participation in
monitoring and guaranteeing the implementation of the General Peace Agreement" (Protocol
V, section III, point 1). United Nations supervision was clarified by the explicit commitment
that the chairman of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), the body charged
with overall responsibility for monitoring and supervising the implementation of the Agree-
11) The other important issue to be setlled was the principle of establishing a commission to supervise and monitor the peace process. Already at this stage, the neqotla-
tors felt that the United Nations would playa critical role, although Its precise nature had yet to be fully clarified. The Protocol simply declared: "The commission shall be
composed of representatives of the Government, Renamo, the United Nations and other organisations or Governments to be agreed upon between the parties" (Protocol I,
point 5) (UN and Mozambique, 1995:17).
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ment, should be appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations (Protocol V, section
II, points 1 and 2). This superseded the preliminary agreement, reached in 1991, that the United
Nations should be merely a member of the CSC (Protocol I, point 5).
The General Peace Agreement also allocated to the United Nations the chairmanships of the
Cease-fire Commission (CCF) and the Reintegration Commission (CORE), and further asked
the UN to assist in the implementation, verification and monitoring of the entire demobilisa-
tion process (Protocol IV, section VI (i), points 2 and 3). These points were again amplified in
Protocol VI, which provided details of the cease-fire and its timetable (Protocol VI, section I,
points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and section II)12l.
In addition to the supervisory and military responsibilities, the GPA assigned a number of other
tasks to the United Nations. The parties agreed to seek the involvement of the competent United
Nations agencies in drawing up and implementing the plan to return Mozambican refugees and
displaced persons (Protocol III, section IV (b)). They agreed to invite the United Nations to
observe the electoral process and to provide technical and material assistance for the holding
of elections (Protocol III, section VI). They also empowered the Supervisory and Monitoring
Commission to settle any disputes relating to the registration of political parties (Protocol II,
point 5 (d))J3l.
The points contained in Protocol IV, which dealt with a range of military questions, were of
special significance to the overall process. Among the protocol's requirements was the forma-
tion of three additional commissions: a Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican
Defence Force (CCFADM - Protocol IV, section I (iii)); a National Information Commission
(COMINFO - Protocol IV, section IV, point 7), which was to monitor and investigate the func-
tioning of the security police; and a National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL - Protocol
IV, section V, point 7).
Other commissions to be established under the terms ofthe General Peace Agreement included
a National Elections Commission (CNE - Protocol III, section V, point 3) and a commission
that was proposed for the facilitation of "collaboration and good understanding" between the
Government and the administration in areas of Mozambique that were controlled by RENAMO
(Protocol V, section III, point 9 (d)). The name of the latter conunission was eventually estab-
lished as the National Commission on Administration (CNA) (General Peace Agreement for
Mozambique, October 1992).
On 9 October 1992, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted to the UNSC a report on the pro-
posed UN role in Mozambique, in which he recommended an immediate plan of action and
stated his intention, subject to the Council's approval, to appoint an interim Special Representa-
tive to oversee UN activities in Mozambique (UNSG report to UNSC, October 1992)
On 13 October, the UNSC adopted Resolution 782 (1992), by which it welcomed the signature
of the OPA between the Mozambican Government and RENAMO and approved the appoint-
ment by the Secretary General of an interim Special Representative and the dispatch to Mozam-
bique of a team of up to 25 military observers. (UNSC Resolution 782, October 1992)
12) At the lime the General Peace Agreement was signed, the annexes on assembly areas had nol yet been provided; the locations of the assembly areas were only specified
some weeks later.
13) Although not all aspects of the General Peace Agreement specifically required United Nations monitoring, the supervisory role allocated to Ihe Organisation carried
the Implication of responsibility for the entire peace process In Mozambique. The Implementation of each part of the process was likely to come under the purview of the
Supervisory and Monitoring Commission and therefore of the United Nations.
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On the same day, the Secretary General appointed Mr. Aldo Ajello 14) as his interim Special
Representative for Mozambique, and asked him to proceed to Mozambique to assist the parties
in setting up the joint monitoring machinery, in finalising the modalities and conditions for the
military arrangements and in carrying out the various other actions that were required of them
at the beginning of the peace process.
The interim Special Representative and the team of 21 military observers, drawn from existing
United Nations peacekeeping missions, arrived in Mozambique on 15 October 1992, the day
the General Peace Agreement entered into force. On 20 October, two teams of military observ-
ers were also deployed to the provincial capitals of Nampula and Beira. Later, two additional
outposts were established to verify the withdrawal of foreign troops from Mozambique, which
was an important element of the GPA (ONUMOZ, 1996:2)
Both Mozambican parties committed themselves to undertake, immediately after, and in some
instances before, the entry into effect of the Agreement, specific action to set in motion the joint
mechanisms to monitor and verify its implementation. However, no such action had been initi-
ated at the time the interim Special Representative arrived in Mozambique'". Upon arrival, he
started extensive discussions with the parties concerned in an effort to ensure the early start of
implementation of the Agreement. (ONUMOZ, 1996:2)
The Secretary General reported on the situation to the President of the UNSC on 23 October.
The President, in a statement dated 27 October, expressed the Council's deep concern about
the reports of major violations of the cease-fire, called upon the parties to halt such violations
immediately and urged them to co-operate fully with the interim Special Representative. (UNSC
statement, October 1992)
In an attempt to avoid further escalation of hostilities, the interim Special Representative called
for an early informal meeting of the Government and RENAMO. The initiative was successful
and both parties sent high-level delegations to attend their first meeting in Maputo. Thereafter,
the two delegations met on numerous occasions, both bilaterally and together with the interim
Special Representative. On 4 November 1992, the interim Special Representative appointed the
Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) CSC was to guarantee the implementation of
the Agreement, assume responsibility for authentic interpretation of it, settle any disputes that
might arise between the parties and guide and co-ordinate the activities of the other Commis-
sions. Itwas chaired by the United Nations.
The CSC held its first meeting on 4 November 1992 and appointed the main subsidiary commis-
sions: the Cease-fire Commission (CCF), the commission for the Reintegration of Demobilised
Military Personnel (CORE), as well as the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozam-
bican Defence Forces (CCFADM). (UNSG report to UNSC, December 1992)
Various delays and difficulties of a political, administrative, as well as of a logistical nature seri-
ously impeded the implementation of the General Peace Agreement. In his 2 April 1993 report
to the Security Council, the Secretary General stated that although the cease-fire had largely
held, many of the timetables established in the Agreement "proved to be unrealistic". Continu-
ing deep mistrust had resulted in reluctance to begin assembly and demobilisation of troops, and
contributed to the delay in the deployment of United Nations military observers. (UNSG report
to UNSC, April: 1993)
14) Mr. Aldo AJollo, a national of Italy was a senior UNDP official. He was only confirmed as Special Representative of the UNSG In March 1993
15) During this period major violations of the cease-fire were reported In various areas of the country, and the parties presented official complaints to the interim Special
Representative. Ho urged the two parties to refrain from any type of military operation and to discuss and settle all disputes through negotiations. (UNSG statement, October
1992)
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As to the elections, the Secretary General stressed that the military situation in Mozambique
had to be fully under control for conditions to be created in which a successful election could
take place. Having found it evident that the elections could not be held in October 1993 as
originally scheduled, he indicated that he would continue discussions with the parties on new
dates. (ONUMOZ, 1996:5)
On 14 April, the Security Council, by adopting Resolution 818 (1993), stressed its concern
about delays and difficulties impeding the peace process in Mozambique, and strongly urged
the Government and RENAMO to finalise the precise timetable for the full implementation of
the provisions of the General Peace Agreement, including the separation, concentration and
demobilisation of forces, as well as for the elections. The Council also urged both sides urgently
to comply with their commitments under the Agreement and to co-operate with the Secretary
General and his Special Representative in the full and timely implementation of the mandate of
ONUMOZ. (UNSC Resolution 818, April: 1993)
In the following weeks, due to determined efforts undertaken by the United Nations, many of the
difficulties were overcome and, by the beginning of May 1993, ONUMOZ was fully deployed
and its military infrastructure established in all three operational regions. (ONUMOZ,1996:5)
On 30 June, 1993, the Secretary General reported about a number of positive developments
which had resulted in forward movement of the peace process in Mozambique. Those included
the establishment of the voluntary Trust Fund to assist RENAMO, the resumption of the work
of the Joint Commissions, international effort in the humanitarian field and a sharp increase in
the return of refugees and displaced persons. The withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian
troops, as provided for in the General Peace Agreement, was also successfully completed and a
status-af-farces agreement was signed between the Government and the United Nations, which
facilitated the entire range of work ofONUMOZ. (UNSG report to UNSC, June: 1993)
However, the establishment of the National Elections Commission and the Commission of State
Administration was still pending, cantonment and demobilisation of troops as well as the forma-
tion of the new army had not commenced. The Secretary General stated that unless the major
provisions of the General Peace Agreement were implemented, the future stability of the coun-
try would remain uncertain and that there should be no further delay in finalising a new and
realistic timetable for the implementation of the Agreement. In addition, the cantonment and
demobilisation oftroops "(should) start soon and be completed early in 1994, and the training
of a new Mozambican army should be initiated as soon as possible." To assist in the process,
the Secretary General was willing to grant the request that ONUMOZ, with the consent of
the Security Council, assume chairmanship of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the
Mozambican Defence Force on the understanding that it would not entail any obligation on the
part of the United Nations for training or establishing new armed forces. (ONUMOZ, 1996:5)
The revised timetable, presented by the Secretary General at that time, took as its point of depar-
ture the resumption of the work of the Joint Commissions beginning on 3 June 1993 and con-
cluding 16 months later with the holding of elections in October 1994. The concentration and
demobilisation of Government and RENAMO troops, to be carried out in stages, was expected
to take eight or nine months. The concentration of troops was scheduled to begin in September
1993 and would be followed a month later by the beginning of demobilisation. Itwas expected
that 50 per cent of the soldiers should have been demobilised by January 1994, and the demo-
bilisation oftroops should be completed by May 1994. (ONUMOZ, 1996:5)
It was expected that approximately 30,000 soldiers would be absorbed into the new army and
the rest were to return to civilian life. Half the new army was to be operational by May 1994
and formation of the new army was to be completed by September 1994. Home transportation
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of soldiers who would not be part of the new army was to start in October 1993, after demobi-
lisation began, and was to be concluded by April 1994 in order to enable the demobilised sol-
diers to register for the elections. Voter registration was expected to take three months and was
scheduled to be carried out from April to June 1994. The repatriation of refugees and displaced
persons was expected to be largely completed by April 1994 so that the resettled population
might register in time for the elections.(ONUMOZ, 1996:6)
By adopting Resolution 850 (1993) of9 July, the Security Council welcomed the progress made
in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement but expressed concern over continuing
delays, particularly in the assembly and demobilisation of forces, the formation of the new uni-
fied armed forces, and the finalising of election arrangements. It approved the Secretary Gener-
al's recommendation that ONUMOZ should chair the Joint Commission for the Formation of
the Mozambican Defence Force. Further, the Council invited the Government of Mozambique
and RENAMO to agree without delay to the revised timetable to implement the provisions
of the General Peace Agreement based on the general parameters described by the Secretary
General.(UNSC Resolution 850, July: 1993)
In his progress report presented to the Security Council on 30 August 1993, the Secretary Gen-
eral stated that the "recent developments in the Mozambican peace process have been encourag-
ing". The most significant development was the "long overdue" start of direct talks between
the President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, and the President of RENAMO, Afonso
Dhlakama.
The talks had begun on 23 August in Maputo. The Secretary General strongly urged the parties
to turn their dialogue into "an ongoing and action-oriented process" aimed at bringing the peace
process to a successful conclusion. As to the revised timetable, the Secretary General indicated
that although it had not yet been formally approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Com-
mission, important progress had been made in key areas. The Government explicitly agreed
to the October 1994 deadline for the holding of the elections, while RENAMO also expressed
its implicit agreement. The Secretary General reported that he had instructed his Special Repre-
sentative to follow as closely as possible the revised timetable for assembly and demobilisation
of forces and the formation of the unified armed forces. (UNSG report to UNSC, August: 1993)
On 10 September 1993, the Secretary General informed the Security Council that two major
agreements had been signed between the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO on 3
September - the outcome of the first meeting between the President of Mozambique and the
President of RENAMO after the signing of the General Peace Agreement in October 1992.
By the first agreement, the Government and RENAMO agreed to integrate into the state admin-
istration all areas that had been under RENAMO control. That agreement, the Secretary General
believed, would contribute to stability in the country and promote national reconciliation.
By the second agreement, concerning the impartiality of the national police, the parties agreed
to request the United Nations to monitor all police activities in the country, public or private,
to monitor the rights and liberties of citizens and to provide technical support to the Police
Commission (COMPOL) established under the Rome Agreement. The proposed United Nations
police contingent would be responsible for verifying that all police activities in the country
were consistent with the General Peace Agreement. The Secretary General planned to send
to Mozambique a small survey team of experts and, based on their findings, make recommen-
dations concerning the size of the police component, while awaiting those recommendations,
preparations would commence to deploy the 128 ONUMOZ police observers authorised by
Resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992. (UNSG report to UNSC, September: 1993)
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On 13 September 1993, the Security Council, by Resolution 863 (1993), strongly urged the
Government of Mozambique and RENAMO "to apply, without further postponement" the
revised timetable for implementing the General Peace Agreement, and encouraged the President
of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO to continue their direct talks. Further, it urged
RENAMO to join the Government in authorising immediate assembly of forces, and urged both
parties to begin demobilising troops, in accordance with the revised timetable and without pre-
conditions.!" (UNSC Resolution 863, September: 1993)
Deploring the lack of progress in the multiparty consultative conference, the Security Council
urged RENAMO and other political parties to join with the Mozambican Government in quickly
agreeing on an electoral law, which should include provision for an effective National Election
Commission. The Council called on the Government and RENAMO to make operational, with-
out further delay, the National Commission for Administration, the National Information Com-
mission and the Police Affairs Commission. The Council requested the Secretary General to
examine expeditiously the proposal of the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO for
United Nations monitoring of police activities in the country, and welcomed his intention to
send a survey team of experts in that connection.(UNSC Resolution 863, September 1993)
In an attempt to break the stalemate in the peace process, the Secretary General visited Mozam-
bique from 17 to 20 October 1993. He met with President Chissano and Mr. Dhlakama as well
as with leaders of other political parties and representatives of the international community.'?'
On 20 October, the Secretary General announced a breakthrough in the peace process. Major
agreements had been reached between the Government and RENAMO on the assembly and
demobilisation of RENAMO and Government troops as well as the simultaneous disarmament
of paramilitary forces, militia and irregular troops, the composition of the National Elections
Commission and the system and timetable for finalising the Electoral Law, and the creation
of local National Police Affairs Commission subcommittees to monitor the activities of the
Mozambican Police. Following these and other agreements, the revised timetable for the imple-
mentation of the Peace Agreement was approved by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commis-
sion on 22 October 1993. (ONUMOZ, 1996:7)
On 29 October 1993, the Security Council, by its Resolution 879 (1993), decided to extend
ONUMOZ's mandate for an interim period terminating on 5 November 1993, pending examina-
tion of the Secretary General's report due under Resolution 863 (1993). (UNSC Resolution 879,
October: 1993)
The Secretary General submitted his further periodic report on 1November 1993. On 5 Novem-
ber, the Security Council, by Resolution 882 (1993), decided, inter alia, to renew ONUMOZ's
mandate for a period of six months, subject to a proviso that the Council would review the
status of the mandate within 90 days based on the further report of the Secretary General.
The Council requested the Secretary General to report by 31 January 1994 and every three
months thereafter on whether the parties had made "sufficient and tangible progress" towards
implementing the General Peace Agreement and meeting the timetable. (UNSC Resolution 882,
November: 1993)
16) On 22 October 1993 the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission approved and signed a revised timetable for the remainder of the peace process. The concentration
of troops was to commence in November 1993, followed by the start of demobilisation in January 1994. Demobilisation was due to end in M.y 1994, by which time the
de mobilised soldiers would be returned to their home areas. The new Mozambican Defence Force was to be fully operational by September 1994. Voter registration was to be
conducted between April and June 1994. The electoral campaign was to take place in September and October In time for elections to be held by the end of October 1994.
17) In an address carried on Mozambican national television, the UNSG warned of a growing reluctance on the part of the international community to sustain the peace-
keeping operation: "Tfrne is short. Solutions must now be found. While the International community continues to show a willingness to assist in the process of building peace,
peace cannot be Imposed from outside, nor can it be built where there is not sufficient political will to make peace."
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ONUMOZ military deployment at time of elections, October 1994
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3.2.1. Cease-fire
Protocol VI of the GPA described the issue of the cease-fire and cessation of hostilities
(CAC) as "a brief, dynamic and irreversible process of predetermined duration which
must be implemented throughout the territory of Mozambique. To this end the imple-
mentation of the process shall be the responsibility of the Government of Mozambique
and Renamo, acting within the framework ofthe Cease-fire Commission (CCF), answer-
able to the CSC, the organ responsible for the overall political supervision of the cease-
fire."
Protocol VI of the GPA also stated that: "The CCF shall be composed of representatives
of the Government, and countries accepted by them and a representative of the United
Nations, who shall preside."
The CCF, was structured as stipulated in Protocol IV, paragraph VI (i) (2), and had the
following functions:
• To plan, verify and guarantee the implementation of the cease-fire rules;
• To set itineraries for the movement of forces, in order to reduce the risk of inci-
dents;
• To organise and implement mine-clearing operations;
• To analyse and verify the accuracy of the statistics provided by the Parties on troop
strength, arms and military equipment;
• To receive, analyse and rule on complaints of possible cease-fire violations;
• To ensure the necessary co-ordination with organs of the United Nations verification
system;
The CAC was to begin on E-Day and end on E-Day + 180.
The CAC consisted of 4 (four) phases:
• Cease-fire;
• Separation of forces;
• Concentration of forces;
• Demobilisation.
"The cease-fire"
The Parties agreed that:
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• carry out any kind of attack by land, sea or air;
(a) The cease-fire shall enter into force on E-Day. E-Day is the day on which the
General Peace Agreement is adopted by the Assembly of the Republic and incor-
porated into Mozambican law. The deployment of United Nations personnel in
Mozambican territory to verify the cease-fire shall begin the same day.
(b) As ofE-Day, neither of the Parties shall carry out any hostile act or operation by
means of forces or individuals under its control. Accordingly, they may not:
• organise patrols or offensive manoeuvres;
• occupy new positions;
• lay mines and prevent mine-clearing operations;
• interfere with military communications;
• carry out any kind of reconnaissance operations;
• carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism;
• acquire or receive lethal equipment;
• carry out acts of violence against the civilian population;
• restrict or prevent without justification the free movement of persons and property;
• carry out any other military activity which, in the opinion of the CCF and the United
Nations, might jeopardise the cease-fire.
• In performing their functions, the CCF and the United Nations shall enjoy complete
freedom of movement throughout the territory of Mozambique.
(c) On E-Day, the United Nations shall begin official verification of compliance
with the undertaking described in paragraph (b), investigating any alleged viola-
tion of the cease-fire. Any duly substantiated violation shall be reported by the
United Nations at the appropriate level;
(d) During the period between the signing of the General Peace Agreement and
E-Day, the two Parties agree to observe a complete cessation of hostilities and of
the activities described in paragraph (b), in order to allow the United Nations to
deploy its personnel in the territory to verify all aspects of the CAC as ofE-Day"
(General Peace Agreement: Protocols IV and VI, 4 October 1992).
In his report to the UNSC on ONUMOZ (UNSG report to UNSC, October: 1992) the
Secretary General stated that in terms of the verification and monitor of the cease-fire "it
will not be possible for the UN to establish more than a token presence in Mozambique
by 15 October 1992. The viability of the cease-fire will therefore, in its early stages,
depend critically on the political will and strict compliance of the two parties with the
agreed modalities".
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In this context the UNSG described the role of the UN as "similar to that entrusted to
the United Nations in other recent cases where the organisation has monitored the imple-
mentation of a cease-fire, the separation and concentration of forces, their demobilisa-
tion and the collection and storage of weapons." In addition, the Cease-fire Commission
would also approve plans for dealing with other armed groups, including irregulars, and
would authorise security arrangements for vital infrastructure, including the corridors.
(UNSG report to UNSC, December: 1992)
According to the UNSG, to ensure credible verification, it would be necessary to obtain
from the parties lists of all troops and paramilitary forces, assembled or unassembled,
together with details of weapons and ammunition held by them. Arrangements would
also be needed for ONUMOZ to control weapons and ammunition in possession of the
Government and Renarno. All arms and ammunition not required for the new armed
forces would be destroyed under close supervision of the United Nations. A systematic
programme for removal of weapons from the civilian population would also be required
from the outset (UNSG report on ONUMOZ, December: 1992).
The Special Representative and a team of 21 military observers arrived in Mozambique
on 15 October as the General Peace Agreement came into force. On 20 October, two
teams of military observers were deployed to Nampula and Beira. Renamo's absence
from the capital impeded the establishment of the monitoring and verification machinery
that was specified by the General Peace Agreement. Thus major violations reported in
the days following the cease-fire could not be effectively investigated. These violations
prompted a statement of concern by the Security Council and, in order to overcome
this immediate potential crisis, the interim Special Representative convened an informal
meeting of the two parties, who responded by sending high-level delegations to Maputo
on 29 October. The meeting greatly helped to defuse the atmosphere of political and
military tension, and no further major cease-fire violations occurred. (UN and Mozam-
bique, 1995:24).
Groups of military cease-fire observers, drawn from several different countries, began
to arrive in February 1993. On 13 February, the UNSG appointed Major-General Lélio
Goncalves Rodrigues da Silva (Brazil) as Force Commander of ONUMOZ. By mid-
March, 154 military observers drawn from 12 countries had been deployed, primarily in
Maputo, Beira, Matola and Nampula. While the cease-fire held, demobilisation of the
two sides' armed forces remained stalled because of their continuing failure to supply
complete lists of their troop strength, arms and ammunition, as they had originally
pledged to do by 15 October 1992 (UN and Mozambique, 1995:28).
During the first three months of 1993, both the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
(CSC) and the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) held a number of meetings to establish pro-
cedural guidelines. The CCF was the most active commission, reviewing alleged viola-
tions of the cease-fire, including troop movements by both sides (UN and Mozambique,
1995:28).
By August, the number of military observers numbered 303, provided by Bangladesh,
Brazil, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Malaysia, the Rus-
sian Federation, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay. The observers surveyed the assembly areas
for demobilisation and established a presence in those that were suitable. They also
investigated reports of cease-fire violations (UN and Mozambique, 1995:31).
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The cease-fire continued to be respected in most of Mozambique, but two potentially
serious violations that came before the CCF during June and July, 1993 were transferred
to the CSC for consideration. Both incidents raised the issue of territorial and admin-
istrative control, which had been a sticking point in the negotiations over the General
Peace Agreement and remained essentially unresolved. In the first incident, Renarno
detained 27 people in Maputo Province, claiming that they had been hunting in the area
of Renamo-controlled Salamanga without permission. Negotiations with Renarno con-
ducted by the Special Representative in conjunction with the head of the Renarno delega-
tion to the CSC succeeded in obtaining the prisoners' return to Maputo. In the second
incident, the Governrnent attempted to forcibly dislodge Renarno from three villages in
Tete Province and one in Gaza Province on the grounds that Renamo had moved into
these areas after the signing of the General Peace Agreement. The Government's action
implied that it had the right to use force to reclaim territory that it considered to be under
its control'" (UN and Mozambique, 1995:33).
The Special Representative, supported by other CSC members, declared that disputes of
any kind could be resolved only within the mechanisms established under the General
Peace Agreement. Hoping to defuse what was a potentially explosive issue, the Special
Representative formulated a set of rules to guide the CCF in dealing with troop move-
ments. The rules separated the military and logistic aspects of troop movements from
those relating to the administration of territory, They also defined as cease-fire violations
all military movements conducted for the purpose of gaining new positions and required
all troops moved for such purposes to be withdrawn (UN and Mozambique, 1995:34).
3.2.2. Demobilisation
According to the UNSG it was apparent to all concerned that Mozambique's planned
elections should not take place until the military aspects of the Agreement had been
implemented. This conclusion was reinforced by the events following Angola's elections
in the preceding weeks, where the failure to complete demobi1isation had enabled the
loser of the election to launch an all-out war. In Mozambique, the UNSG stressed demo-
bilisation of the two sides' forces would have to be vigorously pursued, and arrange-
ments would have to be made for the control and disposal of weapons and ammunition.
United Nations verification would be carried out by teams of military observers (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:26)19).
A hindrance to the start of demobilisation was the unsuitability of the designated assem-
bly points for the cantorunent of troops. During November 1992, the Governrnent had
identified 29 assembly points and Renamo 20, but for many of them access, either for
purposes of verification or for prolonged habitation, was difficult. They had been des-
ignated more for their strategic importance in controlling certain areas than for their
suitability for cantonment. Some could be reached only by roads or tracks that were
known to be mined, some had no access to water and therefore could not sustain tem-
porary settlement. After investigating the sites with a view to preparing for the supply
and well-being of troops once the assembly process began, the United Nations asked for
several to be relocated (UN and Mozambique, 1995:28).
18) On the whole, formally confirmed cease-fire violations were relatively few and presented no serious threat to the peace process. Violations basically fell into three
categories: illegal detention of individuals, alleged movement of troops and occupation of new positions.
19) Groups of military cease-fire observers, drawn from several different countries, began to arrive in February 1993. By mid-March, 154 military observers drawn from 12
countries had been deployed, primarily In Maputo, Beira, Matala and Nampula. Demobilisation olthe two sides' armed lorces remained stalled because ol their continuing
lailure to supply complete lists ol their troop strength, arms and ammunition, as they had originally pledged to do by 15 October 1992. The Joint Commission lor the Formation
ol the Mozambican Delenee Force (CCFADM) could also not begin sitting, as the two parties had not named their respective delegations (UN and Mozambique, 1995:28).
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After the failure of both sides to start demobilising in 1993, the timetable agreed upon in
October of that year demonstrated a new willingness on the part of both Renamo and the
Government to move forward.!"
Demobilisation was the most difficult and dangerous phase of the ONUMOZ mandate.
There was considerable uncertainty about the numbers of troops to be demobilised, and
both sides were reluctant to give up their best fighting units or to assemble their senior
officers until the very end of the assembly and demobilisation process. The agreed proce-
dures laid down by the General Peace Agreement could not be followed, and reinterpre-
tation and occasional substantive changes were required. (UN and Mozambique, 1995:
38)
To prepare for demobilisation, the role of the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) was of criti-
cal importance. In addition to verifying the cease-fire and arranging for the clearance
of landmines, the CCF had the central responsibility for establishing procedures for the
cantonment, assembly and demobilisation of Government and Renamo soldiers. The
CCF also set itineraries for the movement of forces and approved rules of conduct for
the assembly areas. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 38)
Critical to the success of the assembly and demobilisation of troops was the Technical
Unit (TU), a civilian team supporting the military observers. The unit, collaborating
with the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination (UNOHAC),
was responsible for the distribution of food, medicines and other basic services to the
assembly areas, the organisation of a database and issuance of personal documents to
demobilised soldiers, the supply of civilian clothing and the organisation of transport of
ex-combatants to their homes, and the establishment of a solid link with provincial and
district authorities in the demobilisation process. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 39)
The principal outstanding difficulty was in reaching agreement on a final list of assembly
areas. By November 1993, only 35 of the 49 areas (26 out of the 29 designated by the
Government and 9 out of the 20 designated by Renamo) had been approved. ONUMOZ
military observers found several to be unacceptable because of inaccessibility, lack of
basic security (especially because of the existence of landmines) or the absence of basic
infrastructure, especially water. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 38)
ONUMOZ cou1d still only estimate the total numbers of soldiers that it would have
to register. Following the earlier registration of 13 717 Government soldiers who were
demobilised before the signing of the General Peace Agreement, ONUMOZ broadly
expected to register about 80 000 Government soldiers and about 21 000 from Renamo.
(UN and Mozambique, 1995: 39)
The first 20 assembly areas were formally opened on 30November 1993, followed by 15
more on 20 December 1993. Continuing disagreements between the two parties, how-
ever, delayed the opening of the remaining 14 sites. By 24 January 1994, 9 895 Govern-
ment soldiers and 6 714 Renamo troops had been assembled'!'. The arrival of Renamo
troops in greater numbers than expected led to overcrowding and shortages of essential
provisions in a few Renarno assembly areas. Meanwhile, in some Government areas
there were incidents of rioting by soldiers demanding back pay. (UN and Mozambique,
1995: 39)
20) UNSC Resolution 882 (1993) urged the parties to commence assembly of troops in November 1993 and to Initiate demobilisation by January 1994 with a view to ensure
the completion of the demobilisation process by May 1994, in accordance with the new timetable signed by the two parties in October 1993.
21) In his report to the UNSC dated 28 January 1994 the UNSG noted that despite significant progress made In the implementation of the GPA several serious problems
remained to be solved, including the opening of the 14 remaining assembly sites, Initiation and completion of the actual demobilisatlon, transfer of weapons from assembly
areas to regional warehouses, dismantling of paramilitary forces, provision of financial support to Renamo from a military movement into a political party and formalion of
a national defence force.
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After negotiations between the Special Representative and the two sides, the remaining
14 assembly areas were opened and became operational on 21 February 1994. The proc-
ess then moved ahead, albeit at a slow pace. By mid-April 1994, more than 49 000 sol-
diers had reported to assembly areas for cantonment, of which some 34 000 were from
the Government and more than 14 000 were from Renamo. (UN and Mozambique, 1995:
39)
Demobilisation commenced formally on 10 March. Over the first three weeks, 12 195
Government and 561 Renamo troops were given clothing, money and assistance with
transport to their districts of choice. Arrangements were put in place for the full reinte-
gration of demobilised soldiers in their home areas, under the supervision of the Reinte-
gration Commission (CORE). (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 40)
Most of the assembled soldiers had to remain in the assembly areas much longer than
they had expected. Serious tensions arose, resulting in about 20 violent incidents between
January and March 1994. Initially, Govenunent troops protested principally about arrears
in their pay, while Renamo troops refused to be demobilised until they received substan-
tially greater benefits than were scheduled, following unrealistic promises made to them
by their commanders. As the assembly period became more extended, troops from both
sides began to demand immediate demobilisation, including severance pay.22) (UN and
Mozambique, 1995: 40)
On 8 April 1994, President Chissano and Mr Dhlakama agreed on the need to speed up
the assembly of Government forces and the demobilisation of Renamo troops. The two
sides also agreed that some military personnel would not be moved to assembly areas but
would be demobilised at their current locations, such as military hospitals, air bases or
military headquarters. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 40)
On 5 May 1994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 916 in which it urged the two
parties to meet the target dates of 1 June for completion of the assembly of forces and 15
July for the end of demobilisation. (UNSC Resolution 916, May: 1994)
The Secretary General reported to the Security Council on 7 July 1994 and stated that
while significant progress had been made in many areas of the Mozambican peace proc-
ess, and especially in the electoral sphere, serious problems still remained because of
delays in the completion of the assembly and demobilisation of troops belonging to
the Government and to RENAMO, and in the formation of the FADM. The Secretary
General stressed that it was imperative that the assembly and demobilisation of troops
be accelerated dramatically if the established deadline was to be met. Referring to the
problems encountered in the selection of the agreed number of 30,000 soldiers for the
FADM, and the unlikelihood that all would be trained by October, he suggested that it
would be preferable for 15,000 to be trained after the elections. (UNSG report to UNSC,
July: 1994)
On 19 July, the Security Council issued a statement again urging both sides to meet the
15 August deadline and stressing that elections should take place on 27 and 28 October.
On 4 August, the Council announced that it would send a mission to discuss with the
parties how to ensure full and timely implementation of the General Peace Agreement.
(UN and Mozambique, 1995: 41)
22) In mld-1994, CORE approved the creation of a provincial fund to provide small and medium-size grants to employ ex-soldiers and facilitate their participation In
communlty·based economic activities. Other components of reintegration were: a support scheme providing each soldier with an 18-month subsidy In addition to his 6-month
de mobilisation pay, career counselling and problem-solving services and an occupattonal-skllts development programme (UN and Mozambique, 1995:42).
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Continuing frustration among soldiers at their prolonged cantonment provoked further
demonstrations and rioting, occasional attacks on United Nations personnel and looting
of food and other supplies. As a precaution, on several occasions ONUMOZ troops were
deployed around assembly areas. Soldiers in a number of unassembled areas also pro-
tested, sometimes taking their commanding officers hostage to press their demands for
rapid demobilisation or more pay. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 41)
On 15 August, all assembly areas were officially closed to new entrants, and the 3
723 troops remaining at the assembly points on that day were quickly demobilised or
recruited into the reconstituted Mozambican Defence Force. By late November 1994,
demobilisation accounted for a total of 57 540 Government and 20 538 Renamo soldiers,
a total of 78 078. These had been drawn from a total of 91 691 registered troops (both
assembled and unassembled, of which 67 042 were from the Government army and 24
649 from RENAMO), or 4 588 more than the figure of 87 103 that had been declared by
both sides. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 41)
Teams comprising representatives of the Government, Renamo and ONUMOZ began
post-demobilisation verification on 30 August 1994. A total of 722 former military posi-
tions or depots were declared to the CCF by the Government (435) and by Renamo
(287). In accordance with procedures approved by the CCF, the teams verified informa-
tion relating to the presence of unregistered troops and undeclared arms depots or weap-
ons caches. The teams also examined 146 locations that had not been declared by either
party. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 43)
Verification led to the discovery of substantial numbers of weapons, including tanks,
anti-aircraft guns, mines, armoured personnel carriers and mortar bombs abandoned or
stored throughout the country. A small number of previously unregistered military per-
sonnel were also identified at some Government and Renamo bases. (UN and Mozam-
bique, 1995: 43)
The delays in demobilisation and the parties' initial reluctance to participate fully in the
verification meant that the process lagged behind schedule. It was not possible, therefore,
to finish the checking of weapons before the expiry of the ONUMOZ mandate on 9
December 1994. At that point, United Nations teams had examined a total of 754 loca-
tions and had found 22069 weaponsê", as well as large amounts of ammunition (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:43).
3.2.3. New Parties and Elections
Implementing the electoral elements of the General Peace Agreement was a test of the
authority of ONUMOZ and the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission. Following
the issuance of a draft electoral law in March 1993, discussions repeatedly reached an
impasse over the composition of the National Elections Commission (CNE). The Gov-
ernment tried throughout the year to convene meetings to discuss the draft. Finally, after
the visit of the UNSG in October 1993, an agreement was reached, and it was decided
that interested political parties would continue examining the remaining articles on tech-
nical matters. The differences between the Government and Renamo focussed on four
points in the electoral law: voting rights for expatriate Mozambicans, the composition of
provincial and district election commissions, the composition of the Technical secretariat
for the Organisation of the Elections (STAE), and the establishment and composition of
23) In his 21 October report to the UNSC the UNSG expressed concern regarding !he proliferation of weapons despite !he fact that 111,539 weapons had been collected from
troops of !he two parties and 43,491 from paramilitary forces.
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an electoral tribunal. Following a series of direct meetings between President Chissano
and Mr Dhlakarna, which were held in close consultation with the SRSG, these issues
were resolved on 26 November 1993.24) (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 55)
Starting its work on 15 February, the CNE established a timetable for the entire electoral
process, including a period for voter registration between 1 June and 15 August, the
electoral campaign, set for 10 September to 24 October, and the holding of presidential
and assembly elections together on 27 and 28 October 1994. The provincial and district
election commissions were established in subsequent months. (UN and Mozambique,
1995: 56)
The CNE and its executive secretariat were responsible for the conduct, preparation and
organisation of the elections. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) co-
ordinated international financial and material support and provided technical assistance
throughout the entire electoral process in the areas of organisation, training, civic educa-
tion, jurisprudence, social communication and financial management. (UN and Mozam-
bique, 1995: 56)
The ONUMOZ electoral division established its own network of monitoring activities,
with 148 officers stationed throughout the provinces to cover voter registration, civic
education, political campaigns and political party access to, as well as impartiality of,
the media, polling, vote counting and vote tabulation at the provincial counting centres.
Complaints of alleged irregularities in the electoral process were to be transmitted to
the CNE, while ONUMOZ was mandated to carry out separate investigations. (UN and
Mozambique, 1995: 57)
Registration of Mozambican voters began on schedule on 1 June 1994 with the deploy-
ment of 8 000 registrars and 1 600 civic education agents throughout the country. The
National Assembly twice decided to extend the registration process in order to guarantee
that no groups of people were excluded from the electoral process, specifically popula-
tions in remote areas and returning refugees and demobilised soldiers. On 15 August,
at the end of the initial registration period, 5 636 000 voters had been registered. On 20
August, at the end of the first extension, voter registration had risen to 6 034 066, and
at the conclusion of the process on 2 September, 6 363 311 voters had been registered -
81% of the 7 894 850 estimated eligible voting population. (UN and Mozambique, 1995:
58)
Although a number of political parties emerged, the electoral contest was dominated by
Frelimo and Renamo. However, Renamo continued to threaten delay. In December 1993,
at a meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, Mr Dhlakarna had made
an urgent appeal for financial resources. Without them, he warned, Renamo would be
forced to abstain from the elections.25) (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 58)
In view of the extension of time allotted for voter registration it became necessary to
shorten the campaign period from 45 to 35 days. As a result, the election campaign
opened on 22 September 1994, little more than a month before the elections were to take
24) The Electoral Law was eventually approved by the National Assembly on 9 December 1993 and entered into force on 12 January 1994. The Law prescribed that the
President should be elected by an absolute majority; If this was not obtained in the first round, a run-off would be held between the two candidates receiving the largest
numbers of votes. The term of office for the President and the 250 members of the National Assembly would be five years. A system of proportional representation would be
used to allocate the seats among the parties that received a minimum of 5 per cent of the vote nationally.
25) According to the GPA, Renarno, as a partner In the peace process, was entitled to financial assistance for the process of transforming It.elf from a military organisation
Into a political party. The Agreement stipulated that the Mozambique Government would provide the financing and, If lacking the necessary means, could appeal to the
international community, In particular to Italy. The United Nations Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement In Mozambique, established in May 1993, was
the main instrument for this critical task. According to the UNSG Its creation was one of the most Innovative features of the Mozambique operatlon and was a pivotal factor
In maintaining the momentum of the peace process.
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place. Parties and presidential candidates were entitled to 5 minutes of radio broadcast-
ing time each day on Radio Mozambique and 10 minutes per week on television. Few of
the parties took advantage of the media access.i" (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 60)
Both principal presidential candidates, President Chissano and Mr Dhlakama, undertook
extensive tours of the country, focusing on the populous northern provinces. The cam-
paign was largely conducted in an atmosphere of calm, albeit with considerable anxiety
about the possibility of renewed conflict provoked by inflammatory rhetoric, occasional
disturbances and even some physical attacks. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 61)
Despite a number of such incidents and reports, the SRSG declared on 21 October that
ONUMOZ did not believe that they posed a serious threat to the democratic electoral
process. On the same day, the Security Council appealed to the Mozambican parties to
ensure that there would be no violence or threat of violence during the election days and
their aftermath. The Council's appeal underlined its determination to hold the parties to
their obligation under the General Peace Agreement to abide fully by the results, should
the United Nations declare the elections free and fair. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 61)
On the eve of the elections, there were 14 parties contesting the legislative election and
12 candidates seeking the presidency. Polling was to be conducted at 7 244 individual
stations around the country. Approximately 52 000 polling officers and 35 000 party
monitors had been given training in the agreed procedures. More than 2300 international
observers had reached the district capitals and were given the necessary transport to
visit every polling-station in their jurisdiction at least once during the elections. In many
places, the devastated urban and transport infrastructure had still not been repaired, and
the risk of landmines remained. Where landmines threatened the safety of international
observers, arrangements were made to transport them to remote polling-stations by heli-
copter. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 61)
Unexpectedly, late in the evening of 26 October, the day before the elections, Mr
Dhlakama announced in Beira that Renamo would not participate in the polling, alleging
that the Government was preparing to engage in massive fraud during the elections.ê"
The CNE refuted each complaint and said that none of the questions raised by Renamo
contained anything that could call into question the holding of the elections or their
results. The Commission pointed out that, under the Electoral Law, a presidential candi-
date who wished to withdraw from the polling was required to do so 15 days prior to
the election; a party that wanted to pull out had to do so 72 hours beforehand. The CNE
therefore concluded that both Renamo and Mr Dhlakama were still standing in the elec-
tions. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 62)
The UNSG issued a statement emphasising that the elections had to go ahead as planned.
The Security Council also appealed directly to Mr Dhlakama to reconsider Renamo's
decision to withdraw. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 62)
On 27 October, the first day of elections, it was clear that the electorate was, in fact,
proceeding to vote. The parties' election monitors, including those representing Renamo,
remained on duty at nearly all polling-stations throughout the country. In some districts,
26) A separate United NatJons Trust Fund for Assistance to Registered Political PartJes in Mozambique, launched following the establishment of the eNE, was designed to
assist all political parties not signatories to the Peace Agreement In their preparations for the forthcoming elections and an initial sum of $50000 had been given to each of
the 16 parties on 19 August 1994. An additional $50 000 was given to those parties that could provide clear evidence that their spending of the first disbursal had only been
for electton-retated requirements.
27) On 26 October, the leaders of the Front-line states - Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe - met In Harare, Zimbabwe, for
discussions covering Inter alia Mozambique. In their final statement they called for full respect for the 1992 peace accord. They said that conditions existed for free elections
and that the Front-line leaders would accept the result, but warned that they would take "appropriate and timely action" if it became necessary to keep the peace after the
elections."
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voters and election officials did not hear of Renamo's announcement until the end of the
day. Reports from ONUMOZ co-ordinators and observers indicated no major irregulari-
ties. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 62)
On the morning of 28 October, Mr Dhlakama announced the end of his party's boycott.
In a statement issued simultaneously, the international CSC members and ONUMOZ
reminded all parties that any evidence of significant electoral fraud would prevent them
from declaring the elections free and fair. They also welcomed Mr Dhlakama's decision
to participate fully in the elections and recommended that the CNE adopt a flexible
approach to ensure that there was sufficient time to secure a high voter turnout. (UN and
Mozambique, 1995: 63)
The Electoral Law provided for a third day of polling if it proved necessary, and the CNE
ordered an extension to 29 October. While most votes were cast during the first two days,
the extension satisfied the parties that all those who wanted to vote had done so. The
overwhelming evidence provided by the international observers showed an election that
was conducted peacefully, in which electoral officials followed procedures impartially
and efficiently and in which the electorate participated patiently, seriously and with great
dignity. By 31 October, ONUMOZ was able to declare the polling successful. It noted
that some 90% of the registered voters had cast their ballots. (UN and Mozambique,
1995: 63)
On 2 November, the Special Representative issued a preliminary statement asserting
that Mozambique's first multi-party elections had been conducted peacefully, in a well-
organised manner and without any major irregularities or incidents. He added that United
Nations observation did not support any claim of fraud or intimidation, or any pattern
of incidents that could affect the credibility of the elections. He promised to make an
official pronouncement regarding the freedom and fairness of the entire electoral process
following the completion of the count. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 63)
Declaring the election results on 19 November, CNE Chairman Brazáo Mazula stated
that Joaquim Chissano had received 53,30% of the votes in the presidential election,
while Afonso Dhlakama had received 33,73%. A total of 5 402 940 people, represent-
ing 87,9% of the electorate, had participated in the elections. In the legislative election,
Frelimo won 44,33% of the votes, giving it 129 seats, while Renamo received 37,78%,
giving it 112 seats. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 64)
On 19 November, in Maputo, the Special Representative welcomed the results with
a formal declaration that the elections had been free and fair. The SRSG stated that
although problems had occurred, no event or series of events could affect the overall
credibility of the elections. Both the OAU and the European Union also declared the
elections to be free and fair. The observation mission of the European Union, which, with
its Member states, defrayed about 80 per cent of the costs of the elections, expressed
satisfaction that the results announced were correct and reflected the true outcome of the
ballot. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 65)
Following the proclamation of the results, the UNSG made a statement congratulating
the people and the leaders of Mozambique on the successful outcome of the elections.
The UNSG called upon all Mozambicans to ensure that peace and stability prevailed in
their country and region. On 21 November, the Security Council endorsed the results
(UNSC Resolution 960, 1994) and called on all parties to stand by their obligation to
accept and fully abide by them. On the same day, the President of the General Assembly
stated that the elections had "enabled Mozambique to move irreversibly along the road to
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democracy", and that the Mozambican people would now be able to win the battle for the
reconstruction and economic and social development of their nation. On 14 December,
the Security Council welcomed the inauguration of the new President and Assembly and
expressed the hope that with United Nations assistance a national mine-clearance pro-
gramme would be put in place prior to ONUMOZ's withdrawal. (UN and Mozambique,
1995: 65)
On 15 November 1994 the Security Council by its Resolution 957(1994) extended the
mandate of ONUMOZ for technical reasons until a new Government was installed in
Mozambique, but not later than 15December 1994. The overall framework for the draw-
ing down of ONUMOZ was not affected, although there were appropriate adjustments
for the withdrawal schedule of military and police personnel. Resolution 957( 1994) also
authorised ONUMOZ to complete its residual operations prior to its withdrawal on or
before 31 January 1995. (UNSC Resolution 957, November 1994)
The last meeting of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission was held on 6 Decem-
ber 1994. At the meeting, the chairmen of the subsidiary commissions - Cease-fire
Commission, Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force,
Reintegration Commission, National Police Affairs Commission and National Informa-
tion Commission - submitted their final reports. In a ceremony held on 7 December, the
Special Representative handed those reports to Mr Joaquim Chissano as President-elect,
thus formally concluding the work of the commissions. The new Assembly of the Repub-
lic was installed on 8 December 1994. (UN and Mozambique, 1995: 66)
The inauguration of the newly elected President of Mozambique on 9 December 1994
marked the expiry of the mandate of ONUMOZ, and the SRSG left Mozambique on 13
December 1994 (UN and Mozambique, 1995:66).
3.3. Evaluation
The study interpreted the linkage by Boutros-Gali of peacebuilding and landrnines as valid
in recognising the dramatic shift in the use of landmines as an offensive weapon against civil-
ians and their proliferation in internal conflicts The study also concluded that the impact of
landmines on peacebuilding became acute taking into consideration their consequences for
the social and economic infrastructure in post-conflict Mozambique. The mining of roads not
only blocked transportation but cut communication networks and disrupted the flow of goods
and services. This effected employment opportunities and marketing systems. The presence of
mines also disrupted the return and reintegration of people up-rooted by war. The inability to
return home and regain a sustainable means of survival undermined demobilisation and reinte-
gration processes and threatened political stability, food security and rehabilitation of shattered
health and educational infrastructure.
In assessing the successes and failures of the UN operation in Mozambique it is important to be
mindful of the magnitude, degree of complexity and difficulty of the UN operation. The difficul-
ties derived from the size of the country, the devastated state of its infrastructure, the disruption
of its economy by war and drought, the limited capacity of the Government to cope with the new
tasks arising from the General Peace Agreement and the complexity of the processes enshrined
in the Agreement. An additional security dimension derived from the critical importance of the
Mozambican corridors. To achieve in one year the high priority placed on peacebuilding, the
assembly, disarmament and demobilisation of the two sides' troops, the formation of new armed
forces, the establishment of a police component, the resettlement of millions of refugees and
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displaced persons, the provision ofhurnanitarian relief to all parts of the country and the organi-
sation and conduct of elections required an intense co-operative effort between the Government
and RENAMO and by the international community, with the United Nations in the lead.
In evaluating the overall success of ONUMOZ, the UNSG, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:67) declared that ONUMOZ was one of the most effective peacekeeping
operations in the history of the United Nations. Itbrought peace to Mozambique and contributed
directly to the profound political transformation that has enabled Mozambique to set a firm
course towards greater peace, democracy and development. According to the UNSG, ONUMOZ
"succeeded admirably in all its objectives." It provided the vehicle with which Mozambicans
could sustain their peace efforts, created an environment of security which allowed the cease-
fire to hold, accomplished the demobilisation of former combatants and provided the basis
for democratic practices, rather than military confrontation, in the conduct of Mozambique's
national affairs (UN and Mozambique, 1995:67).
The UNSG also pointed out that fundamental to the success of ONUMOZ was the "deep desire
of the Mozambican people and of the principal parties involved for peace" and that the United
Nations Operation in Mozambique "stands as testimony of the ability of the international com-
munity to help build the foundation for sustained peace even in situations of seemingly intrac-
table conflicts". (UN and Mozambique, 1995:67)
In addition, the UNSG described ONUMOZ (UN and Mozambique, 1995:3) "(as) a complex
operation involving peacekeeping, the demobilisation of armed forces, the provision ofhurnani-
tarian relief, electoral support and the return of millions of refugees. One of its most important
aspects was the emphasis placed on peacebuilding - helping to-ensure that the laying down of
guns would create a durable peace. The Organisation's unprecedented endeavours were concen-
trated not only in its oversight of the electoral process but also in channelling efforts by the
international community to strengthen the organisational capability of parties contesting the
election. In a significant development for peacekeeping operations, the United Nations estab-
lished a trust fund to help RENAMO transform itself from a military movement into a political
party. The transformation of a guerrilla force, experienced only in war, into a political entity
with a stake in the democratic process is one of the most significant legacies of the United
Nations operation."
Regarding the GPA the Secretary General concluded that the agreement provided "(a) clear and
precise, if nevertheless complex, set of tasks for the United Nations. The Rome accords envis-
aged a one-year timetable for the accomplishment of the peace process. From the outset, how-
ever, this was recognised as unrealistic and all parties involved showed pragmatism in agreeing
to an evolving implementation schedule. This adherence to an established and agreed plan -
despite some differences in interpretation - was a vital factor in the success of ONUMOZ,
even though the mission required two years instead of one to complete its mandate." (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:4)
With reference to the United Nations chairmanship of the commissions established to super-
vise the implementation of the General Peace Agreement the UNSG argued that this allowed
ONUMOZ to maintain the momentum of the peace process, especially whenever either party
showed reluctance to move to the next stage. "Patient but active diplomacy, with the constant
involvement of the international community, helped to overcome the deep distrust that initially
divided the two main parties and to defuse a number of potential crises. Most importantly for
the achievement of an atmosphere of genuine peace in Mozambique, the two parties respected
the cease-fire without serious breaches." (UN and Mozambique, 1995:4)
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With specific reference to the humanitarian role of ONUMOZ the UNSG declared (UN and
Mozambique, 1995:5) that one of the keys to the success of the ONUMOZ operation was the
United Nations humanitarian assistance programme, which helped to build a climate of trust
and co-operation between the contending parties. According to the UNSG the Mozambican
repatriation was one of the largest such operations ever undertaken by UNHCR in Africa. By
the time the ONUMOZ mandate ended in December 1994, the country's humanitarian crisis
was considerably eased. Some 4 million refugees and displaced persons had gained sufficient
confidence to travel to their home areas and resume farming and other economic activities.
According to the UNSG (UN and Mozambique, 1995:5) the principal problems confronting
ONUMOZ concerned the long delay in the initial deployment of the peacekeeping contingents;
the question of territorial and administrative control over certain areas of the country which had
been contested during the war, the additional demands made by the different parties, especially
RENAMO, which led to serious delays in the demobilisation of the armed forces, and the many
logistical constraints which made more difficult the task of closely co-ordinating the various
aspects of the operation and which were compounded by delays in the start "(of) the vitally
important programme of mine clearance."
The UNSG therefore acknowledged that although both the General Peace Agreement and the
ONUMOZ mandate were successfully implemented, a number of concerns remained at the time
of the mission's conclusion. These included, on the security front, the continuing need to train
and equip the new integrated anned forces and to collect and dispose of all outstanding caches
of weapons. There was also a need to strengthen Mozambique's democratic institutions and to
promote economic and social reconstruction so that peace, democracy and development could
be sustained. (UN and Mozambique, 1995:5)
In his final overview of the UN operation in Mozambique (UN and Mozambique, 1995:3) UNSG
Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserted that the first free and fair multi-party elections in Mozambique
were the culmination of a major success story in United Nations peacemaking, peacekeeping,
and humanitarian and electoral assistance. "Through a complex, multifaceted and highly inno-
vative strategy which broke new ground in how the United Nations dealt with parties in a con-
flict situation, a formerly socialist Government, committed to a one-party State, negotiated with
an armed, rebellious group to create peace for their country."
Several authors have assessed the role of Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the United
Nations Secretary General in the successful completion of the ONUMOZ mandate. According
to Synge, Ajello's performance (Synge, 1997:153) as SRSG earned conflicting assessments,
"(but) there was no doubting his courage and commitment to making a success of the peace
process." His principal strength, according to Synge, "(was) his ability to act as a politician
rather than as a UN bureaucrat - a role for which he was unsuited."
Chachiua and Malan, (1998: 19) in outlining the successes of ONUMOZ stated that this should
be explained in terms ofthe role of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG),
adequate resources, political leadership and donor co-ordination. "(as) the SRSG, Aldo Ajello of
Italy was willing and able to use the political muscle at his disposal to push the process forward,
to challenge the UN bureaucracy, and to deal squarely with foot-dragging by both Mozambican
parties."
Dennis Jett, US Ambassador to Mozambique during the ONUMOZ period confirmed that much
ofONUMOZ's success, was due to the force of Ajello's personality, close co-ordination within
the international community, and Mozambique's exhaustion after a long civil war capped by its
worst drought in a century. Jett also pointed out that the lessons to be learned from ONUMOZ
and the implications for future conflicts "must therefore be carefully noted." (Jett, 1996:2)
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However, Berman (1996:27-28) concluded that on some major issues the relationship between
the UN and Government were strained and that the major tension as far as the Government was
concerned, however, lay with the operating style of the Special Representative of the Secretary
General (SRSG) for Mozambique, Aldo Ajello. "The Government found him to be abrasive
and disrespectful - not just toward the Government, but toward the terms of the General Peace
Agreement and the UN's mandate as well. As the Security Council established ONUMOZ in
exercise of its powers granted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the UN was obliged to
operate with the consent of the parties. The Government constantly reminded the SRSG of this
fact."
In this context, by the second year of ONUMOZ, according to Synge (1997: 149) "(the) United
Nations came to be perceived as a parallel administration. At times it almost had the features of
a colonial operation, fulfilling a foreign agenda rather than a domestic one, although the rapid
scaling-down of ONUMOZ after the elections showed that the United Nations had no long-term
political intentions. It did use interventionist diplomacy but only to ensure the completion of the
steps laid down by the GPA."
Synge also argued that between December 1993 and December 1994, ONUMOZ and the inter-
national community effectively displaced the normal functions of government. The short-term
priorities of that period diverted attention from Mozambique's longer-term requirements for
social and economic reconstruction and derailed the government's own efforts to reform and
restructure the state and economy.
Aldo Ajello (1996: 13) SRSG in Mozambique surmised that the fundamental ingredient for the
Mozambican settlement was a long period of negotiations in Rome during which the warring
factions could come to terms with each other and get used to a power-sharing situation. This
stood in contrast to many other peace settlements, where a long-term settlement of the conflict
was sacrificed in order to force a quick success story, and a peacekeeping operation was left to
address all the questions that were successfully excluded from the negotiations.
However, the most negative aspect of the peace agreement according to Ajello was the limited
timeframe of one year, "(as) it was clear from the outset that one year would not be sufficient to
implement the UN mandate and the main objective." The timeframe was further hampered by
the slow process of deployment of the peacekeeping force. Ajello pointed out that against the
will of the UN Secretariat, the SRSG pledged "he would stay at least double the amount of time
in order to deliver his mandate" and in this regard according to Ajello "(it) was obvious that the
general rules of UN engagement needed fundamental reform." (Ajello, 1996:14)
Aldo Ajello (1996:15) also concluded that the Mozambican Peace process was carried by the
people's strong will for peace and a deadlock of the warring parties. "The end of the Cold War
and the breakdown of Apartheid opened up a window of opportunity. In order to prevent the
mistakes experienced in Angola, where fighting was renewed after a peace agreement and elec-
tions, the international community decided to spend more right from the beginning, thus creat-
ing an almost "perfect mission" for Mozambique, following the design of the SRSG. This was
ultimately enforced with the support of the United States. The size of the peacekeeping army
and the role of the international community, particularly that of the United States and the UN,
was extended. These features represented a unique opportunity."
The establishment of a Trust fund to consolidate peacebuilding had also been identified as a
positive development in the Mozambican peace process. Ajello (1996:15) viewed the estab-
lishment of a UN Trust Fund as "a final, yet integral part of the operation which granted the
operation some flexibility." According to the SRSG it helped transform the guerrilla movement
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Renarno into a political party and contributed in the demobilisation and reintegration of former
soldiers, who needed training and employment in order to be reintegrated into Mozambican
society. This transformed the peace process into a lasting settlement by preventing widespread
banditry and a disintegration of the disarmament process.
Within the context of peace building Synge (1997:148) also concurred that the principal politi-
cal achievement was the conversion of Renamo from an almost entirely military force and an
instrument of destruction into a credible political organisation. Such a conversion was, indeed,
the primary goal of the GPA, and it was achieved through patient engagement with the Renamo
leadership, both by Ajello and by the international community as a whole. The defusing of
the military threat had to be accompanied by inducements, including the controversial Renamo
Trust Fund, which became an effective insurance policy against failure. But the international
community's efforts to keep Renamo in play, and its efforts on occasion to treat the government
and Renarno as equals, provoked considerable resentment on the part of the government and the
Frelimo leadership.
Jett (1996:2) pointed out that successful peacekeeping requires enormous effort and is most dif-
ficult after a protracted civil war like the one in Mozambique and that such operations have not
always achieved their goals, regardless of the resources applied. Un1ike many other peacekeep-
ing operations, however, ONUMOZ was heralded as a success.
Jett however raised the question whether the costs associated with the UN operation in Mozam-
bique were justified, and concluded that "even if one could be callous enough to attach no mon-
etary value to the reduction of human suffering, ONUMOZ was a good investment. Whether it
pays off in the long run will be up to the people of Mozambique. The United Nations can be
effective at peacekeeping only when there is a peace to keep. Eventually, it must depart and
leave the people of that country to determine how strongly they wish to preserve peace" (Jett,
1996:11).
Reflecting on ONUMOZ's shortcomings Chachiua and Malan (1998:20) pointed out that
ONUMOZ was the first UN Peacekeeping operation to incorporate a large humanitarian com-
ponent. "While the SRSG was nominally in charge from the outset of the mission, he lacked the
authority necessary to force the various elements of ONUMOZ to operate as a team. Instead,
he had to contend with various parent UN agencies pushing their own agendas and having
their own lines of authority and communication with their representatives in Mozambique. In
particular, the creation by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) of a parallel
bureaucracy to oversee humanitarian operations not on1y duplicated the efforts of other UN
agencies and dozens of non-government organisations (NGOs) already active on the ground, it
actually served to slow and even block donor efforts to deal with problems."
It was also pointed out (Synge, 1997:71) that UNOHAC came into being "(without) the consent
and co-operation of the dozens of humanitarian organisations on the grounds." In addition "deci-
sions in New York raised problems in Maputo, where the aims and management of UNO HAC
were subjected to scrutiny by a long-established community of international, bilateral, and non-
governmental humanitarian agencies. A high degree of co-ordination already existed, both for-
mally and informally, and these organisations found it hard to accept the need for an additional
agency."
In terms of the overall successes of UNOHAC Synge (1997:89) declared that "(most) of the
credit for the successes in the humanitarian field, as in so many other areas of the Mozambican
peace process, should go to the country's people. Their patient and co-operative spirit ensured
the generally peaceful return home of the refugees, the displaced, and the demobilised sol-
diers. The generosity of the international community, which kept faith with its long-standing
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support of Mozambique in earlier years, also played a large part. UN agencies, international
organisations, and NOOs generally provided high levels of assistance. The organisational and
interagency problems besetting the humanitarian relief programmes never seriously hindered
the generally well co-ordinated and accurately targeted delivery of many different forms of
emergency assistance."
Synge (1997:90) however pointed out that the long-term legacy of humanitarian work during the
peace process was more difficult to assess. Donor agencies relied heavily on foreign NGOs to
deliver resources, prompting some observers to comment that the donor community was delib-
erately attempting to weaken the government rather than to promote a healthy balance between
state and civil society. The fact that there were more international NOOs in Mozambique at
the end of the process than at the time of its launch could be a cause of concern. Although the
international community delivered humanitarian assistance effectively, especially in Renamo-
held areas, it did not follow this through with a strategy for a balanced, Mozambican-managed
completion of the process.
With reference to demobilisation during the Mozambican peace process (Synge, 1997:112)
stated that "(in) operational terms, demobilisation was as thorough and effective as it could have
been in the circumstances, thanks to an extraordinary effort at co-ordination by the international
donor community. Much of the organisation was managed under programs established inde-
pendently ofONUMOZ bureaucracy." The principal shortcoming of the demobilisation process
according to Synge was the delay in collecting and disposing of weapons, although "(this) could
be largely attributed to the reluctance of the parties and the lack of priority given to the issue in
the OPA."
In terms of the size and deployment of ONUMOZ Berman (1996:81) contended that "(the)
issue is hotly contested by some." According to Berman "One of the interesting lessons learned
from the operation in Mozambique was that cantonment of troops was possible with a minimum
of UN presence." In this regard Chachiua and Malan (1998:20) agreed, pointing out that the
majority of the ONUMOZ military mission burden was carried by a small contingent of mili-
tary observers who staffed assembly areas, assisted with demobilisation, collected arms from
caches and verified weapons deposits - "(while) the bulk of the military contingents spent their
time patrolling transportation corridors in a relatively secure environment. The result was that
the demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, the formation of the new FADM, and the
disposal of surplus small arms were the most desultory aspects of the entire peace process."
Most authors and analysts are ad idem in their assessment of ONUMOZ failure towards its
disarmament objectives during the peace process. Chachiua and Malan (1998:25) argued that
"(the) short-sightedness with which the disarmament and demobilisation of redundant soldiers
were undertaken, proved a significant impediment to the post-conflict reconstruction process.
The UN neglected the need for a comprehensive 'security first' approach to peace in Mozam-
bique, as can be clearly demonstrated by the contempt for issues of security and stability during
the ONUMOZ deployment. Although disarmament was initially a high UN priority, Chachiua
and Malan also pointed out that ONUMOZ represented "(a) shift from military to electoral and
political issues."
While the UN Secretary General reported that some 190 000 weapons were collected under
ONUMOZ supervision, very few of these arms (and the ammunition which was recovered) were
destroyed - while many found their way back into illegal hands. Moreover, it was estimated that
there were probably as many as one million assault rifles in circulation in Mozambique at the
time. (Chachiua and Malan, 1998:26)
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According to Chachiua and Malan the neglect of safety and security issues "(becomes) even
more apparent when one views Mozambique's longer term security concerns. Although the
country needed support for demobilisation and reintegration, it also needed an army for the
maintenance of security in the aftermath of the peace process. The UN remained totally uncon-
cerned with the fact that less than ten per cent of the registered soldiers volunteered to join the
new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM). This lack of enthusiasm to serve in a new peacetime
national army was partly because of war fatigue but also, significantly, because no material or
moral incentives were provided for joining - there was nothing akin to even the paltry demobili-
sation packages which were sponsored by the international community." (Chachiua and Malan,
1998:26)
Chachiua and Malan (1998:27) also concluded that "(it) the primary objective of peace opera-
tions is meant to be that of enhancing security, long term stability and therefore sustainable
development, then issues of violence, peace and stability should not be viewed through a purely
political lens. Elections, for example, should not be viewed as an end in themselves, but also as
a means for promoting long term political and social stability. When people continue to suffer
from widespread insecurity, violence and social instability during and after a peace process, no
mission can be regarded as an unqualified success."
The criticism that ONUMOZ failed in its disarmament objectives is supported by Berman
(1996:84-85) stating "(that) overall, the greatest problem with the GPA was that it was too gen-
eral and the non-specific nature of much of the GPA - especially as concerned disannament
and arms destruction - gave both parties room to manoeuvre in interpreting the plans. The UN,
therefore, was not able to ensure that the parties adhered strictly to their commitments. The
UNs mission was further complicated by the Chapter VI framework in which the PKO was
undertaken; the Government's acute sensitivity toward upholding its sovereignty, and powerful
interests within both parties to delay demobilisation and to refrain from disarming."
In this regard Berman argued that the UN and the international community dealt with this pre-
dicament by affecting policies not foreseen in the GPA as a means to undercut both parties'
influence. "The RSS achieved the goal of demobilisation, but did little toward realising disar-
mament. The Government is now forced to locate and destroy caches of weapons in the post-
ONUMOZ environment with substantially reduced resources than those, which were available
during the PKO. The result has been a marked increase in violent crimes in neighbouring coun-
tries as the cross-border trade in assault rifles escalates." (Berman, 1996:85)
According to Berman disarmament, which at first had been the prerequisite to holding elections,
"(eventually) became little more than an afterthought and the operation's great failing lies with
the fact that it did not also make disarmament a priority." Berman therefore concluded that it is
rare when the UN and the international community have an opportunity to reduce significantly
the threat that small weapons pose to law and order within a country as well as within a region.
"ONUMOZ presented such an opportunity, yet it was not appropriately exploited." (Berman,
1996:85)
Reflecting on the UN's capacity to respond to peacekeeping operations as presented by the
Mozambican scenario Alden (1995: 127) concluded that several of the numerous problems which
emerged in Mozambique called into question "(the) capacity of the United Nations to fulfil mis-
sions of this nature. The overall readiness to engage in such peace support operations was found
in many instances to be wanting. Delays in introducing UN troops, partially due to the failure to
secure immediately a Status of Forces Agreement with the Government, were compounded by
the reluctance of UN member-states to provide soldiers. The inter-agency conflicts, reflective of
structural flaws in the UN system itself, also damaged the credibility of ONUMOZ."
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Alden (1995:112) also pointed out that although the 1992 peace agreement had called for the
introduction of a UN presence in Mozambique almost immediately, it took nearly six months
before ONUMOZ was actually established. In addition, bureaucratic wrangling, involving eve-
rything from in-fighting over "turf' issues to paralysis over procedures, played a significant part
in the character of ONUMOZ. "While this could be expected in any large undertaking, and
certainly amplified in the case of an operation of the magnitude found in Mozambique, there
were several indications that these highlighted the existence of important problems in both the
structure and the manner in which UN peace support operations were carried out. In particular,
the overlap in terms of mandate fuelled inter-agency conflicts over everything from securing
of lucrative contracts to implementing their provisions, while a narrowness of interpretation
frequently prevented UN agencies from fulfilling aspects of the peace process which would
seem to logically fall within their purview. In addition to incompatible bureaucratic procedures
in such key areas as accounting, trust fund management, and the allocation of resources, insti-
tutional prohibitions on working with non-state bodies was an obstruction to UN action. Further
compounding the situation were the clumsy and slow procurement procedures which, while
designed for maximum "transparency", did not lend themselves to the quick and successful
implementation of a massive mission in support of peace" (Alden, 1995:115).
Synge (1997: 160) also observed that although the soldiers were eventually demobilised, very
few of their weapons were collected or destroyed. Disarmament in Mozambique as a national
priority was never addressed seriously by the GPA, by the ONUMOZ mandate, or by the inter-
national donor community. It was common knowledge that millions of AK-47s were at large
in the country, in the possession of soldiers and civilians alike. "The rare opportunity that the
ONUMOZ period provided for a comprehensive disarmament was missed entirely. As a result,
there is continuing concern about the effects of the proliferation of Mozambican weapons on the
stability of the wider Southern African region and of South Africa in particular." Only 180 000
weapons were collected under CCF monitoring and all these were handed over to the new army,
with the exception of 24 000 that were destroyed, according to Synge.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PEACEBUILDING AND LANDMINES
4.1. The Problem Of Landmines In Mozambique
Landmines were extensively used in Mozambique's war of independence, and in the ensuing
civil war. Over a period of more than twenty years, the warring parties used landmines to defend
army strongholds, villages, strategic areas and in order to ambush and disrupt the enemy, and
deny its population the use of land. Mines were also used offensively.(Department of Foreign
Affairs, May: 1998)
According to Human Rights Watch (1997:69) landmines were deployed by the parties in a vari-
ety of ways. Frelimo and Renamo in the 1980s and 1990s frequently disseminated landmines
in a random fashion. In many cases it appeared "(that) civilians were the main target and that
mines were used deliberately to terrorise civilian communities and to deny them access to fields,
water sources and fishing points." In the southern provinces, Renamo was largely responsible
for laying mines specifically to discourage or make impossible the return of displaced persons
to their homes.
Renamo's war against the govermnent was aimed at the devastation of the economy and the
isolation of government forces to garrisons and towns. As part of this campaign Renamo used
landmines extensively. Rhodesian military officials began training Renamo combatants in land-
mine use in 1977. Route denial was a frequent objective through mining of major roads, supply
routes, and rural tracks. Airstrips were also an important target of Renamo mining. Ambush
mining, particularly on roads and tracks, was extensively employed by Renamo. (Human Rights
Watch,1997:69)
Government forces began using mines to protect border installations against Rhodesian incur-
sions in 1977. Many of the technicians had received training in mine laying when they were
trained as nationalist guerrillas in Tanzania, China, and Algeria. Government forces primarily
used defensive mining, for the protection of key economic installations and strategic locations
(Human Rights Watch, 1997:69).
Portuguese forces in the independence war also used landmines in Mozambique to protect
economic and strategic installations and during counterinsurgency operations. Rhodesian and
South African forces planted mines in cross-border raids in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Tanzanian troops laid defensive minefields around their bases in Zambézia province. Malawian
troops planted mines along the Nacala railway and Zimbabwean regular forces mined the Beira
and Limpopo transport corridors (Human Rights Watch, 1997:71).
While systematic mine laying occurred from 1965 until 1992, most mines were laid by Mozam-
bican government armed forces and Renamo between 1978 and 1990. According to Human
Rights Watch no one knows the true extent of the landmines problem but most surveys so far
suggest that it is a patchy, but nevertheless, serious problem. The most widely cited estimate of
the number of mines is the December 1992 UN estimate of two million mines. However, this
figure has no independent basis; it was reached by simply taking the average of estimates being
circulated at the time. Human Rights Watch was unable to conduct a comprehensive assessment
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of landmine numbers, but its 1994 study found that the UN estimate was considerably high, and
the figure was better thought of in the tens or hundreds of thousands. (Human Rights Watch,
1997:73)
Analysis of reported mined areas in Mozambique
(UNDPIDHAlADP, 1996)
Province Category
"
1 2 3 4 5 6
Niassa 8 10 4 12 39 26
Cabo Delgado 1 8 3 12 74 21
Nampula 3 19 5 25 63 9
Zambézia 6 72 2 141 202 55
Tete 3 37 4 31 106 38
Manica 14 14 0 7 6 1
Sofala 7 32 2 5 la 2
Inhambane 6 25 6 30 118 25
Gaza 6 15 1 10 18 0
Maputo 35 36 25 32 84 ]
Total 129 268 52 305 720 178
Mined area categories:
1. Minefield Rings
2. Roads/Tracks
3. Key National Infrastructures (dams, bridges, power lines)
4. Local Infrastructure
5. Local High Use Areas (schools, health posts, wells)
6. Local General Areas
According to Human Rights Watch (1997:74-75) former Soviet mines remain the most com-
monly found in Mozambique. Some mines came through circuitous routes. The French
MAPDV-59 appeared to have originally been use in Algeria: after independence the Algerians
lifted many and resold them to Mozambique. The South Africans also "recycled" mines cap-
tured in Angola and gave them to Renarno for its operations.
The following is a list of landmines reported in Mozambique:
• Soviet: PMN, PMN-2, POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMD-6M, OZM-3, OZM-4, OZM-72,
MON-50, MON-IOO;
• Czechoslovak: PP-Ml-SR II;
• East German: PPM-2;
•Yugoslav: PROM-I;
• Chinese: Type 69, Type 72, Type 72B;
• Italian: VAR-40, VAR-IOO,Valmara V-69;
• Belgian: PRB-M409;
• French: MAPDV-59;
• British: No.6;
• Portuguese: M-969;
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• United States: MI8AI, M14;
• South African: M2A2, NO.69 Mkl, Shrapnel Mine No.2, MIM MS-803 (mini-Clay-
more);
• Rhodesian: RAP-I, RAP-2, RAPS (PloughShear);
• Zimbabwean: RAP-No.1, ZAPS (PloughShear).
Antitank mines found in Mozambique include: TM-46, TM-57, TMN-46, TM-62D, TM-62M,
TM-62P, TMK-2 (Soviet); Mk5, Mk7, (UK); M19, M24 (USA); Type 72 (Chinese); PtMiBaIII
(Czechoslovak); T-ABI (Brazilian); DNW ATM 2000E (Austrian); PRB M3 (Belgian); NO.8MkI
(South African); "Chocolate Box" (Rhodesian).
In terms of the impact of landmines on Mozambique (Hidden Killers, 1998:7) the U.S. State
Department pointed out that the impact oflandmines extended far beyond the immediate danger
to individual lives and property and affects virtually every aspect of life in heavily mine-infested
regions. "The toll that landmines take is far greater than the $300-$1 000 required to remove one
of them from the ground or the $3 000 to provide a prosthetic device for a victim. These costs
are especially onerous for agrarian societies which typify the mine-infested areas."
According to Hidden Killers the unseen costs and impact of landmines in Mozambique
include:
• Medical: Treatment and rehabilitation of victims, when services are available, can take
years and deplete scarce medical resources in poor countries.
• Refugees and repatriation: The presence of landmines impedes the return of refugees
and the rebuilding of war-torn societies, prolonging the consequences of war and armed
conflict.
• Economic: Landmines prevent the fullest utilisation of farmland, destroy livestock, and
disrupt markets and production patterns. Their presence inhibits tourism and other poten-
tial investment and development opportunities. Retarding economic recovery and recon-
struction may increase tensions and instability in the region.
• Environmental: Damage to wildlife, forests, and other environmental resources have
consequences for both economic and social development. Minefields sometimes become
breeding grounds for disease.
• Security: The presence of land mines threatens the peace process and post-conflict recov-
ery and reconstruction. They may impede humanitarian assistance efforts, prevent deliv-
ery of urgently needed services and supplies, and discourage potential investors.
Until 1995, according to the US State Department, "the most widely cited number of mines
in Mozambique had been the 1992 UN estimate of more than two million. A partial national
survey, conducted by the Halo Trust in 1994 for the UNDHA, concluded that the actual number
of landmines was likely to be significantly lower, and in June 1995 the UN officially revised
its estimate downward to one million. Some NGOs argue that the UN estimates are still highly
exaggerated and should be lower (Halo Trust estimates 250 000 to 300 000). The lack of records
regarding actual mine locations renders it impossible to give a more precise figure, and no offi-
cial Mozambican statistics exist. The variety of national and international forces operating in
Mozambique during the past two decades have uncovered nearly 50 different types oflandmines
during clearance operations (Hidden Killers, 1998:29)28)
28)The U.S. State Department has adjusted Its esUmate In Mozambique to 1 million (Hidden Killers) A UNDHA study of April 1997 puts the estimate for Mozambique between
500,000 and 1 million landmines.
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The South African government (Dept. of Foreign Affairs, May: 1998) concluded that the dec-
ades of armed conflict in Mozambique had left a legacy of tens of thousands of landmines
strewn in all provinces of the country. In addition to the daily human tragedy landmines caused,
mines were also a significant impediment to the socio-economic reconstruction and develop-
ment underway in Mozambique because of its implications for human security, for sustainable
development, and for the consolidation of democracy. The Department of Foreign Affairs con-
cluded that minefields were a deadly trap for rural populations and prevented the utilisation
of vast and rich cultivation areas, agricultural development, and the expansion of employment
opportunities, all of which tended to affect the stability of democratic governance. Landmines
also blocked the rehabilitation and expansion of national infrastructure such as schools, clinics,
roads, bridges, electrical transmission towers, reservoirs and hydroelectric plants, and posed a
major threat to long-term peacebuilding and reconstruction.
The South African Department of Foreign Affairs (May: 1998) also pointed out that:
- Almost eighty percent of the Mozambican population depended on agriculture for sur-
vival and the rural economy formed the backbone of food security and national devel-
opment. This sector remained seriously threatened by the presence of landmines on a
national scale. Agriculture also accounted for 70% of Mozambique export earnings.
- The continued existence of landmines in Mozambique was hampering the initiatives
of the Mozambique tourist industry to establish infrastructure to develop this potential
resource of income that Mozambique desperately needed.
- The demining of routes, community areas and facilities to stimulate socio-economic
activities and trade links was regarded as a high priority. Ithad been argued that illegal
Mozambicans currently in South Africa would return to Mozambique, once the threat
of landmines in their country had been removed.
- The removal of landmines in Mozambique directly served South Africa's regional
objectives of promoting peace and economic stability in the region. Those areas of
South Africa bordering Mozambique would also benefit directly from the rehabilitation
and reconstruction underway. In addition, the Maputo Development Corridor Project
was regarded as a top priority for the South African Government and successful dem-
ining of the Maputo Province would significantly enhance conditions for economic
growth and development.
- The rehabilitation of Mozambique's essential infrastructure i.e. roads, dams, industrial
areas, schools, clinics etc. remained a critical priority for the development of the coun-
try, and the removal of the landmine threat could contribute to the eventual success of
reconstruction and development programmes undertaken by the Mozambican Govern-
ment and the international donor community.
In terms of landmine victims in Mozambique (Hidden Killers, 1998:30) the US State Depart-
ment concluded that no comprehensive number of landmine casualties for all provinces existed
and there were wide variances (20 to 50 per month) reported. Handicap International had how-
ever collected data in most provinces as part of its mine awareness campaign, and estimated that
45 to 50 casualties per month resulted from landmines. Some NGOs also reported that casual-
ties were minimal in areas in which they conducted clearing operations. Based on recorded
accidents in eight of the 10 provinces, the number of casualties showed a reduction between
1996 and 1997, but Mozambique "(must) still contend with the nearly 10000 people who have
become mine victims since the signing of the peace accord."
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The 1994 Halo Trust Mozambique landmine survey supported by other relevant data obtained
(Mechem Project Proposal, May: 1995) provided the following summary oflandmine contami-
nation in Mozambique:
Minedarea Estimated FarmlandProvince (mJi) mines released. (lIa)
Maputo 1 793 500 237 121 22604
Gaza 737 100 19027 1 385
Inhambane 1 839000 29923 464
Sofala 589000 13 290 211
Manica 612000 13 315 195
Zambézia 1 611 400 55025 956
Tete 770000 23526 290
Nampula 723900 24682 503
Cabo Delgado 660000 8916 330
Niassa 1 125000 18579 316
Total 10460900 443404 27254
With reference to mine awareness (Hidden Killers, 1998:32) the US State Department
indicated that the UNHCR and NGOs conducted extensive mine awareness and educa-
tion for returning refugees in neighbouring countries. Surveys were conducted by Human
Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foun-
dation in some provinces during different periods from 1993 to 1995 to assess levels of
mine awareness. Results showed that a relatively low level of mine awareness existed
among the returning refugees and internally displaced persons, even when landmine
casualties were high. In 1994, the UNHCR asked HI to undertake responsibility for the
national co-ordination of mine awareness. HI had set up a voluntary partner system at the
local level to integrate mine awareness with local government ministries and offices of
the NGOs. Other NGOs and the ICRC, NPA, UNHCR, and the Mozambican Red Cross
each provided mine education and awareness in locations closest to their operations.
Most included some demining in nearby areas that provided basic social services for
the local population. The US Government had provided training aids, pamphlets, books,
and cards to support these programs. UNICEF had supported a countrywide Landmine
Awareness Campaign for several years, emphasising broadcasting and print media to
provide information in multiple dialects.
In terms of victim assistance Hidden Killers (1998:32) observed that Mozambique suffered
from a lack of adequate health and rehabilitative facilities that contributed to a high fatality
rate among mine casualties while UNICEF had reported that nearly 60% of all victims died
before they could receive appropriate first aid. In 1996, a comprehensive Community Informa-
tion Epidemiological Technologies (CIET) International survey of four major landmine-affected
countries reported that, in Mozambique, more than 25% of all households were affected by
landrnines, and women, more than in any other country surveyed, were victims. The govern-
ment relieed heavily upon NGOs to meet its rehabilitative needs. The ICRC, VVAF, MSF, and
POWER (Prosthetics and Orthotics World-wide Education and Relief), an international NGO,
operated rehabilitation and orthopaedic centres in most provinces and were enhancing the local
production capacity for prostheses by training local technicians in production and maintenance.
The ICRC had transferred control of some prosthetic/orthopaedic projects to indigenous health
care organisations.
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As the effects of war and drought spread in Mozambique and food insecurity and vulnerability
increased throughout the 1980s measures were taken to strengthen the overall UN response.
Within the UN system, a co-ordination forum was established in 1984 under the responsibility
of the UN Resident Co-ordinator. However, individual agencies tended to unilaterally pursue
their sectoral activities. In February 1987, the UN Resident Co-ordinator was appointed UN
Special Co-ordinator of Emergency Relief Operations and the office of UNSCERO was cre-
ated. Agencies involved in large-scale' operational activities continued with the organisation of
unilateral programmes but UNSCERO provided a useful forum for the exchange of information
and, as the peace process moved centre stage in the latter part of 1992, was instrumental in
negotiating access to RENAMO-held areas. With the creation of UNOHAC in December 1992,
UNSCERO ceased to exist. (UNDHA, 1997:10)
4.2 ONUMOZ - Peacebuilding and Landmines
The General Peace agreement signed in Rome in October 1992 stressed the importance of
humanitarian action being an integral component of the larger peacebuilding endeavour. How-
ever, there was no "humanitarian contingent", as such, involved in the peace negotiation process
and it was not until July 1992 that both parties agreed to a Declaration of Principles designed to
facilitate unhindered humanitarian action. There was no specific reference to landmines in the
peace agreement. 29) It must be noted that in 1992 few individuals or entities in or outside the
UN were adequately aware of the nature of the problem posed by landmines. In April 1992, the
Department of Humanitarian Affairs was formally established and it was not until August of that
year that the UN acquired the assistance of an in-house mines specialist who worked with the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and provided advice to UNDHA. (UNDHA, 1997:11)
As early as July 1992, the Under Secretary General for UNDHA, Mr. Jan Eliasson contacted
UNSCERO for advice on the nature of the landmines problem in Mozambique and was advised
that it was not possible to provide any kind of precise information prior to a cease-fire.
UNSCERO also indicated that mines were, indeed, a problem and that aid agencies were in the
process of contacting demining companies which might, potentially, be used to open up access
roads for relief convoys. (UNDHA, 1997:11)
Consequent to the signing of the Joint Declaration by President Chissano and RENAMO leader
DHLAKAMA on 7 August 1992 in which they committed themselves to a General Peace
Agreement on 1October 1992, the United Nations dispatched a Technical Team to Mozambique
on 9 September 1992.
The team was assigned the objective of evolving a plan for the implementation of the likely role
of the United Nations in the cease-fire verification arrangements. It was also assigned the task
of assessing the requirement for human and material resources to implement this plan.
The Technical Report (1992:12) concluded that a priority element of the UN Operation must be
to assist in the demining and repair of road and rail networks, and to provide security for those
undertaking such work.
The Technical Report, however pointed out that it was impossible to estimate the total numbers
of mines deployed in minefields, because of the variety of mine-laying agencies. In addition,
mines had not been laid in a disciplined fashion, nor had minefield records taken place. Accord-
29) Protocol VI (article 1, par 2) of the GPA merely stated that the CCF should organise and implement mine clearing operations while par 5 (point 6) stipulated that as of E.day
(entry into force of the GPA) the Parties may not lay mines and prevent mine clearing operations.
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ing to the Report "(a) very rough figure, based on arbitrary and untested approximations, is that
the total mine contamination in Mozambique is in the order of250,000 mines of various types."
(Technical Report, 1992:28)
The Technical Team concluded that "the scope of the demining problem is difficult to define,
and a mine contamination survey will have to be carried out as a matter of priority after the
cease- fire.
The Report also pointed out that the removal of mines will have to be an integral part of the
road and rail network clearance and repair. This aspect again will require military engineer
capability, because neither the Government engineers nor their counterparts in RENAMO are
organised, trained or equipped for the removal of anti-personnel mines. As with other repair
and reconstruction groups, mine clearance teams would have to be protected or capable of self
protection." (Technical Report, 1992:13)
The Report identified the following priorities for a UN demining capacity as part of a projected
UN Peacekeeping operation in Mozambique (Technical Report, 1992:29-30)
(a). Implementation of a full-scale mine reconnaissance along routes and in areas necessary
for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.
(b). Clearance essential to the establishment of UN Military Observers, and their immedi-
ate areas of operations.
(c). Clearance essential to the administrative support of Assembly Areas after the cease-
fire.
(d). Clearance necessary for the humanitarian movement of food to feeding centres.
(e). Clearance necessary for the return of refugees to Mozambique from neighbouring
states.
(f). Clearance and clearance training necessary for the resettlement of refugees.
(g). Clearance of major infrastructure items not directly connected to the UN operation.
In recommending the establishment of ONUMOZ the UNSG pointed out that the character
and scope of the United Nations ongoing humanitarian assistance programmes in Mozambique
required adjustment following the signing of the Agreement, in which the parties undertook
to facilitate significantly the provision of humanitarian aid to previously inaccessible areas
and called on the United Nations to co-ordinate the provision of all such assistance. The
UNSG immediately after the signing of the agreement, accordingly dispatched a Humanitarian
Assistance Mission to Mozambique to assess existing United Nations operations in this area
and to devise a more effective United Nations response to the intended expansion of humanitar-
ian activities, with emphasis on the development of an appropriate co-ordination mechanism.
(UNSG report to UNSC, 1992: December)
As a result, the UNSG recommended that ONUMOZ should have a humanitarian component
in the form of a United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
(UNOHAC) which would be established in Maputo, with sub-offices at the regional and pro-
vinciallevels. Itwould replace the office of the United Nations Special Co-ordinator for Emer-
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gency Relief Operations (UNSCERO). Headed by the Humanitarian Affairs Co-ordinator, and
under the overall authority of the interim Special Representative, it would function as an inte-
grated component of ONUMOZ. To ensure the proper provision and delivery of relief assistance
to an expanded beneficiary population in Mozambique, UNOHAC would co-ordinate the vari-
ous humanitarian assistance programmes, operational agencies and the non-governmental aid
community would be asked to provide representatives to work within UNOHAC. (UNSG report
to UNSC, 1992: December)
According to UNDHA (1997: 11) after the entry into force of the GPA, it became apparent that
neither the Government nor RENAMO were enthusiastic about mine clearance for humanitar-
ian purposes. When various relief agencies encountered problems in obtaining approval for
verification and clearance activities, a special meeting of the Cease-fire Commission was held
on 28 December 1992. At the meeting, the SRSG stressed that it was important to distinguish
between mine clearance in the context of Protocols IV and VI concerned with military matters
and mine clearance undertaken for humanitarian purposes. Referring to the Guiding Principles
for Humanitarian Assistance signed by both parties in July the SRSG noted that the United
Nations and the ICRC had the authority to undertake the clearing of mines in order to obtain
access to people in need of humanitarian assistance. The SRSG referred to various sections of
the Guiding Principles including those which stipulated freedom of movement for persons and
means which, under the flag of the United Nations or of the ICRC, were engaged in humanitar-
ian actions and were not accompanied by military escorts. The SRSG, referring to Protocol VI
of the GPA which stated that the Cease-fire Commission (CCF) would organise and implement
mine-clearing operations, indicated that these provisions were strictly limited to the implemen-
tation of the cease-fire agreement and did not give the CCF a monopoly over all mine action
activities. (UNDHA, 1997:12)
To avoid problems in the future, the SRSG proposed that the Cease-fire Commission be respon-
sible for all issues related to mines but with the clear understanding that this approach should
have no negative effect on the delivery of humanitarian aid and if problems arose in the Cease-
fire Commission, the issue would automatically come before the CSc. (UNDHA, 1997:12)
On 31 December 1992, the Control and Supervisory Commission decided that in relation to
mines a national plan should embrace the dual objectives of clearing all Mozambican territory
of mines and strengthening the national capacity to undertake mine clearing operations. The
CSC affirmed the role of the two Mozambican parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO to develop
this plan with the support of ONUMOZ which requested the UN Department of Peacekeeping
(DPKO) in New York to make immediately available the services of the resident mine specialist,
to assist in the preparation of a national plan as ONUMOZ had no personnel with the necessary
experience in mine warfare. (UNDHA, 1997:13)
In January 1993, after a reconnaissance trip to Mozambique, a preliminary plan was developed
setting out the overall direction and modalities of a future mine action programme. The prelimi-
nary plan was geared to meeting the immediate needs of the ONUMOZ peacebuilding mission
and focussed on the opening of major routes particularly those which had been approved in
December 1992 by the CCF although there was no real understanding of the extent to which
these roads were mined. (UNDHA, 1997:14)
While there was a sense of urgency to get clearance of major routes underway as quickly as
possible, the plan also established the need to simultaneously develop a cadre of Mozambican
mine clearers to commence tackling secondary routes and other mined areas likely to cause high
civilian death rates. A key element of the plan was the organisation of a mine clearance training
school where basic courses would run for 8-9 weeks. After a few months of actual clearance it
was envisaged that the most skilled personnel would be selected for training as team leaders
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and supervisors. The plan also outlined requirements for the actual management of UN support
but no reference was made to the creation of a Mozambican capability essential for the overall
co-ordination and management of a national programme upon the departure of the UN mission.
(UNDHA, 1997:14)
The plan highlighted the importance of mine awareness and survey activities being undertaken
at an early stage but did not identify clearly defined objectives in this regard. With the plan
focussed on immediate clearance needs it was primarily concerned with developing a pro-
gramme which could manage and organise contractual arrangements for rapid clearance of
major routes and the organisation of a school to train Mozambicans in mine-clearance and
related skills. In this connection, the plan also indicated that at some future date Mozambicans
could become a source of expertise for other programmes in Africa. (UNDHA, 1997:14)
The plan also stated that when ONUMOZ "winds down, the Project Management role will
continue and, eventually, (it) will pass to the future Mozambique Government". However, there
was no indication as to when or how this could occur or an assessment of the government's
capability to assume such responsibilities. The plan did not indicate to what extent, if any, the
government, RENAMO and others were involved in, or consulted on, the formulation of the
plan. (UNDHA, 1997:14)
Notwithstanding considerable concern about the implications of mines for a vast range of peace-
building activities, the CFC did not approve the project document for a national mine action
programme, as broadly outlined in the preliminary plan, until November 1993 - eleven months
after it was tabled by ONUMOZ. Initially, FRELIMO expressed reservations about the overall
programme and objected to the way in which its use of mines during the war was outlined in the
plan. In March 1993, RENAMO began a three-month boycott of the CSC effectively making
approval impossible. (UNDHA, 1997:16)
The CFC recommenced its activities with RENAMO participation in June 1993 but since deci-
sion-making was by consensus, and the RENAMO participant did not have the necessary author-
ity to decide on particular issues, little progress was made in securing approval for a nation-wide
programme. In September and October various tri-lateral meetings were held, paving the way
for approval of a number of individual projects including a HALO Trust Level I survey and an
NPA programme in Tete. A country-wide programme, which largely reflected the objectives,
institutional arrangements, and operational modalities set out in the initial preliminary plan, was
finally approved on 24 November 1993. (UNDHA, 1997:17)
UNDHA (1997:17) pointed out that the initial plan was framed within the context and time-
frame of the ONUMOZ mission and was vague about institutional arrangements needed to sup-
port activities which would continue after the ONUMOZ mandate expired. The general idea
was that activities under the direct management of the Programme Manager of the Mine Clear-
ance Programme Management Unit would become the responsibility of the government at
the completion of the ONUMOZ mandate. UN institutional arrangements for the mine action
programme during the ONUMOZ period were also ambiguous. The plan envisaged a central-
ised management structure with the Programme Manager reporting to the SRSG while work-
ing closely with the UNOHAC Director; in practice, the Programme Manager reported to the
UNOHAC Director and collaborated with the Force Commander on issues such as the Mine
Clearance Training School which was under the direction of ONUMOZ engineers.
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UNDHA (1997:19) also observed that "throughout most of 1993, the UN mine action pro-
gramme essentially consisted of an office with a Programme Manager waiting for the Cease-
fire Commission to reach agreement on the Mozambique Mine Clearance Programme." It
was understood that this programme would be executed by the United Nations Development
Programme/Office for Project Services (UNDP/OPS). The project document assumed that rapid
deployment of mine clearance units would require contracting with commercial firms particu-
larly in relation to the clearance of major routes. 30)
By early 1994, According to UNDHA (1997:20) a chorus of criticism was directed at UN activi-
ties in relation to mine action in Mozambique. The central complaint from donors was that not-
withstanding the allocation of funds in early 1993, no mines had actually been cleared under the
auspices of the UN programme some 12 to 14 months later. Aware of such criticism, perturbed
by delays, and anxious to have a Mozambican capability operational prior to the end of the
ONUMOZ mission, UNOHAC initiated steps in April 1994 to launch what became known as
ADP, the Accelerated Demining Programme.
The report of the Secretary General on ONUMOZ (UNSG report to UNSC, April:1994)
acknowledged that the United Nations mine-clearance programme "(has) suffered significant
delays, partially as a result of the slow approval of the national mine-clearance plan by the
Cease-fire Commission, but also because the process of identifying and selecting suitable con-
tractors turned out to be protracted. Negotiations have finally been completed for a contract for
the clearance of unexploded ordinance and mines blocking 2 000 kilometres of priority roads."
In the same report the UNSG also announced that "(the) mine-clearance programme will be
accelerated to ensure that sufficient progress is made in the coming months in the movement of
internally displaced persons and returnees and to facilitate the election campaign. The training
of mine-clearance personnel, being undertaken by the United Nations and other donor agencies,
will be speeded up so that an adequate number of Mozambicans will have been trained to carry
out the necessary mine-clearance activities." 31) (UNSG report to UNSC, April: 1994)
Security Council Resolution 916 (May:1994) renewing the mandate of ONUMOZ until 15
November 1994 and urging the Mozambican parties to allow ONUMOZ unimpeded access to
the areas under their control emphasised the importance of progress being made in the area of
mine clearance and related training in Mozambique. It also welcomed the Secretary General's
intention to accelerate the implementation of the United Nations programme and expressed
appreciation to those countries which had provided assistance.
In the report of the Secretary General on ONUMOZ to the UNSC (July:1994) the UNSG
announced that "(the) plan to establish a national mine-clearance capacity is now making
progress, and it is expected that some 400 Mozambican deminers will be trained by November
1994. In this regard, the Mine Clearance Training Centre is to be moved from temporary facili-
ties in Beira to more permanent ones in Tete, In the meantime, the national mine survey was
completed on 9 June 1994, providing critical details concerning safety of roads and 1 300 con-
firmed or suspected mined sites.'?"
30) Despite the slow progress UNSC Resolution 663 of 13 September 1993 welcomed "the progress on mlne·clearlng"ln Mozambique.
31) The Secretary General in his report to the UNSC (1993:November) Indicated that "(the) projected aim to train 1500 deminers Is now In an advanced stage of preparation."
32) The UNSG described the Halo Trust Survey as a "national mine survey (which) will provide high quality information on mined roads and areas all over the country." UN
DHA however found the survey to be "seriously flawed" given the absence of crucial information such as the magnitude of mined areas identified, the precise length of roads
suspected of being mined and the non classification of the reliability of individual accounts of reported mineflelds.
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In addition, a statement by the President of the Security Council (July: 1994) expressing concern
at continued delays in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique
underlined the importance to the peace process of the rehabilitation of areas with a large return-
ing population, including through an effective mine-clearance programme. In this regard, "(it)
urged that high priority be given to mine-clearance activities and related training/'ê"
The visit of the UN Security Council mission to Mozambique between 7 and 12 August 1994
underscored the serious problems experienced by the ONUMOZ mine clearance programme
towards the end of its mandate. In the report of the UNSC mission (August: 1994) the mission
pointed out "(that) substantial delays in the implementation of aspects of the mine-clearance
programme, and the state of the programme generally, were a source of dismay to the Mission.
While the National Mine Survey has been largely completed, there has been only limited
progress in the clearing of priority roads, and the Mine-clearance Training Centre is still not
fully operational." The Mission was especially concerned to learn during a visit to the Training
Centre at Tete that the Centre was experiencing difficulty attracting Mozambican trainees. The
lack of resources at the centre, including such basics as a reliable water supply and medical
support unit, was also a cause of concern to the UNSC mission.
The UNSC Mission therefore concluded that "(if) there was one area of disappointment in an
otherwise successful mission, it was that of mine clearance, which was late in starting and has
made little progress. This must be rectified, with proper machinery put in place. There should
be no attempt whatsoever to disrupt the programme, or to transfer existing resources to another
operation." (UNSC Mission Report, August: 1994)
With regard to the longer term sustainability of the programme after expiration of the ONUMOZ
mandate the mission observed that "(the) financing of the programme beyond November 1994
deserves serious consideration as the Government of Mozambique is unlikely to be in a position
to finance the programme on a long-term basis." (UNSC Mission Report, August: 1994)
The Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly on humanitarian and disaster
assistance to Mozambique, (September: 1994) also addressed the longer term dimension of
landmines in Mozambique and stated that "(the) clearance of the land-mines, which are imped-
ing the economic and social development of Mozambique, will require a number of years. It
is hoped that the Mozambican national capacity can eventually encompass all of the Mozam-
bicans who have been engaged in mine-awareness and clearance efforts. The establishment of
a national government entity, which is to assume responsibility for the demining programmes
upon the expiry of the ONUMOZ mandate, has unfortunately also suffered delays. Additional
technical and financial assistance will clearly be required from November 1994. Before that
time, however, required managerial capacities must be created and a management training pro-
gramme should be in place that would provide operational and financial management capacities
and thus set the stage for the eventual assumption of full responsibility by the Government of
Mozambique." 34)
The Statement by the President of the Security Council welcoming the installation of the
President of Mozambique and the inauguration of the new Assembly (December: 1994) also
expressed the hope "(that) effective arrangements for the disposition and, as appropriate, the
destruction of weapons and the establishment, with the assistance of the United Nations, of a
33) The initial mine action plan clearly Identified mine awareness as an Important component of the envisaged programme but according to UN DHA no serious attempt was
made by the UN to develop a national programme during the initiation period. In fact mine awareness was stipulated as part of the plan in the report to the UNSG to the UNSC
on ONUMOZ (1993:November). Although primarily focused on the physical and occupational rehabilitation of mine victims Handicap International began to playa key role in
conducting mine awareness in Mozambique in early 1993.
34) A statement by the President of the Security Council on 7 September expressed concern at the limited progress made In the area of demining, welcomed efforts to
revitalise the programme and urged all concerned to accelerate training and mine-clearance "(and) work with the relevant Mozambican authorities towards the establishment
of a national demining capacity"
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national demining capability will be in place prior to the final withdrawal of ONUMOZ, and
that consideration will be given to leaving demining and other equipment in Mozambique after
the withdrawal, subject to the appropriate arrangements."
In the final report of the Secretary General on ONUMOZ (December: 1994) the UNSG informed
the UNSC that "(as) a result of the slow start of the original United Nations demining pro-
gramme, a new and accelerated programme was put in place in June 1994. lts ultimate goal is
the creation of a national Mozambican mine-clearance capacity. By the end of the mandate of
ONUMOZ, the programme had been able to train 450 Mozambicans to man 10 demining teams,
which are currently operating in the southern areas of Maputo province. They have cleared
some 40 000 square metres and disabled over 555 mines. The programme has also achieved a
significant number of other goals: 20 Mozambicans were trained as demining team supervisors;
an additional 16Mozambicans have completed training as minefield surveyors; and others have
been trained for work as paramedics, explosive ordnance disposal specialists and logisticians,
and for general administrative and other functions."
The Secretary General also expressed the hope that "(the) period of time between the end of
the ONUMOZ mandate and November 1995 will be sufficient for the Government of Mozam-
bique and others concerned to reach a final determination regarding the future of the demining
programme." In this regard the UNSG concluded that "(all) parties concerned with demining
in Mozambique share the view that there is a need for the establishment of an entity at the
national level to provide the various demining organisations and companies with policy orienta-
tion, operational standards and coherence. At present, it is envisaged that the capacity required
for such an entity will be built through a donor-supported UNDP project." (UNSG report on
ONUMOZ, December: 1994)
According to UNDHA at the end of 1994, the combined efforts of the NGOs, commercial com-
panies and the UN resulted in the following levels of clearance:
• Roads cleared 2,800 km
•Area cleared 1,440,750 sq.m (144 hectares)
• Mine destroyed __ 1,184
• UXO destroyed __ 78,000
It was estimated that during this period just under $24 million was disbursed to achieve these
totals. (UNDHA, 1997:24)
Towards the end of the ONUMOZ mandate the UN General Assembly in a Resolution concern-
ing assistance to Mozambique noted "(with) appreciation that a mine-clearance programme
is underway in Mozambique", with the support of the United Nations, in close co-operation
with Governments and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations. The Resolution
also urged the international community "(to) continue to provide the needed assistance for the
accomplislunent of the mine-clearance programme in that country." (UNGA Resolution 49/21,
1994: December)
4.3. The Ottawa Treaty 1997
4.3.1. Introduction
The 1997 Ottawa Treaty is part of the international response to the humanitarian crisis
caused by the global proliferation of anti-personnel landrnines. Their long-term nega-
tive impact upon individuals, communities and societies and on sustainable develop-
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ment presents one of the most serious man-created problems of the twentieth century.
Once emplaced, landmines are indiscriminate in their effects, and unless removed or
detonated, long lasting.
In 1990, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and humanitarian organi-
sations began to document a dramatically high number of civilian mine casualties. Many
of the victims were wounded during periods when no fighting was taking place or after
the end of hostilities. Subsequently, the ICRC, and the International Campaign to Ban
Landrnines (ICBL) - an international coalition of non-governmental organisations -
began efforts to raise awareness about the devastating effects of these weapons and press
for an end to their use. During the years leading up to the conclusion of the Ottawa Treaty
in 1997, these efforts were the dominant force in mobilising public opinion, stimulating
military and political debate, and ensuring that the plight of victims and communities
living under the threat of landmines was highlighted.
Detailed provisions specific to anti-personnel mines are contained in various interna-
tional agreements and the use of landmines is restricted by international law, specifically
international humanitarian law namely:
- Parties to a conflict must always distinguish between civilians and combatants.
Civilians may not be directly attacked and indiscriminate attacks, and the use of
indiscriminate weapons are prohibited.
- It is prohibited to use weapons which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering. Therefore, the use of weapons whose damaging effects are dispropor-
tionate to their military purpose is prohibited.
These principles have become part of customary international law and therefore apply to
all states irrespective of their international treaty obligations.
In terms of Treaty law, which applies only to States party to specific international trea-
ties, the principal agreement governing the use of landmines, prior to the Ottawa Treaty
was the United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have
Indiscriminate Effects, adopted in 1980 (CCW). Protocol II of the Treaty, the Protocol
on prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices,
applies only to those states which agree to be bound by its terms as an international legal
agreement, as opposed to international customary law. The CCW was regarded as a weak
instrument with inadequate provisions and a low ratification rate. The CCW formally
applied only to international armed conflicts while the majority of modern day conflicts
were internal armed conflicts. The CCW also lacked implementation provisions.
In light of the humanitarian and socio-economic impact of landmines it became evident
that existing provisions of the CCW were inadequate. Governments therefore agreed
to a Review Conference in September 1995 (Vienna) of the CCW and to specifically
strengthen the provisions of Protocol II dealing with anti-personnel mines. Talks to pro-
hibit or strictly limit the production, transfer and use of anti-personnel mines became
deadlocked and the Review Conference was reconvened in Geneva for two sessions in
1996. Although changes to Protocol II of the CCW were agreed upon, many govern-
ments, the ICRC and ICBL considered the outcome inadequate in terms of the complex-
ity of provisions, and effective implementation mechanisms in the context of the nature
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of modem day armed conflicts. The amended Protocol II was also seen as insufficient
to curb proliferation of the weapon and consequently, to reduce the number of civilian
casualties.
At the closing session of the Review Conference, Canada announced its intention to
invite stakeholders and countries supportive of a total ban on landmines to attend a con-
ference in Ottawa aimed at effectively ending the affliction caused by landmines.
The Canadian conference, "Towards a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines", took place
in Ottawa in October 1996 with the active support of 50 governments, the ICRC, the
ICBL and the United Nations. On 5 October 1996, the conference adopted the Ottawa
Declaration, which committed the participants to carrying out a plan of action intended
to increase resources for mine clearance and victim assistance and to ensure that a Mine
Ban Treaty was concluded at the earliest possible date. At the closing of the conference,
the Canadian government invited all governments to come to Ottawa in December 1997
to sign a Treaty prohibiting the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of anti-personnel
mmes.
The formal follow-up to the 1996 Ottawa conference took place in Brussels, June 1997.
The Brussels International Conference for a Global Ban on Anti-Personnel Mines was
attended by representatives of 154 countries and 97 governments signed the Brussels
Declaration, launching formal negotiations on a comprehensive Landmine Ban Treaty,
greater international co-operation and assistance for mine clearance and the destruction
of all stockpiled and cleared anti-personnel mines. The Declaration called for the con-
vening of a diplomatic conference in Oslo to negotiate such a Treaty.
In accordance with the Brussels Declaration, formal Treaty negotiations took place
during September 1997 at the Oslo Diplomatic Conference on an International Total Ban
on Anti-Personnel Landmines. Ninety-one countries took part in the negotiations as full
participants and 38 countries were present as observers, as were the ICRC, the ICBL,
and the UN.
The Oslo Diplomatic Conference chaired by South Africa's Ambassador Jakob Selebi,
on 18 September 1997 adopted the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil-
ing, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction. The
Ottawa Treaty signed by 122 countries in 1997 established a new norm in international
humanitarian law by banning the use, stockpile and transfer of anti-personnel mines. It
also established a comprehensive international legal framework with binding timeframes
and commitments to clear landmines, assist victims, destroy stockpiles, cooperate inter-
nationally and ensure implementation and compliance.
4.3.2. Mozambican Position on the Mine Ban Treaty
On October 24, 1995 President Chissano announced in New York after meeting with
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that Mozambique was prepared to head an
international campaign against landmines. Pres. Chissano stressed "(that) many people
are demanding that Mozambique should head a world campaign against the production,
sale and use of landmines." He pledged that Mozambique was prepared to play such a
role. However, the government took little concrete action as it appeared that there was
a split on the landmine issue, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development
increasingly supportive of a ban, but the Ministry of Defence opposed. Some in the
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Mozambican military clearly wanted to retain the option of using landmines, believing
that they had a useful role in Mozambique's defence strategy. (Human Rights Watch,
1997:99)
In November 1995 the Campanha Mocambicana Contra as Minas (CMCM)-
Mozambican Campaign to Ban Landmines-was launched. In 1996 the CMCM lobbied
the Commission for Defence and Public Order for a law to ban landmines in Mozam-
bique. It also held meetings with the foreign minister and the speaker of the assembly.
The CMCM also gathered over 100,000 signatures on a petition calling for a total
ban. Mozambican Foreign Minister Leonardo Simáo in October 1996 spoke at the UN,
saying, "We look forward to continue working together with a view toward eliminating
these horrible weapons, not only in Mozambique but also in all countries affected by this
evil." He said his government supported a world-wide ban on the production, stockpiling
and distribution of landmines. Mozambique also played a constructive role in support-
ing the u.S.-sponsored UN General Assembly Resolution calling on nations "to pursue
vigorously" an antipersonnel mine ban, and to conclude an international Ban Treaty "as
soon as possible." The Resolution passed on December 10, 1996 by a vote of 156-0, with
ten abstentions.
As the 4th International NGO Conference on Landmines (held in Maputo February
25-28, 1997) approached, the government's position on landmines received greatly
increased attention domestically, regionally and internationally. President Chissano, after
repeated delays, agreed to meet with the Mozambican ban campaign the week before the
conference. (Human Rights Watch, 1997: 100)
On February 26, Mozambique's foreign minister addressed the NGO Conference and
announced an immediate ban on the use, production, import and export of antipersonnel
mines. Foreign Minister Simáo's statement said:
"Accordingly, under the provisions contained in paragraph 1 of article 153 of the Consti-
tution of the Republic, the Council of Ministers determines:
1. With immediate effect, the production, commercialisation, utilisation and non-
authorised transportation of antipersonnel landmines is hereby prohibited in the
national territory.
2. The Government shall continue to promote all efforts aimed at ensuring mine
clearance activities, with a view to guaranteeing greater security to the citizens."
Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified the Treaty on
25 August 1998.
Mozambique, as a State party to the Mine Ban Treaty undertakes "never under any cir-
cumstances":
(a) to use anti-personnel mines;
(b) to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone,
directly or indirectly, antipersonnellandmines;
(c) to assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity
prohibited to a State Party under the Convention (Art 1. para. 1).
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4.3.3. Peacebuilding: Implications of the Mine Ban Treaty for Mozambique
An analysis of the Mine Ban Treaty reflected the following implications for Mozambique
having signed and ratified the convention on the prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel mines and on their destruction.
4.3.3.1. An End to the Use of Landmines
Mozambique obliges itself "never, under any circumstances" to use
anti-personnel landmines. This includes all situations of armed conflict -
whether between countries (international armed conflict) or a civil conflict
(internal armed conflict) - as well as troubles of a lesser intensity commonly
referred to as internal unrest or civil disturbances. All offensive and defensive
usage is prohibited. Moreover, any resort to the weapon during peacetime is
also proscribed. Mozambique cannot deploy anti-personnel mines to fortify its
borders as a means of preventing unwanted persons from entering its territory
or to protect important military or other installations. In ratifying the Treaty,
Mozambique accepted that mines were no longer a legitimate weapon to be
used either in peacetime or in time of war.
4.3.3.2. Prohibition on Development and Production
The Treaty prohibits the development and production of anti-personnel mines
(Art. 1, para. 1 (b)). Mozambique cannot manufacture the devices, nor can it
initiate any projects intended to improve current models, develop new models,
or generate any such weapons in the future.
4.3.3.3. Prohibition on Stockpiling
In addition to prohibiting the development, production and use of anti-personnel
mines, the Treaty precludes Mozambique from stockpiling them (Art. 1, para. 1
(b)) and Mozambique is not allowed to purchase, procure, or otherwise obtain
the devices.
Furthermore, any existing stocks must be destroyed within four years of the
date on which the Treaty enters into force for Mozambique (Art. 4). States
requiring assistance in order to ensure the destruction of anti-personnel mines
within the specified time period may apply to other States Parties to the Treaty
for such assistance (Art. 6).
However, Mozambique is permitted to retain or transfer a limited quantity of
mines for training in mine-detection, mine-clearance, and mine-destruction
techniques. The number of mines kept shall not exceed the minimum number
absolutely necessary for such purposes (Art. 3, para. 1).
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4.3.3.3. Prohibition on Transfer
The final component of the comprehensive ban established by the Treaty is a
prohibition on transferring anti-personnel mines. Mozambique is not allowed,
in any way or under any circumstances, to transfer anti-personnel mines either
directly or indirectly. According to the Treaty, the term "transfer" involves,
in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from
national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does
not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
(Art. 2, para. 4).
The prohibition on transfer covers import and export as well as transfer of own-
ership of mines. In order to facilitate mine detection, destruction and clearance,
there are, however, a small number of narrow exceptions to this prohibition.
First, Mozambique is permitted to transfer anti-personnel mines for the purpose
of destruction. Second, it may transfer a limited number of mines allowed to
be retained for training purposes Any other exchange of anti-personnel mines
beyond these exceptions is forbidden. As the definition makes clear, the trans-
fer of territory containing anti-personnel mines does not constitute a "transfer"
of those mines for the purposes of the Treaty.
4.3.3.5. Other Prohibited Activities
Mozambique having ratified the Treaty agrees never under any circumstances
to assist, encourage or induce anyone, whether or not they are bound by the
Treaty, to engage in any prohibited activity. This reinforces the effectiveness of
the Treaty's comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines.
The Treaty obliges each State Party to clear all anti-personnel mines already
in the ground within a period of 10 years following its entry into force for that
country. Specifically, Mozambique must destroy all anti-personnel mines in
"mined areas" under its jurisdiction or control. This covers not only its own
territory but also territory, which it may be occupying. The Treaty defines a
mined area as "an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected
presence of mines" (Art. 2, para. 5).
This includes all Mozambican territory known to contain mines, such as mine-
fields, which are defined as areas where these weapons have been system-
atically laid in such places as national borders and tracts around military
installations. It also includes all other public or private land known or believed
to contain the devices. It is irrelevant how the mines came to be in a particular
area, and Mozambique assumes responsibility for clearance whether the mines
were laid by their own military units or by other forces.
An area is considered to be "mined" if it is thought to contain either anti-
personnel or anti-vehicle/anti-tank mines. Since anti-personnel mines are
often used to prevent the removal or deactivation of anti-vehicle mines, if an
area is suspected of containing anti-vehicle mines it will often also contain
anti-personnel mines. If this is found to be the case, all anti-personnel mines
in the area must be destroyed. There is no obligation in the Treaty to remove
or destroy the anti-vehicle mines. However, they remain regulated by the rel-
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evant provisions of Protocol II to the CCW, which require that as soon as pos-
sible after the cessation of active hostilities all mined areas be either cleared or
marked, fenced and monitored to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.
The Treaty recognises that some mine-affected countries may not be in a posi-
tion to clear and destroy all anti-personnel mines in areas under their jurisdic-
tion or control within 10 years. Such countries may therefore request that the
other States Parties accord them an extension period of up to 10 years (Art.
5, para. 3). Requests are to be made at a meeting or review conference of the
States Parties and the decision to grant or reject a request for additional time
is to be made by a majority of those countries present and voting (Art. 5, para.
5). An extension period may be granted more than once. This offers an oppor-
tunity for States requiring assistance to present their case and to seek appropri-
ate help, whether in terms of financing, human resources or technical aid, in
their mine-clearance efforts. This opportunity, is reinforced by the obligation
on States "able to do so" to provide international co-operation and assistance
for mine clearance (Art. 6).
Pending the clearance of mined areas and irrespective of any extension granted,
Mozambique "shall make every effort" to identify all areas under its control
known or suspected to contain anti-personnel mines. Once an area has been
identified as possibly containing such weapons, action must be taken to ensure
that civilians are prevented from entering it. The perimeter must be marked,
monitored and protected, by fencing or other means. The method chosen
must ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Mozambique has a responsi-
bility, not only to close off the area, but also to make certain that the barriers
remain in good condition and do not deteriorate, become damaged, or other-
wise disintegrate. The protections put up are to remain in place until all of the
anti-personnel mines have been destroyed. In marking an area, certain mini-
mum standards set out in the amended version of Protocol II of the CCW must
be met. These standards include but are not limited to the following:
• signs should be used to mark mined areas and should be placed at a
distance sufficient to ensure their visibility at any point by a civilian
approaching the areas;
• the marking should be of a distinct and durable character;
• all feasible steps should be taken to ensure that the means used to
establish the perimeter of a mined area are not removed, concealed or
destroyed.
4.3.3.6. Assistance to Victims
The Treaty calls upon all countries able to help to do their utmost to ensure
the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims. A specific role in this
process is accorded to the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Move-
ment: Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the
care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine vic-
tims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter
alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national
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organisations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federa-
tions, non-governmental organisations, or on a bilateral basis (Art. 6, para. 3).
4.3.3.7. Entry into Force
The Treaty as a whole will enter into force six months after 40 countries have
deposited declarations with the UN Secretary General that they adhere to its
provisions. Nonetheless, even before it becomes legally binding, countries are
encouraged to declare their intention to apply "provisionally" the basic pro-
hibitions on the development, production, stock-piling, transfer and use of
anti-personnel mines (Art. 18).
The Treaty's obligations become binding on a particular country once the text
has formally entered into force as a whole and for that country. A State's sig-
nature is not of itself enough to bind the signatory to respect all of its provi-
sions. Signing a Treaty does, however, signal the intention to adhere formally
at a later date (through ratification, approval or acceptance) and international
law requires that a signatory must not do anything that undermines the "object
and purpose" of the Treaty. The two-stage process of signature followed by
formal adherence is intended to allow national parliaments or legislatures to
debate the Treaty, and its implications for the country before a final decision is
made whether or not to become bound by its provisions.
After it enters into force, countries that have not signed the Treaty may still
formally adhere to it by accession. Any State may accede directly to the Treaty
instead of signing and ratifying it thereby binding itself to respect its provi-
sions.
4.3.3.8. Treaty Compliance
The Treaty provides for a number of mechanisms to promote implementation
and resolve disputes. These include a requirement for Mozambique to report
regularly on action taken to implement the obligations laid down in the Treaty:
a duty to co-operate in settling disputes, legal, administrative and other meas-
ures to be taken nationally to prevent violations, and regular meetings to review
the effectiveness of the Treaty and its implementation (Arts. 7-13).
4.3.3.9. Reporting on Implementation
In order to promote openness and confidence that the Treaty is being imple-
mented, Mozambique must provide the UN Secretary General with an annual
report concerning the action it has taken to comply with its provisions (Art. 7).
This report must include inter alia information on:
- the progress of its mine-destruction programmes, including the total
number and the types of mines destroyed;
- and the national measures, such as legislation or administrative regula-
tions, taken to prevent and suppress violations of the Treaty.
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4.3.3.10. Settling Disputes
Countries are encouraged to consult and co-operate with each other in order
to settle any disputes which may arise (Art. 10, para. 1). In addition to issues
of compliance, any disputes concerning the application or interpretation of the
Treaty may also be brought before the meeting of States Parties. Mozambique
as a country participating in the meeting can offer its services to mediate, or
States Parties may recommend ways to resolve the disagreement (Art. 10, para.
2).
Another mechanism established by the Treaty to promote confidence in its
implementation is an enquiry process to be used in the event that a State Party
is suspected by another State Party of having failed to respect the provisions of
the Treaty (Art. 8). The process begins with a "request for clarification", which
is passed on to the country under suspicion through the UN Secretary General.
Once the request has been received, that country has 28 days within which to
respond to the allegation (Art. 8, para. 2).
Ifno response is received within that time period, or if the response is deemed
unsatisfactory, the issue may be presented to the next meeting of States Parties.
If, however, the issue is considered urgent, a "special meeting of States Parties"
may be convened to consider the matter (Art. 8, para. 3). In both instances, the
countries attending the meeting will examine the information submitted and
decide by a majority vote if further action is necessary (Art. 8, para. 6).
If additional information is required, a fact-finding mission may be sent to
the country (Art. 8, para 8). The fact-finding team will consist of up to nine
experts whose task is to collect information directly related to the allegation.
lts members are appointed by the UN Secretary General and drawn from a pool
of previously submitted names. The country that is the object of the inquiry is
consulted on the selection of the experts. The nationals of the country request-
ing the fact-finding mission or any country directly affected by it cannot par-
ticipate in the mission (Art. 8, paras. 9 and 10).
The country under examination is obliged to accommodate the fact-finding
mission and ensure that it is given the opportunity to speak with all persons and
visit all areas relevant to the inquiry (Art. 8, para. 14). Such access, however,
may be subject to arrangements made by the country to protect its national
security, the safety of fact-finding personnel, and the proprietary and constitu-
tional rights of its citizens. Unless otherwise agreed, the fact-finding mission
will not remain in the country for more than 14 days nor stay at any particular
site for more than seven days (Art. 8, para. 15).
The fact-finding mission will report the information it has gathered to the UN
Secretary General who will forward it to the meeting, or special meeting of
States Parties (Art. 8, para. 17). After reviewing the report, countries may sug-
gest ways to resolve the issues. In extreme cases, this could include referring
the matter to the UN Security Councilor adopting other enforcement measures
provided for by the UN Charter. Any decision taken at this stage is made by
consensus or, if that is not possible, by a two-thirds majority of the countries
present and voting (Art. 8, para. 20).
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4.3.3.11. National efforts to prevent violations
A State Party must do all it can to prevent and put an end to violations of the
Treaty on territory over which it has jurisdiction or control, or by persons over
whom it has jurisdiction or control (Art. 9). Mozambique is also required to
adopt national laws or enact other administrative or regulatory measures to
prevent and punish prohibited activities. Such action should include criminal
penalties for violation.
4.3.3.12. Reviewing Implementation of the Treaty
The Treaty provides for a series of regular meetings of States Parties that will
enable the countries concerned to discuss its implementation. There are four
types of meetings referred to in the Treaty: meetings of the States Parties (Art.
11), special meetings of the States Parties (Art. 8), review conferences (Art.
12) and amendment conferences (Art. 13). In summary, the meeting of States
Parties is convened to review the status of the Treaty's application and imple-
mentation. Such a meeting will be held annually for, at least, the fust four years
after the Treaty has ended into force. There, countries can raise issues concern-
ing implementation of the Treaty and try to resolve any disputes on its inter-
pretation. The special meeting of States Parties is an extraordinary measure
to examine a specific concern about possible non-compliance. Five years after
the Treaty's entry into force, a full review conference will be held. In addition
to providing a forum to discuss Treaty implementation, it may also determine
how often meetings of States Parties will be held in the future. Further review
conferences may be convened at the request of any State Party at intervals of,
at a minimum, five years (Art. 12, para. 1).
4.3.3.13.Strengthening and Updating the Treaty
To ensure that the Treaty can be adapted to address a changing world situa-
tion and evolving technologies, there is a specific provision for its amendment
at any time after it enters into force (Art 13). Proposals for amendments may
be submitted by any State Party. They must be sent to the UN Secretary Gen-
eral, who will circulate them to all the States Parties. These countries must,
within 30 days, indicate if they support discussing the proposals further. If a
majority of countries respond favourably, the Secretary General will convene
an Amendment Conference to which all State Parties will be invited.
At the amendment conference, the proposed amendments will be discussed
and voted upon, and adopted if approved by at least two-thirds of the States
Parties present and voting. However, support for the proposals at the confer-
ence is not enough for them to become binding on the States Parties. Follow-
ing the conference, countries must inform the UN Secretary General that they
agree to be bound by the amendments, which only come into effect once a
majority of State Parties have made this notification and then only for these
States (Art. 13, para. 5). Once in force, the amendments do not apply to any
country that has not ratified them. Nonetheless, these States will remain bound
by the original text.
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4.3.3.14. Reservations
No reservations are possible to any of the Treaty's provisions (Art. 19). This
means that at moment of signature or subsequent adherence, Mozambique is
not entitled to make a unilateral declaration that it will not respect one or more
of these provisions.
4.3.3.15. Withdrawal
As is the case with many other international legal agreements, Mozambique
is permitted to withdraw from the Treaty. To do so, it must give notice of its
withdrawal to the UN Secretary General and to the other States Parties. How-
ever, the withdrawal does not take effect until six months after such notice
is received. If, however, at the end of this six-month period the country is
involved in an armed conflict, the withdrawal is not effective until after the end
of the armed conflict.
4.4 The Mozambican National Demining Commission
With the departure ofONUMOZ on the horizon in mid-1994, UNOHACIDHA approached the
government for permission to begin planning for a "national demining entity". It was assumed
that a model similar to that developed in Cambodia - a combined co-ordination and imple-
mentation mechanism within a traditional ministerial style body - would emerge in Mozam-
bique. UNOHAC proposed a Mozambique Mine Action Centre (MOZMAC) to the government
in late July and presented a paper for donor discussion in late August 1994. MOZMAC was
consciously modelled after the Cambodian Mine Action Centre. The donors argued that this
model was too top heavy, expensive and replicative of existing efforts by NGOs and commer-
cial companies. In spite of well-articulated criticism from the very donors asked to support the
programme, UNOHAC/DHA continued pursuing an integrated co-ordination and implementa-
tion model as late as October 1994.An impasse developed. UNOHAC was unable to re-think its
original proposition. It equated a Mozambican capacity with the ability to directly clear mine-
fields and it was unable to convince donors that the Government should have the capacity to
oversee, co-ordinate and regulate all mine action activities in the country. The inability of the
UN and the donors to reach consensus meant that one of the poorest war-torn countries in the
world was not given the help it needed to have a voice in the way in which the problem of mines
was addressed. The absence of a central co-ordination mechanism meant that it was up to the
mine action agencies and the donors to determine where and how resources would be allocated
and used. (UNDHA, 1997:21)
According to UNDHA the donors pushed for a model which would have given the government
the capacity to regulate and oversee mine action in Mozambique. This meant that the govern-
ment would not have a direct implementation capacity but would be responsible for:
1) developing policy and identifying priorities;
2) co-ordination;
3) budget development;
4) contracting others to undertake specific tasks;
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5) quality control;
6) mine awareness, and
7) maintenance of a national database on landmines.
At the beginning of the consolidation period, DHA and UNDP were still pushing for an insti-
tutional arrangement which would have given the government both oversight as well as a field
operational capacity but donors and the UN never reached agreement. This meant that the UN
Accelerated Demining Programme effectively became a project managed and supported by the
UN. The issue of a Mine Action Centre or central co-ordination mechanism was left unresolved.
(UNDHA, 1997:31)
The SRSG negotiated with the newly-elected government to take over responsibility for mine
action activity from the GPA mechanisms and UNIDHA/UNOHAC. The government accepted
its responsibility to exercise sovereign authority over mine action activities through the creation
in May 1995 of the National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC) and its executive arm CND.
- Comissao Nacional de Desminagem. (UNDHA, 1997:28)
The CND was established by government decree no. 18/95 comprising seven ministers and the
director of the executive body of the commission. The commission was to be chaired by the
minister of foreign affairs and co-operation and was mandated to:
• collect, process and analyse information and data relevant to demining, elaborate a strat-
egy and action plans for mine clearance, and establish procedures for setting priorities at
local and national levels;
• monitor and co-ordinate all ongoing demining activities;
• act as the approval and licensing authority for new operators wishing to start mine clear-
ance activities in the country, as well as ensure quality control and uniform standards;
• adjudicate public tenders for service contracts in the field of mine clearance;
• promote and oversee the implementation of a national program to improve public mine
awareness.
The CND was also mandated to "promote a national demining capacity, through national com-
panies and non-governmental organisations, as well as through a subsidiary national demining
operative unit." This provision was for the transfer of the Accelerated Demining Programme to
the government in 1997. (Interview with Min. Simáo, March: 1999)
With the departure of UNOHAC in late 1994, UNDP assumed responsibility for humanitarian
co-ordination and tasks which had been handled by UNOHAC. ADP thus came under UNDP
administrative authority. UNDP and UNDHA made it clear to the government that ADP, while
a nationally executed project, remained under the direct management and control of UNDHA
and UNDP. The ADP became operational in February 1995. (UNDHA, 1997:32)
By early 1996 there was increased awareness of the need to assist the government to acquire the
necessary skills and expertise to make the NMCC a working reality. Although the NMCC had
been decreed into existence in May 1995 it had never formally met. (UNDHA, 1997:31)
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In February 1997, the Government and UNDP signed a project document for the continuation
of ADP activities for the following three years. The overall strategy identified for the project
period was to undertake activities in the three southern provinces based on plans formulated by
the CND or on the basis of consultation between local authorities and the CND. The project
document had clearly identified objectives for the on-going Mozambicanisation of the ADP.
(UNDHA, 1997:33)
In the absence of a central co-ordination and regulatory capacity, programme activities evolved
in an ad hoc fashion and in response to specific donor and other objectives. Some of the major
characteristics of the consolidation period included the geographic division of Mozambique by
ADP, NPA and HALO Trust into three spheres with NPA in the north, HALO in the centre and
ADP in the south; the continued and unilateral use of commercial companies to fulfil specific
donor objectives, the use of dogs for clearance and experimentation with the use of mechani-
cal devices, and the attempt to co-ordinate and implement a national mine awareness education
strategy. (UNDHA, 1997:33)
Towards the end of 1997 a UNDP evaluation mission carried out an assessment of the UNDP
technical assistance programme to CND. The Report of the evaluation mission (UNDP, 1997:4)
pointed out that in terms of the development of an indigenous mine action capacity "(the) CND
existed with little personnel, equipment, expertise or foreign technical assistance (and) although
CND only became a UNDP technically assisted project in January 1997, technical assistance
did not begin effectively until March 1997."
Consequently the UNDP evaluation team recommended "multiple and individual steps that may
be enacted immediately to address the current problems." Moreover, the UNDP team presented
several scenarios for the future structure of CND, namely a continuation of the current project,
the creation of a nationally executed programme, or the construction of a national demining
"institute", with the last selected by the evaluation team as the preferred and recommended solu-
tion towards the establishment of an effective indigenous Mozambican mine action capacity.
(UNDP, 1997:3)
In a collaborative project between the Department of Foreign Affairs, the South
African Institute of International Affairs, the international donor community in Mozambique
and CND as to the political, technical and operational status of indigenous mine action in
Mozambique the following pertinent trends and shortcomings were determined. (Research Con-
sultancy, 1998:10)
4.4.1. Consensus for CND's Role
All donors and operators confirmed the view that CND is a necessary tool of the gov-
ernment to co-ordinate and control mine action in Mozambique. The President of the
NMCC, the Foreign Minister, confirmed his interest and full support for CND and rec-
ognised its current deficiencies and structural weaknesses.
4.4.2. Delayed Commencement of the Project
The technical assistance project to the CND began later than anticipated, thus adding to
the sense of frustration and lack of confidence expressed by some parties and causing
the entire project's impact to be slowed. The CND expressed the belief that the project
was years late in starting, as it should have come sooner after the creation of the NMCC
and CND. In addition, although the project was to begin in January 1997, the technical
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assistants were not fully in place until March; the equipment donated by the UNDP only
arrived in part and much of it was unusable; and office staff and new equipment had to
be procured before the project could begin. As a result, the budget had to be revised soon
after commencement.
4.4.3. Effect and Impact
The effect and impact of the technical assistance project were not measurable, as CND
had not fully developed its structure as defined in the statutes. Therefore, no effects or
impact have trickled down through the operators to the stated beneficiaries-the people
of Mozambique.
4.4.4. Communication
Communications between the CND and government, as set out in the statute, are com-
pletely unworkable [because of ministers' heavy responsibilities and programmes] with
the NMCC consisting of a large number of ministers who must approve policy decisions.
This has led to a lack of speedy and effective decision making on important policy mat-
ters.
Communications within the CND also needed improvement, including the production
of internal regulations and a provision for staff meetings. The use of good management
techniques will alleviate this problem. In addition, the frequent absence of the Execu-
tive Director, when he is called upon to fulfil government duties such as attending inter-
national conferences, impeded communications between the technical assistance project
and the executive level of the CND.
The relationship between CND and donors seems to have been characterised by scep-
ticism based on a lack of accurate information. This can only be dispelled by proven
progress toward meeting the objectives set out for the technical assistance project and
through collective briefings of donors.
4.4.5. Transparency
Mine clearance activities created a great deal of competition between operators and
between donors. The establishment of procedures and criteria for tendering and award
of contracts might dispel some of the scepticism, rumour, and lack of confidence that
an absence of information on these matters created. Further, good liaison between the
Executive Director and donors/operators will also help diminish concerns.
4.4.6. Statutes
The statutes establishing CND and defining its role required revision with the objectives
of improving the policy decision-making process and the creation of regional delega-
tions. The government and CND should revisit this because the experience is that the real
co-ordination and information lies at the provincial level, and governors have a vested
interest in mine action. Governors have an established structure-the provincial govern-
ment-and it seems the logical place to locate CND representatives who can provide a
fast channel to the provincial governor, operators, development agencies, and CND.
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Despite the provisions of the project document, no tripartite meetings had taken place,
and this factor itself may have lead to a lack of information for donors and others about
the problems of the programme and its progress. In addition the project document made
incorrect assumptions about basic capabilities and resources extant in CND.
4.4.7. Staffing Problems
A further complication for CND was the acute shortage of qualified personnel. This
is due to the fact that CND officials are remunerated for their services according to
Governmental salary scales. These salaries are far below ex-pat salaries and those paid
by NGOs and UN concerns. Personnel trained by UNDP officials attached to this pro-
gramme seemed to be inadequate for the task and they do not have the capacity to run
and operate the system. Fact is the low salaries as offered by the Mozambican Govern-
ment cannot attract the right competent manpower required to operate such a system.
This fact should be pointed out to potential donors.
The Collaborative Research Project (Research Consultancy, 1998:12) pointed out that
although CND had been appointed by the Mozambican Government to act as the official
Governmental body to co-ordinate all demining activities, the ADP (a reminiscence from
ONUMOZ) remained a parallel body to CND, with the difference that it was funded
by the UNDP. It was seen to be more competent than CND mainly because it had a
demining capability containing field teams, operational command control as well as sup-
port systems. AU this was budgeted for and financed on an annual basis through UNDP,
something CND could not do due to lack of Governmental funding.
The Report also highlighted the lack of co-operation and co-ordination between CND
and ADP and pointed out that a national indigenous mine action capability "(must) be
managed and controlled from Governmental level, not necessarily by the Government
itself." The Report also argued that "one possibility is to transfer the political function
to CND who will operate on behalf of the Mozambican Government, whilst ADP is
regarded as the operational executive body under CND. A problem is foreseen with this
model due to the fact that UNDP sponsors ADP and it is doubtful whether they will
relinquish their control over most of the national operations capability in Mozambique."
The Report observed that "mechanical demining is in the process of establishing itself
as the only viable and cost-effective way of attacking the mine clearance problem on
a global scale. The fact is that mechanical clearance still requires a manual operation
behind it to ensure 99,6 clearance efficiency. The advent of mechanical clearance exposed
the inefficient efforts from NGOs and hence the donor shift away from NGOs as NGOs
cannot afford the capital intensive procurement of mechanical equipment"
In conclusion the Report stressed that the most critical priority in the development of
an indigenous mine action capacity in Mozambique "(was) a long overdue and critical
need for a detailed national level I landmine survey in order to effectively address the
longer term objectives of peacebuilding and reconstruction underway in Mozambique."
(Research Consultancy, 1998:15)
In an interview with the Executive Director of CND, Mr Osorio Severiano (Interview
with CND, March: 1999) pointed out that during the ONUMOZ period (31st December
1992 - 31st March 1995) mine action in Mozambique focused on the distribution of
emergency aid, return of refugees, resettlement of the refugee population and displaced
people as well as mine action within the context of the Cease-fire Commission. The
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Executive Director described the objectives of mine action during this phase "(as) ensur-
ing the free movement of people and goods, and creating the necessary conditions for the
successful conclusion of the GPA."
In terms of the creation of an indigenous mine action capacity in Mozambique during
this period, the Executive Director concluded that "(the) main aim of ONUMOZ, after
the completion of its mandate, was to leave the Government elected from the election
foreseen in the General Peace Accord, with the necessary instruments which would allow
the effective continuity of the demining process in the country. Unfortunately, this objec-
tive, due to well known reasons, was not attained. This worsened considerably the heavy
burden of responsibilities of the elected government in the ambit of peace consolida-
tion, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of the country." (Interview with
eND,March: 1999)
According to the eND Executive Director during the ONUMOZ period the following
achievements were recorded regarding mine action at a total cost of approximately
USDollar 59 Million.
6200 km of roads cleared
• 262 km of energy transport lines cleared
• 2200 ha of soil for diverse usage cleared (agriculture, animal rearing,
people resettlement, etc)
• 23000 anti-personnel mines destroyed
271 anti-tank mines destroyed
• 20000 unexploded ordinance (UXO's)
• 26000 Small calibre ammunition rounds destroyed.
The second period, spanning for 31'1 March 1995 to March 1999 (Interview with eND,
March: 1999) was characterised by the following actions according to the Executive
Director.
a) Strengthening of the Government's role in the conduct of mine action in the
country, through its transformation into a decision making and co-ordination
body overseeing the whole demining process;
b) The creation, development and co-ordination of mine-action aimed at creating
a real and effective demining national capacity, through the "Mozambicaniza-
tion" of mine clearance operations;
c) Development of more effective partnerships among all actors in the mine action
process.
In terms of the establishment of an indigenous mine action capacity the Executive Direc-
tor remarked that "(the) country went into this initiative driven only by the need to have
an instrument for the conduct of this process, so important and sensitive for the country's
life, but without any experience nor reference about ideal structures. The intention at the
time was to accept and learn to improve, and leading the process."
The Executive Director of eND therefore concluded that the creation of the eND by
the Government of Mozambique, in May 1995, constituted "(an) important historical
landmark." This led to major changes both in qualitative and quantitative terms in the
conduct of mine action in Mozambique, according to the Executive Director.
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It was confirmed by the Executive Director of CND that since the inception of mine
action in 1992 to the time of the interview the "statistical balance" was as follows (Inter-
view with CND, March: 1999). Total spending on mine action during this period was
estimated by the Executive Director to be US Dollar 116 million.
• 7337 km of roads cleared
• 379 km energy transmission lines cleared
• 90 km railways cleared
• 3500 ha of soil for diverse use cleared.
• 50971 antipersonnel mines destroyed
• 361 antitank mines destroyed
• 23667 unexploded ammunitions destroyed
• 417404 small calibre ammunitions destroyed.
4.5 Evaluation
The issue of landmines and peacebuilding in Mozambique and the failure of ONUMOZ to
effectively address this critical dimension of its stated objectives within its peace building man-
date has been singled out by practitioners, commentators and analysts. In evaluating the success
and failure of UNO HAC in mine clearance Synge (1997: 85) concluded that UNO HAC achieved
some success in helping to open up Renamo areas to humanitarian access, in facilitating con-
tact between government and Renamo, and in building up a reliable and accurate database of
humanitarian activities in Mozambique. "(but) in mine clearance it bungled badly, and in assist-
ing the reintegration of demobilised soldiers it failed altogether."
Synge (1997:84) also argued however that by the end of the peace process UNOHAC was seen
as an example "(of) co-ordination at its worst, requiring costly investments of time and money,
frustrate action, centralise functions that are better left decentralised and politicise humanitar-
ian action". Synge also pointed out that UNOHAC's problems derived primarily from an inad-
equate definition of its role at the outset, compounded by political pressure for the newly created
DHA to "establish its image". "It failed to build upon the existing co-ordination of humanitarian
action within Mozambique. The advantages of integrating UNOHAC within ONUMOZ were
later judged to be far smaller than the disadvantages. As a political operation, ONUMOZ had
little understanding of humanitarian issues. UNOHAC was caught in the middle, misunderstood
by its political bosses and resented by the rest of the humanitarian community".
In this respect Synge (1997: 85) stated that UNOHAC "(as) the local expression of DHA had
considerable seniority within the UN system but (its) performance fell short of its promise". It
generated unproductive antagonism from other UN agencies and failed to win respect from the
donor community upon which it vitally depended. UNDP officials privately blamed the "myopic
view of the UN Secretariat" for disrupting the inherited co-ordination system, and bilateral
donors openly denounced UNOHAC as unnecessary, expensive, inefficient, and plagued by bad
management. According to Synge the SRSG acknowledged the criticism that was raised against
UNOHAC's "excessive bureaucratic rules and procedure, its tendency to build overly heavy
structures on central and provincial levels, and its indication to be involved in medium and
long term programmes where it had no mandate". However, the SRSG strongly defended the
principle of the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance as "an essential part of any peacekeep-
ing operation" in particular in meeting the needs of soldiers during demobilisation. (Synge,
1997:86)
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In conclusion Synge (1997:87) stated that UNOHAC "(not) only disrupted the formal co-ordi-
nation of UN agency activities but also left a tangled inheritance of projects in its wake when
the phase-down proved as difficult as the phase-in. Agencies that had felt displaced now found
themselves having to take on numerous activities that UNOHAC had launched but not com-
pleted. No fewer than fifty-three UNOHAC projects were passed to UNDP for continuation,
including mine clearance and a series of overlapping projects for demobilised soldiers, such as
business and skills development, the provincial fund, vocational training, and the provision of
food and other forms of support."
Another missed opportunity according to Synge, (1997: 161) was the failure to start a compre-
hensive demining program until the ONUMOZ mandate was ending. "(Although) the number
and location of landmines planted throughout Mozambique over nearly thirty years of conflict
could only be guessed at, there was a general consensus in 1992 that mine clearance should
begin along priority roads, to permit the distribution of food relief and to improve the safety of
returning refugees. UNOHAC and UNDP controlled the largest budgets for this work but failed
to authorise programs or projects until mid-1994, leaving the bulk of mine clearance during the
ONUMOZ mandate to the actions of individual agencies. The failure of UNOHAC to provide
either leadership or co-ordination in demining came to be seen as one ofthe greatest weaknesses
of the ONUMOZ operation."
Alden (1995:121) with specific reference to landmines contended that "(the) UN humanitarian
programme was dogged by controversy. This principally manifested itself in friction between
the international donor community, the NGOs, components of ONUMOZ, and UNOHAC over
a range of practices and procedures which was, in the case of demining, to degenerate into
public indictments and a breakdown of communication between the various parties."
Within the framework of weak UN co-ordination Alden (1995:123) concurred "(as) such, it
revealed what had been known to many close observers of the UN and, indeed, the subject of
numerous internal reviews: that UN agencies are in many instances resistant to co-ordination,
either due to conflicting mandates and/or confusing procedures. Equally, it could be said that
some of the structural problems in ONUMOZ were no more than a reflection of the condition
of the overall UN system. The mission in Mozambique, in spite of the creation of UNOHAC,
did not solve but merely underscored these problems."
In terms of mine actions during the ONUMOZ mandate, AIda Ajello, former SRSG admitted
that "major mistakes" were made. In this respect he described the ONUMOZ failure in the fol-
lowing terms "There are still millions of mines in the country, and people continue to be seri-
ously endangered by them. When I was in charge of the peacekeeping mission, I must admit
that I did not have time to look into this area very thoroughly. While rules and procedures were
followed carefully, I am afraid that the results were not very encouraging. It took eight months
to complete all the procedures and contract with a demining company. The management of the
operation was given to UNOPS, which found the contract unacceptable and re-negotiated it,
so the whole process started again. Fortunately, the time of implementation was shorter than
foreseen. The demining process was, nevertheless, the weakest point in the mission." (Ajello,
1997:29)
In this respect Synge (1997:77) pointed out "(that) management of the demining programme
was placed under UNOHAC, which reported to DHA rather than to the SRSG. UNOHAC
delayed a number of important decisions and insisted that all work should be approved by the
dernining subcommittee of the CCF. The persistent failure of the peace commissions to meet
and the wariness of both parties about opening up roads that linked Renamo with government
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areas resulted in prolonged delays in approving the projects at this level, although the money
was available and the implementing agencies such as Norwegian People's Aid and Halo Trust
were ready to start work."
According to Synge (1997;77) the rivalry between DRA and UNDP in New York over program
jurisdiction represented "(a) classic case of UN bureaucratic entanglement" and played a major
part in the confusion and failure to act in clearing landmines. UNDP in New York according
to Synge was unwilling to approve projects and programmes proposed by UNORAC, "arguing
(instead) over the wording of contracts, tendering procedures, and quality control."
In terms of the development of an indigenous mine action capacity UNDHA pointed out
(UNDHA, 1997:39) "(that) planning for mine action in Mozambique commenced in 1992, some
four years after the beginning of programme activities inAfghanistan and one year after the UN
became involved in the problem of landmines in Cambodia. DHA, which was designated UN
focal point for humanitarian mine action in December 1994, was concerned with the issue but
had only limited staff and other resources to help countries deal with the problem. At this point,
DRA relied heavily on DPKO staff experienced in the use of landmines and saw its role prima-
rily as a catalyst in helping countries develop appropriate expertise. Regrettably, the experience
of Afghanistan appears to have been largely ignored and the wrong lessons were learned from
Cambodia. In addition, the Mozambique programme suffered from a lack of consensus, particu-
larly among the key stakeholders, on the most appropriate institutional model which needed to
be developed to ensure that national authorities were in charge and able to sustain a capacity
needed to deal with the long-term elements of the problem. The use of commercial companies
was also a distinctive and disruptive feature which complicated the initiation of mine action
activities and exacerbated tensions between stakeholders concerned with the development of a
Mozambican mine action capability."
With regard to mine action during the ONUMOZ mandate, UNDHA (1997:39) argued "(that)
mine action was dominated by the institutions responsible for the peace process which eroded
the space needed for humanitarian mine action and complicated the identification of priorities
and institutional modalities needed to give substance to the stated objective of developing a
Mozambican mine action capability. In addition, the organisation and development of a humani-
tarian mine action programme in Mozambique suffered when it was subjected to the political
machinations of the Cease-fire Commission. In addition to the fact that it took the Commis-
sion a year to approve plans for activities then deemed urgent there was a preoccupation with
road networks and infrastructure such as hydroelectric plants and inadequate attention to the
needs of the rural poor and others whose livelihoods were directly affected by landmines. The
emphasis was on mine clearance associated with ONUMOZ mission objectives. Complications
encountered in the organisation of contractual arrangements concerned with the use of com-
mercial companies to undertake verification and clearance of major routes became a central
and divisive issue. This undermined the credibility and ability of the UN to organise support
for the development of a Mozambican mine action programme focused on the humanitarian
implications of landmines. The many obstacles which seriously impeded the development of a
long-term mine action capability in Mozambique confirms that in situations where a formal UN
peacekeeping mission is deployed, humanitarian mine action should be developed in concert
with, but not within, the structures of such missions. Programmes need to be developed quickly
to meet humanitarian needs while simultaneously ensuring that initial action contributes to the
development of an indigenous and sustainable capability."
UNDHA (1997:40) also evaluated the role of the donor community during the ONUMOZ
period and concluded that donors in Mozambique were well organised and had a major say in
the way the peace process evolved. "The donor community was not a monolithic group on the
issue oflandmines but quickly arrived at the conclusion that the UN was inept and was not using
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the UN, which was in general agreement with the government, and the donors on the issue of
landmines never emerged. This seriously undermined various attempts, during the ONUMOZ
period, to initiate the development of a Mozambican capability. Donors were adamantly against
a traditional ministerial-style model which their governments were funding in Cambodia but
for more than a year DHA pushed for such an institutional arrangement. When no consensus
emerged by ONUMOZ's departure at the end of 1994 the issue lapsed. This in effect meant that
there was no central co-ordination or regulatory mechanism and the government had no say in
the evolution of mine action activities in Mozambique. This institutional vacuum continued to
exist in Mozambique until 1997when the National Mine Clearance Commission, established in
1995, finally began to receive some technical assistance from the UN with the support of a few
donors."
UNDHA (1997:16) consequently concluded (that) there were no formal arrangements to allow
for a structured dialogue with donors which, in the eyes of many, was a major factor in the
inability of UNOHAC to mobilise broad-based support for a programme which was dependent
on political and financial support for its development and continuity. The donor community in
Mozambique also had fairly clear points of view on broad issues of policy and, at times, narrow
issues of national self interest."
With regard to the role of UNOHAC during the ONUMOZ period, UNDHA (1997:17) con-
cluded that given the many high priority issues which needed to be addressed to keep the peace
process on track it was not easy to secure interest in, and support for, activities which extended
beyond the ONUMOZ timeframe. "UNOHAC should have pursued a more constructive and
structured dialogue with donors who were generally of the impression that clearing minefields
wherever they were located was the central priority. There was inadequate attention to the issue
of building a sustainable capacity, which would ensure that activities were undertaken in a pri-
oritised and cost-effective manner. This would have necessitated, for example, a country-wide
survey and centralised data-base which would have helped identify which communities were
most severely affected and needed the most urgent attention. Support for the development of
skills essential for the co-ordination of a national programme should also have received priority
attention."
In conclusion UNDHA (1997:31) observed that the many difficulties encountered in the devel-
opment of a Mozambican mine action capability "(can) in part be attributed to the erroneous
perception that an indigenous capacity is first and foremost a mine clearance capability. The
shape and content of institutional arrangements will vary but it is clearly important that national
authorities, who are ultimately responsible for the problem of landmines, must be helped to
acquire the expertise and other requirements necessary to manage and sustain a nation-wide
programme. National mine action bodies, which do not automatically need to be part of a gov-
ernment ministry, must be assisted in a way which will allow them to oversee, regulate and co-
ordinate all mine action work undertaken in their country. In this connection, it is important that
none of the major stakeholders, including in particular government authorities, donors and the
UN, are wedded to a particular institutional framework. Institutional mechanisms must respond
to actual requirements and address the issue of sustainability."
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CONCLUSION
CHAPTER FIVE
5.1. Introduction
Underlying the purpose of this study was the optimism expressed by world leaders during the
third ever 1992 United Nations Security Council Summit, following the paralysing impact of
the Cold War, about the future role of the United Nations as the organ with the primary respon-
sibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.
It was against this background that the UN Security Council invited the newly appointed UN
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to prepare an analysis and recommendations on
ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the
UN Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and
for peacekeeping.
The publication by UN Secretary General, Dr.Boutros Boutros-Ghali of his seminal paper, An
Agenda for Peace (1992) placed the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding prominently in the
UN's peace and security regime of preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, peacemaking and
peacekeeping in addressing the dynamic, changing context of post-Cold War international con-
flict.
In defining the conceptual foundations of post-conflict peacebuilding as the development of the
social, political and economic infrastructure in a war torn environment in order to prevent future
violence and consolidate peace the UNSG specifically identified the existence of landmines as
a threat to the process of peacebuilding.
The study therefore elected to focus on the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Mozam-
bique as the ONUMOZ intervention (1992-1995) provides an important case study of how the
concept of peacebuilding with specific reference to the role of landmines in the process was
interpreted and operationalised by the United Nations in Mozambique.
In this context Mozambique was also viewed as a case study for dramatic shifts in recent dec-
ades in the use of landmines as an offensive weapon against civilians and their uncontrolled
proliferation in intra-state conflicts, when the strategy was to disrupt the enemy and destroy
people's means of live-hoods. Moreover, the study identified Mozambique as a prime example
where landmines constituted an enormous burden on post-conflict peacebuilding in a war-dev-
astated society in an underdeveloped country. The study also discerned a trend in that Mozam-
bique with a weak or collapsed social and economic infrastructure had one of the toughest and
most extensive landmine problems, posing a severe threat to post-conflict peacebuilding and
human security.
Central to this impact of landmines on peacebuilding the study consequently focused on the
Mine Ban Treaty and the implications for Mozambique as a State Party to the Treaty which
provided a framework for the development of an indigenous capacity in order to effectively
address the full spectrum of mine action activities in Mozambique over the long term in pursuit
of the principles of post-conflict peacebuilding.
In terms of the significance of the study, it derived its purpose from the call of the UNSG Kofi
Anan as articulated in his 1998 report on the Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Durable Peace
and Sustainable Development in Africa wherein he stressed the importance of re-examining the
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UN peacekeeping experience in Africa and extracting lessons that can guide future UN opera-
tions. The UNSG specifically cited the UN operation in Mozambique and its successes, which
testified to the contribution the UN can make as an "impartial and legitimate actor for peace"
in confronting conflict in Africa. This notion is also central to the view held by Chachiua and
Malan in Anomalies an Acquiescence: The Mozambican Peace Process Revisited which con-
cluded that while analysis of the ONUMOZ operation may seem rather irrelevant in the light
of new and "more exciting" developments in the realm of international peace operations, there
are significant lessons to be learned by revisiting concluded operations - especially when the
implications of such interventions for longer term peacebuilding become apparent.
The theoretical relevance of the study is the analysis of the term peacebuilding, which since
its inception has emerged as a mostly undefined concept, which remains in its semantic and
etymological adolescence including its underlying assumptions.
The practical value of the study therefore relates to the application of the peacebuilding concept
as a conflict resolution instrument in the UN's peace and security regime, with specific reference
to landmines as a threat to post-conflict peacebuilding in Mozambique. Accepting that each new
peace operation bears little resemblance to its predecessor in tenns of demands and dynamics
what was learned in Mozambique could however be applied to some extent to future UN peace
missions.
5.2. The Concept of Peacebuilding.
The study concluded that in the post Cold War period UN peace operations evolved rapidly and
in an ad-hoc fashion, from classical peacekeeping to complex multidimensional interventions.
During this period the study observed that the rapid pace and unpredictable nature of these
developments confused scholarly attempts to clearly explain unambiguous concepts for the new
type of operations.
Consequently, confusion had been created about the terminology and definitions used, which
resulted in different countries and organisations attaching different meanings to the various
terms and definitions, which emerged. Moreover, terms such as "peacekeeping operations",
"peace operations", "wider peacekeeping oprations", "peace support operations", "peace mis-
sions" and "multifunctional peace operations" had been used interchangeably to define the over-
arching spectrum of activities related to UN involvement in preventing or settling international
disputes in terms of Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter.
The radically altered post-Cold War security environment also resulted in the mutation and
expansion of the UN's agenda for peace and security to include the newly defined concept of
post-conflict peacebuilding described by UNSG Boutros Boutros Gali as the construction of
a new enviromnent and the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, aimed at the prevention of
a recurrence of conflict. Noting that peacebuilding was the least established function in terms
of the UN's peace and security regime the study observed that the conceptual foundations of
the term had given rise to sketchy and holistic approaches in describing UN operations which
sought to build a political, social and economic infrastructure in societies destroyed by civil
war.
As in the case of peacekeeping, the conceptual foundation of peacebuilding demanded further
development, description and terminology. The study however concluded that despite the wide-
spread acceptance in political and academic circles of the concept, peacebuilding emerged as
a less than clear concept and has remained so ever since, with various role-players producing
personal and institutional variations and models. In the process no clear semantic distinction
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has been made between terminology in the literature such as "nation-building", "institution
building", "national reconstruction", "civic reconstruction", "national recovery", "post-conflict
transition" and "post-conflict reconstruction and development", which are being used synony-
mously to describe the overarching spectrum of activities related to peacebuilding. However,
despite this blurred nature, peacebuilding as a concept is conceived as an integral part of UN
efforts to promote peace which linked the organisations more traditional conflict resolution and
management instnunents of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.
Underlying the assumptions of peacebuilding, the study concluded that the increased recogni-
tion of the importance of human security over state security impacted profoundly on the UN's
responsibility and vision for maintaining international peace and security. In fact, the humani-
tarian dimension now underpins the full spectrum of UN responses to international conflict.
In terms of the interrelationship between the various elements of a UN peace mission the study
concluded that these elements cannot be interpreted to be entirely separate activities, and that
they do not always follow each other in a chronological order. Although it would seem logical
for a peace process to proceed through the sequential stages of "preventive diplomacy", "peace-
making", "peacekeeping", and "peacebuilding", the Mozambican experience has shown that
this was rarely the case. These activities were therefore interpreted as instruments in the process
of conflict prevention, management and resolution and their application could overlap theoreti-
cally to the point where they all run concurrently at a given point in time in order to take advan-
tage of their natural linkages and to become mutually reinforcing. Conversly, peacebuilding is
the fourth phase in the UN strategy for conflict resolution and becomes relevant when preventive
diplomacy fails to resolve conflict and after peacemaking and peacekeeping have established a
framework for a negotiated settlement and reduced the levels of violence.
In analysing the interrelationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding or more specifically,
the transition period between peacekeeping and peacebuilding (also referred to as the "Twi-
light Zone"), the study concluded that this represents the "peacebuilding dilemma" in which
the UN involvement provided by a peacekeeping operation was no longer in place whereas criti-
cal assistance was still needed in order to consolidate the results of the peace operation and
to prevent conflict from re-emerging. In this respect the linkage between the establishment of
an indigenous capacity to advance the principles of post-conflict peacebuilding became self-
evident.
This linkage also pointed to the interdependent quality of peacebuilding as a concept of political
civic action and, in terms of its practical application, the issues of policy formulation, manage-
ment and co-ordination were interpreted as critical to its success. This interdependent quality
can however also be extended to become mutually supportive links between peacemaking and
peacebuilding. This is specifically the case when peacemaking creates the mandate for post-
conflict peacebuilding and define actions and strategies that restore a country to peace. On
the other hand, peaceduilding can contribute by enhancing the peacemaking and peacekeeping
processes. This interdependency is further strengthened by the fact that peacebuilding depends
on peacekeeping especially in relation to the logistical and organisational expertise of peace-
keeping forces.
Recalling Haugerudbraaten's (1998: 23-24) two distinct concepts of short-and-long term peace-
building the study concluded that peacebuilding is a multifaceted, comprehensive undertaking
with wide parameters but governed by specific criteria and needs aimed at consolidating peace
to a point where it becomes self-sustaining. Within these parameters it is of critical importance
to distinguish between the objectives of short-term and long-term peacebuilding. The short-term
objectives of peacebuilding therefore included all measures, which are immediately relevant for
consolidating what had been achieved during the peacekeeping phase. Subsequently, long-term
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92
peacebuilding is viewed as a long lasting process of (re)-building a nation with emphasis on the
development of indigenous capacities and structures towards this end. Short-term peacebuild-
ing measures within this perspective should as a consequence lay the groundwork for long-term
peacebuilding, which is the responsibility of the country in question, the UN and the interna-
tional community.
Reflecting on the linkage between peacebuilding and development as articulated by Alden
(1996:55) and Whaley and Piazza-Georgia (1997:69) the study identified the evolutionary qual-
ity of post-conflict peacebuilding as described by Boutros Boutros-Ghali "(as) action to identify
and support structures, which tend to strengthen and solidify peace". In this equation the UN
and the international community substitutes for the normal efforts a state makes during peace-
time taking into consideration that the transition from conflict is characterised by weak govern-
ance structures, few human or financial resources, collapsed infrastructure and economies, large
numbers of combatants without skills and critical needs for external humanitarian assistance.
These peacebuilding activities may include emergency relief, economic rehabilitation, infra-
structure reconstruction, mine action, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers and refugees,
custody and destruction of weapons, monitoring elections, advancing human rights, reforming
governmental institutions and promoting participation in political processes. These are crucial
components of an attempt to address the effects of war and restore the semblance of normal life
that long-term peacebuilding requires.
The concept of peacebuilding as the "construction of a new enviromnent" in terms of the eco-
nomic, social, cultural and humanitarian dimensions represents the revolutionary quality of
peacebuilding. The study therefore concluded that this revolutionary dimension and long-term
peacebuilding are synonymous, aimed at transforming a war tom society to institutions, society
and an economy based upon, and furthering the premises of peace.
In addition to the evolutionary and revolutionary qualities of peacebuilding the study identified
the preventive quality of peacebuilding as central to the objectives of long-term peacebuilding.
In this equation the culminating purpose of peacebuilding activities underpinned the definition
that they are to insure against and to prevent a "relapse into conflict" as defined by Boutros
Gali. Accepting that all societies reflect degrees of conflict the premise of the preventive quality
of peacebuilding is thus building the capacity to address the long-term, root causes of violent
conflict.
5.3. Peacebuilding and Landmines in Mozambique.
The study concluded that the non-polar, post-Cold War period presented a series of problems
and difficulties which had not been properly anticipated by the UN as it entered an era of activ-
ism that witnessed a rapid expansion of peacekeeping operations around the globe in the early
1990's. One of these problems had been the high number of civilian landmine casualties docu-
mented in intra-state conflicts where many victims were wounded or killed during periods when
no fighting was taking place or in the aftermath of hostilities. This phenomenon, coupled with
the threat of landmines to post-conflict reconstruction underpinned the qualitative change in
peacebuilding as articulated by UNSG Boutros Boutros Ghali in An Agenda for Peace. The
study therefore interpreted the linkage by Boutros Boutros Ghali between landmines and peace-
building as visionary and valid especially in light of the devastating impact of landmines on
societies transitioning from conflict.
From this perspective the study identified Mozambique as a prime example of an impover-
ished, war-ravaged country emerging from years of violent conflict and in critical need to
address the indiscriminate impact oflandmines on human security, and as a costly obstruction to
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
93
peacebuilding and the regeneration of social and economic development. The linkage between
peacebuilding and landmines was also magnified by the study with the identification of four
interconnected linkages, underpinning the positive correlation between peacebuilding and land-
mines in post-conflict Mozambique, and conceptualised by Boutros-Boutros Ghali "(as) the
development of the social, political and economic infrastructure in a war tom environment
in order to prevent future violence and consolidate peace". This is further linked to Boutros-
Boutros Ghali' s assessment that landmines should be interpreted in the terms of reference of
peacekeeping operations which "(is) crucially important when peacebuilding is underway".
The first linkage in order to give the civilian population hope that a "normal" life is possible
refers to the cessation of hostilities and after a peace agreement had been instituted. It is during
this phase of transition that landmines posed a direct and immediate threat to human security
when population movements increased as displaced Mozambicans returned home and the pres-
sure to make a living in known or suspected mined areas mounted. This was exacerbated by the
need for humanitarian relief.
The second linkage reflected the revival of economic and agricultural activity where the absence
of war had to be accompanied by the semblance of a normal life, characterised by meaningful
employment, the availability of goods and services and the restoration of normal community
services including schools, electricity and water supply and medical services.
The third linkage involved the complications created by landmines for the electoral process
where maximising participation became a key to future acceptance of the government and politi-
cal stability.
The fourth linkage entailed the ability of the government to extend its presence in the country,
including war-tom areas. In this scenario landmines could impede the delivery of government
services and act as physical obstacles to unity and reconstruction. Mobility therefore became a
sine qua non for post-conflict peacebuilding.
However in terms of the application of the newly established concept of peacebuilding in
Mozambique the study concluded that although An Agenda for Peace formulated a broad spec-
trum of responses to conflict situations, these concepts were not integrated into a coherent, inter-
related hierarchy of responses that would function effectively at specific points along the UN's
peace and security regime. Nor had an appropriate division of labour based on relative advan-
tage been articulated for the various government and inter-government role-players to affect
the qualitative changes in conflict resolution and management. This was underscored by Malan
(1998: 1) in Peacekeeping inAfrica-Trends and Responses in which he concurred that the former
UNSG "played a key, though obviously unintentional role in the "prostitution" of peacekeeping,
through the publication of his An Agenda for Peace in 1992. In all fairness Boutros-Boutros
Ghali did attempt to distinguish between a new array of "conflict management tools" supposedly
available to the international community, including "preventive diplomacy", "peacemaking",
"peacekeeping", "peace enforcement" and "peacebuilding". However, most of these "tools" did
not come with clear instruction manuals, and most actors remained comfortable with the prin-
ciples and practices established during half a century of UN peacekeeping".
A key factor therefore in generating an effective response with regard to the linkage between
peacebuilding and landmines was the way in which the UN operationalised or applied the con-
cept as defined by Boutros-Boutros Ghali. In this context the study observed that when the UN
became involved in Mozambique institutional arrangements for the coordination of humanitar-
ian assistance and strategies on landmines within the UN system were weakly developed and
clouded by the perception that landmines were primarily a "military problem".
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In this respect the study observed that notwithstanding the fact that prior to the GPA, the UN,
conflicting parties to the agreement, the donor community and NGOs were well aware of the
extent of the landmine problem in Mozambique, the issue did not figure prominently at the
peace negotiations in Rome. The problem was only loosely defined and no compliance meas-
ures or a clauses specifically related to landmines were incorporated in the GPA. While the
UN emphasised the importance of an integrated approach to the peacebuilding mission there
were no representatives from the UN humanitarian arena involved in the lead-up to the Rome
Accords and no substantial preparatory work on the issue of landmines was undertaken prior to
the arrival of ONUMOZ personnel in Mozambique.
As a consequence the study concluded that peacebuilding elements should be explicity and
clearly referred to in peace agreements and in the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Such
mandates should set clear targets and time frames for peacebuilding activities. The roles of the
different actors in peacebuilding should also be explicitly referred to, including the possible
"dual role" for peacekeepers.
Conscious of the need for rapid action and the one-year timeframe of the ONUMOZ mission, a
preliminary UN mine action plan was available by January 1993 just two months after the sign-
ing of the Peace Accords in Rome. The plan referred to the need for a Mozambican indigenous
capacity, which could address the long-term implications of the problem but focussed instead
on operational activities needed to meet immediate peacekeeping mission objectives.
The plan, and the initiation of the proposed mine action programme however encountered sig-
nificant difficulties. The overall approach was challenged by different sets of stakeholders and
was eventually abandoned. In addition, the study found that the plan compiled by a UNDPKO
specialist lacked a strategy and the expertise needed to meet the stated objective of developing
an indigenous capacity. A thorough nationallandmine assessment, which would have given
planners and others a better appreciation of the extent of the landmine problem, and ways and
means of addressing it, was not undertaken. This can, in part, be explained by the sense of
urgency surrounding the ONUMOZ mission and the goal of maintaining the momentum for
peace and the fear that repatriation and greater mobility within the country as political tensions
subsided would result in high numbers of landmine accidents.
This inter alia highlighted the critical relationship between peacebuilding and information and
the study concluded that comprehensive information and thorough analysis are indispensable
for the correct assessment of peacebuilding requirements, especially in relation to landmines
and its impact on human security and post-conflict peacebuilding. In the case of Mozambique
no national comprehensive assessment (level I and II surveys) had been undertaken. In addition,
the 1994HALO Trust Landmine Survey undertaken during the ONUMOZ mandate was viewed
by the study as cursory in nature with a narrow focus, compounded by the absence of minefield
maps. It also appeared that the pre-planning assessment mission before the ONUMOZ operation
tended to consist of a small team of military munitions experts making a brief visit to a coun-
try they were not familiar with arriving at a very approximate figure on the estimated number
of mines in the whole country and only indicating the geographic areas severely affected and
the type of infrastructure and facilities which were mined. The assessment also referred to the
implications of mines for troop deployment and mobility of the population. This type of infor-
mation may be useful if the mine problem was interpreted as a mathematical equation, but of
limited value when trying to determine who was most vulnerable, what factors should influence
the prioritisation process for minefield mapping and clearance, and the most appropriate and
effective means of reducing vulnerability in mine-affected areas taking into account available
resources and constraints in launching mine action activities.
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The study found that the launching of a mine action programme within the ambit of the UN
Security Council-mandated peacebuilding mission in Mozambique was complex and problem-
atical. The mission had to implemented quickly and in a very short timeframe. The emphasis
was on political objectives - demobilisation, formation of a newly constituted army, elections
and inauguration of a new political era - which were central to securing the peace. In this situa-
tion the development of a humanitarian mine action programme was of secondary concern. The
overwhelming focus was on operational mine clearance and inadequate attention was given to
building an indigenous capacity and to issues of continuity and sustainability. This problem
was further compounded in Mozambique when stated objectives indicated that the goal was
the development of an indigenous humanitarian mine action capability but appropriate support
was not provided and there was no appreciation of the requirements and timeframe needed to
develop such a capacity in a war-torn environment.
In Mozambique, the study observed that the UN was slow, bureaucratic, reactive, divided within
itself, and unable to provide the leadership and vision essential for the rapid initiation of mine
action activities. UN arrangements were also interpreted as dysfunctional which undermined
the development of an indigenous capacity when it tried to combine activities geared to meet-
ing the operational requirements of the peacekeeping mission and the development of long-term
humanitarian mine action programmes.
The study consequently concluded that even in the best of circumstances it is unrealistic to
assume that a mine action capacity can be generated to meet both immediate peacekeeping
objectives and to form the basis for a long-term indigenous capacity. The objectives are, how-
ever compatible, but the required vision, modalities, and timeframes are different. It is the view
of the study that the UN must take quick and early action to help national and local authorities
address the humanitarian implications oflandmines. The realisation of this objective cannot be
considered of lesser value than the organisation of mine action activies focused on addressing
peacekeeping operational needs. It is equally important that any activity or capacity which is
generated under the auspices of a UN mission form part of a coherent plan focussed on enabling
national authority to meet long-term peacebuilding responsibilities.
As the study documented the UN was inadequately equipped to provide leadership to the con-
flicting parties and international stakeholders and to ensure that avoidable problems did not
occur. In addition to problems associated with internal confusion on roles and responsibilities
and parallel reporting structures, UN support had in too many instances been characterised by
slow mobilisation, a reactive approach, and personnel and recruitment policies that were inap-
propriate to crisis situations. This was compounded by procurement and personnel recruitment
rules that were cumbersome and costly. The absence of accountability mechanisms was another
factor in the slow UN implementation of decisions to proceed in accordance with agreed plans.
In Mozambique, UN mechanisms which should have supported the rapid initiation of on-the
ground mine action activities proved inadequate and were seen to have hindered rather than
helped. The reasons for poor UN performance in Mozambique included a too narrow defini-
tion of the landmine crisis and what constituted an indigenous capacity. The UN had also been
retarded by the lack of clarity on which parts of the system were responsible for specific tasks
and the unwillingness of certain UN agencies to be co-ordinated or to work within an agreed
chain of command.
The study recorded that at the time of the departure of ONUMOZ at the end of 1994, the UN and
the donor community had still not reached agreement on future institutional arrangements and
how Mozambican authorities would be empowered to deal with the landmine problem. By then,
a pragmatic arrangement had emerged hereby Norwegian People's Aid operated in the north of
Mozambique, HALO Trust in the centre, and the UN-supported Accelerated Demining Project
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(ADP) in the south. In May 1995, the newly-elected Mozambique government established a
National Mine Clearance Commission (NMCC) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-
operation, mandated to undertake regulatory and co-ordination functions. It's executive arm
the Mozambican National Demining Commission (CND) had since then been responsible for
management functions such as planning, licensing, priority-setting, data collection and analysis,
and oversight of all operational activities undertaken by the UN, NGO's or commercial agen-
cies. The interview with the executive director of CND confirmed that CND remained a weak
indigenous capacity, unable to effectively co-ordinate and support the full spectrum of mine
action activities in Mozambique.
In this regard the study concluded that the Mozambican indigenisation programme under-
scored the importance of the UN mobilising support among the key stakeholders for the over-
all philosophy and direction of the programme and the institutional arrangements necessary
to meet immediate and long-tern objectives. Notwithstanding the achievements of individual
mine action agencies in Mozambique, there were obvious disadvantages in not having a strong
central co-ordination and planning mechanism. The Mozambique experience also illustrated the
importance of early action to capacitate national authorities, who are ultimately responsible for
dealing with the long-term consequences of landmines.
Of equal importance was an exit strategy at the conclusion of the peacekeeping mandate,
which should have included specific recommendations with regard to post-conflict peacebuild-
ing measures, including the role of the UN and World Bank in addressing the longer term needs
in terms of post conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction.
The study also observed that in the early phases of UN involvement in mine action programmes
in Mozambique, approaches and perspectives were elaborated in an ad hoc manner. In the case
of the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique a clash of interests (immediate versus capacity
building objectives) served to thwart an effective and timely UN response. Access to, and avail-
ability of, different sources of funding also had a profound impact on the way in which priorities
were defined and activities supported. The drive to quickly generate mine clearance activities -
although this invariably took much longer than anticipated - and the perspective that the initia-
tion phase was tied to the timeframe of the peacekeeping mandate had serious implications
for both the organisation of institutional arrangements and the realisation of capacity- building
objectives. In addition, the UN repeatedly illustrated that it was unable to deal with its bureauc-
racy and that it lacked the management structure and expertise which would have enabled it to
move quickly and decisively, particularly when problems demanded prompt remedial action.
The study therefore concluded that a different timeframe and approach must be envisaged by
the UN if they want a national authority to acquire the skills and resources which are central to
the effective management and sustainability of a nation-wide programme. This assumption that
the national authority in Mozambique was somehow able to absorb and sustain programmes
launched during the relatively short life span of the peacekeeping mission indicated either a lack
of understanding of what constituted an indigenous capability or a disregard for what actually
happened after the UN had concluded their peacekeeping mandate.
5.4. Evolution oj UN Policy on Landmines
Following the identification of the conceptual foundation of post-conflict peacebuilding and the
role of landmines as a threat to this process by UNSG Boutros Boutros - Ghali in An Agenda
for Peace (1992) the UNGA adopted its first Resolution on Assistance in Landmine Clearance
inOctober 1993. The study therefore concluded that the issue of landmines in Mozambique and
specifically the ONUMOZ mandate (1992-1995) had a direct and indirect influence on the evo-
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lution of overall UN policy with respect to landmines. In its Resolution A/48/LS of 19 October
1993 the UNGA expressed grave concern for the serious humanitarian, social, economic and
ecological disruption caused by the failure to remove landmines and confirmed that landmines
constitute an obstacle to reconstruction and economic development as well as to the restoration
of normal social conditions. In this respect the Resolution acknowledged "(that) there is scope
for the United Nation to strengthen its contribution to the solution of problems relating to mine
clearance".
The UNGA Resolution also stressed the importance of co-ordination by the United Nations
of activities, including those by regional organisations, related to mine clearance, in particular
those activities relating to information and training with a view to improving the "effective-
ness of activities in the field," and invited all relevant programmes and bodies, multilateral
or national, to include, in a co-ordinated manner, activities related to mine clearance in their
humanitarian, social and economic assistance initiatives.
The Resolution also requested the Secretary General to submit to the UNGA before its forty-
ninth session, a comprehensive report on the problems caused by the increasing presence of
mines and other unexploded devices resulting from anned conflicts and on the manner in which
the United Nations contribution to the solution of problems relating to mine clearance could be
strengthened.
It also requested the Secretary General to include in his report consideration of the financial
aspects of activities related to mine clearance and, in this context, of the advisability of estab-
lishing a Voluntary Trust Fund to finance, in particular, information and training programmes
relating to mine clearance and to facilitate the launching of mine-clearance operations;
In April 1992 the UNDHA was formally established and during August 1992 the UN acquired
the assistance of a mine-specialist who co-operated with UNDPKO and provided advice to
UNDHA, which became increasingly involved in the humanitarian implications of landmines.
In December 1994 the UNSG designated UNDHA as the focal point for mine action within the
UN system.
Through its Mine Clearance Policy Unit, UNDHA developed an integrated approach towards
co-ordinating the capacities of the various departments, programmes and associations within
the United Nations system, as well as those of non-governmental organisations and the private
sector, in addressing the landmine problem. At the same time, UNDHA recognised that the
ultimate responsibility for landmine problems lay with the affected country.
The Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was mandated to develop working arrange-
ments with all parties in order to outline the role each agency would play in providing assist-
ance in mine action. In executing the mandate, the following principles were considered by
UNDHA:
(a) Action to address the mine problem had to begin as early as possible. Such action
was seen to include data gathering and socio-economic impact studies, which would
result in advocacy work, mine awareness and medical programmes as soon as pos-
sible, often before the peace process itself had started;
(b) The peace process, in tum, was to acknowledge and address the mine issue by set-
ting out the political and infra-structural framework needed to begin a mine-action
programme once the situation allowed it;
(c) A mine-action plan was to address more than the need for eradication. It was to
include three key elements: mine awareness, mine clearance and victim assistance.
Mine awareness was to encompass information gathering and social research about
the impact and meaning of landmine contamination, mass information and dissemi-
nation campaigns and grass-roots activities aimed at promoting general awareness,
as well as more specific risk-reduction and safe practices education. Mine clearance
was to foster conformity with agreed international standards and locally determined
priorities. Priority setting was to be a broad and well-informed consultative process
involving the results of targeted data gathering and socio-economic impact research
initiated under the plan, together with the participation of key stakeholders from
the central political level, regional authorities and grass-roots communities. Even in
areas where mine clearance could not be undertaken because of security or other
considerations, efforts needed to be made to carry out risk reduction and to assist the
injured. Where possible, information essential to the conduct of mine clearance was
to be gathered and plans were to be made to begin demining as soon as the situation
permitted. There was to be an ongoing evaluation of all programme activities, and
an analytical capability was to be established to make sense of programme infor-
mation generated, especially that relating to the social impact of mines in the coun-
try. The plan was also to address the needs of landmine survivors, including their
medical, social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration. Lastly, the plan was
to be undertaken with a view to establishing a national capacity to respond to the
multi-faceted challenges presented by landmines and unexploded ordnance. For
programmes to be sustainable and appropriate in the long term, local people had
to be swiftly empowered to take charge of the management and development of the
programmes.
(d) The principle of comparative advantage was to apply, and those most capable and
readily available were to be given responsibility to undertake various elements of
the plan;
(e) Finally, UNDHA recognised that even the best integrated mine-action plans alone
would not solve the problem, and that it was equally important to pursue efforts to
prohibit landmines totally and to stigmatise their use internationally.
In October 1997 the UN focal point for mine action was transferred by the UNSG to the Depart-
ment of Peacekeeping Operations and DPKO was made responsible for mine clearance and
mine awareness related to UN peacekeeping missions. This role was reconfirmed by the Secu-
rity Council in its presidential statement on demining in 1996, which said that operational
demining should be an important element and an integral part of peacekeeping mandates. The
Department of Peacekeeping Operations was therefor mandated to provide technical support
to mine-clearance and surveying operations conducted during peacekeeping missions. It also
advised the Department of Humanitarian Affairs on technical issues such as the provision of
equipment to demining operations. It worked closely with the UNDHA to ensure the smooth
transition from peacekeeping demining operations to long-term humanitarian programmes, from
mine clearance in support of the implementation of a peacekeeping mission to programmes
involving the development of long-term national capacity to support a viable, appropriate and
well-targeted national mine-action plan that met the needs of a nation over several decades.
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The UNGA, in November 1998 endorsed a policy paper "Mine Action and Effective Co-ordi-
nation: The United Nations Policy" prepared by the UN secretariat in terms of the UN role in
mine action and the responsibilities of the various parts of the UN system to this end. These
structures and activities are for the purpose of the study summarised as follows:
• United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in the UN Department of Peacekeep-
ing Operations is the focal point within the UN system for all mine-related activities.
Among the functions UNMAS performs in consultation with other parts of the system
are: establishing priorities for assessment missions; co-ordinating the mobilisation of
resources; developing and promoting safety standards with UNICEF and WHO; collect-
ing, analysing and disseminating mine related information; advocating a global ban on
landmines; and managing the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clear-
ance.
• Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) supports the role of the United Nations
Secretary General in relation to the Ottawa Convention, particularly in the areas of trans-
parency measures and in facilitation and clarification of compliance .
• Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) UNMAS and OCHA
efforts complement one another in advocating a global ban and on resource mobilisation.
OCHA manages the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, which supports rapid response
to humanitarian emergencies, and the Consolidated Appeals Process, which supports
system-wide requirements for humanitarian intervention.
• Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ensures
that the needs of refugees and other populations of concern to UNHCR are met. UNHCR
attaches special importance to its work with UNICEF on mine awareness programmes,
and with the World Food Programme on the safe delivery of food.
• United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) works with a wide range of partners
within and outside the UN system, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
on mine awareness, rehabilitation of landmine victims, and advocacy.
• United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) addresses the socio-economic con-
sequences of landmine contamination and helps build national and local capacity to
overcome landmine-related obstacles to normal economic activity, reconstruction and
development. Where landmines are not only a humanitarian emergency, UNDP develops
integrated, sustainable mine action programmes at the local and national level, working
closely with UNMAS.
• United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is the principal service provider
within the UN system for integrated mine action and capacity building programmes. In
order to speed up response in support of mine action programmes, UNOPS established
a Mine Action Unit (MAU) in March 1998 to provide technical, managerial, legal, con-
tracting and purchasing expertise needed for all phases of mine action projects. In addi-
tion to supporting country programmes, UNOPS works with UNMAS, UNDP and the
Survey Action Centre on the Global Landmine Survey project.
• World Food Programme (WFP) is particularly concerned with clearance of landmines
from access roads for speedy and cost-effective delivery of food assistance in mine-
affected areas; clearance of land for safe return of displaced populations; and clearance
of agricultural land for local food production.
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• Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) contributes to mine action as it relates to
humanitarian relief and rehabilitation efforts. FAO also helps define criteria for deter-
mining priority sites for mine clearance.
• The World Bank works closely with all UN departments and agencies. The Bank
shares with UNDP, in particular, a perspective which views mine pollution as a develop-
ment problem with long-term consequences requiring long-term solutions. With UNDP,
the Bank convenes donor groups in reconstruction situations, mobilises resources and
focuses long-term attention on mine action.
5.5. The Mine Ban Treatyand Beyond.
The First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty took place in Mozambique 3-7
May 1999. In adopting the Maputo Declaration States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to
the eradication of anti-personnel mines and agreed to hold the next meeting of State Parties in
Geneva from 11 - 15 September 2000 and decided on an intersessional mechanism to address
the key issues of victim assistance, mine clearance and the general status and operation of the
Convention.
The Meeting in Maputo was attended by 43 States Parties and 64 non-State Parties. The main
objectives of the Meeting in Maputo included the adoption of:
• The Maputo Declaration;
• Reporting formats for Article 7;
• President of the Meeting's Paper on the circulation of Article 7 Reports, and;
• President's Paper on Intersessional Work.
The Meeting was opened by President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique. In his address Presi-
dent Chissano stressed the importance of the Mine Ban Treaty as a tool for co-operation on
mine action. He summarised the impact landmines had on the daily lives of Mozambicans and
stressed the importance of providing assistance to the victims of landrnines. He indicated that
Mozambique in co-operation with various countries had drawn up a national assistance strategy
for landmine victims and expressed the hope that Mozambique will be free of landrnines by the
year 2009.
The Mine Ban Treaty is now binding international law and Mozambique as a State Party is
required to report to the UNSG on its implementation measures by 1 September 1999 (Article
7), to destroy all its stockpiles by 1March 2003 (Article 4) and to destroy mines in the ground
in territory under its jurisdiction and control by 1March 2009 (Article 5). Mozambique, during
the first Meeting of the States Parties, did not submit a request for an extension of the lO-year
period provided for the destruction of landmines in mined areas (Article 5).
The Treaty did not establish an independent monitoring mechanism. In an effort to promote
transparency, however, it requires each State Party to send an annual report to the Secretary
General of the United Nations which must include the following information (So far Mozam-
bique has not yet submitted the required report in terms of Article 7 of the Treaty).
• the total number and the types of anti-personnel mines it has stockpiled;
• the progress made in its mine-destruction programmes, including the total number and
the types of mines destroyed;
• the total number and the types of mines kept for training purposes;
• the technical characteristics of each type of mine it has produced in the past;
• the location of all mined areas under its jurisdiction or control; details of the type,
quantity and age of the mines laid there (to the extent known); and steps taken to warn
the civilian population;
• the national measures, such as legislation or administrative regulations, taken to prevent
and suppress violations of the Treaty;
• the status of programmes for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel
mine production facilities.
The study concluded that the Mine Ban Treaty and the rights and obligations, afforded to
Mozambique as a State Party under its 22 articles, provided an appropriate implementation
framework to address the long-term solution of landmine contamination in Mozambique.
In terms of the clauses of the Treaty prohibiting the use, stockpile, development and transfer of
anti-personnel mines the study concluded that Mozambique would haveto take a number of
regulatory steps at the national level. Specifically, it must adopt appropriate legal, administra-
tive and other measures to prevent and punish any prohibited activity by persons or on territory
under its jurisdiction or contro1. Depending on the national law or procedures, this may require
the adoption of specific criminal legislation.
In addition, implementing the Treaty's provisions will entail the adoption of administrative
measures to make sure that the relevant changes in military doctrine and operating procedures
are made.
The successful completion of the removal of landmines within a lO-year timeframe (a near
impossible task) depends much on the establishment of an effective indigenous capacity in
Mosambique.
In this respect a new mine action co-ordination body has been established in Mozambique.
New legislation, approved by the Council of Ministers in June 1999, changed the status of
the Commissao Nacional de Desminagem (CND) to the Instituto Nacional de Desminagem
(IND). Under the new legislation, the IND changes from a government commission to a semi-
government "institute" and has greater financial and administrative autonomy. The IND has also
been tasked to ensure that mine action is integrated into Mozambique's wider reconstruction
and development plan, and according to Elliot (2000: 102) "(is) better placed to achieve its
objectives."
Under the new legislation, the IND has greater financial and administrative autonomy. Although
still under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, the IND has more
freedom in decision-making. The Institute will restructure existing management and adminis-
trative system. This expansion should reduce the likelihood of the UND encountering similar
problems to that of its predecessor with regard to workload and inefficient co-ordination at sub-
national levels.
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According to Elliot (2000: 102) the future success of the de-mining industry is widely regarded
as dependent upon two interrelated factors:
- The donor community's acceptance and support of the IND is vital for the newly
formed institution's credibility and financial viability.
- In tum, the IND's ability to provide a greater degree of transparency and accordingly,
while improving national mine clearance, co-ordination is crucial to its credibility with
the donors.
Another positive development has been the initiative by the Canadian International Demining
Centre (CIDC) to conduct a nationallandmine survey in Mozambique in early 2000. The survey
will also include an assessment of the socio-economic impact of landmines on communities.
This should greatly facilitate the integration of mine action priorities with development priori-
ties in agriculture, health care, education and infrastructural development, which will support
the objectives of long-term peacebuilding.
5.6. Research Methods
The study sought, through the employment of a full spectrum of data sources, including doc-
umentary sources as well as direct and indirect observations to analyse and interpret the cen-
tral theoretical thesis namely the application of the concept of post-conflict peacebuilding in
Mozambique with specific reference to the role of landmines in the process. In evaluating the
role of the UN in this equation the case study further aspired to improve efficacy by analysing a
key concept in the discipline of international conflict resolution in order to improve understand-
ing of the dynamics and application of the concept.
Towards this objective the study concluded that the UN's multidimensional peace operation
in Mozambique was successful from a macro perspective in terms of the cumulative applica-
tion of the concepts of peacemaking, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding.
Mozambique's peace process has subsequently been selected as a model peacekeeping opera-
tion, which could be adopted to post-conflict interventions elsewhere.
While the humanitarian, electoral and, to some extent, the political success of ONUMOZ cannot
be contested, the neglect of peacebuilding in relation to landmines could serve as a basis for
possible lessons learned in future wider peacekeeping in Africa under UN auspices.
In this respect the study identified Angola, one of the severest landmine contaminated countries
in the world, as a possible future case study once the country returns to a situation where there is
peace to keep under UN supervision. However, Dennis Jett (1997:2) provided a cynical perspec-
tive on this proposition when he stated as follows:
"The achievements in Mozambique are real, but many materialised despite, not because of the
UN's supervision of the peace process. There were elements in ONUMOZ, which would be
difficult to replicate elsewhere and are therefore not all that instructive. There are other aspects
of ONUMOZ which should be repeated in places like Angola, but will not be because the self-
protective UN bureaucracy rarely learns from its own mistakes."
The study was therefore compelled to concur. A cursory analysis of the Angolan situation con-
firms that the experience of trying to initiate a mine action programme with the over-arching
goal of creating a sustainable indigenous capacity within the context of a peacebuilding mission
was no less fraught in Angola than elsewhere. In contrast to Mozambique, planning did com-
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mence before the signing of the Lusaka Accord in November 1994. There was also a reasonable
understanding of how mines would impede peace, humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation
activities, and there was a commitment from the beginning to help Angolan authorities develop
the capabilities necessary to deal with the problem on a long-term basis.
However, initial plans which stressed the importance of a unified approach and direction to
address both immediate and long-term needs soon foundered in interminable bureaucratic
infighting as "UNAVEM objectives" were seen to take precedence over action needed to develop
a long-term capability. In this context the study observed that the Angolan programme had oper-
ated on different tracks, that divergent perspectives drove activities in different directions, that
there was little appreciation of the role the UN needed to play and even less understanding of
what is involved in the development of indigenous capabilities. For the most part, mines were
perceived as a military problem and the answer was seen as clearance by commercial contrac-
tors to meet UNAVEM operational needs and training of "deminers" to attend to other clearance
priorities. To compound the matter the ICBL has monitored increased deployment oflandmines
by the government and the MPLA in contravention of the Mine Ban Treaty to which Angola is
a signatory. (December 1999)
The aforementioned necessitated Dennis Jett American ambassador to Mozambique during
ONUMOZ to point out in an article in the New York Times (2000: May) "The UN's Peacekeep-
ing Failures are Built in and Intractable" that in Apri11995, after the UN's failures in Somalia
and Angola a "Lessons Learned Unit" was established to determine why peacekeeping efforts
failed. This office of eight people is currently collecting and analysing information on a peace-
keeping operation in Yugoslavia, which ended in 1995, and in Angola, which ended in 1997.
"Apparently, the lessons of failure come slowly", according to Jett.
However, the study concluded that the surge in peacekeeping operations, which occurred in the
early 1990s, will not necessarily be the norm in the future. The international community has
become increasingly selective in mandating peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. It is
also wary of making commitments involving personnel and huge amount of expenditure in situ-
ations where "military solutions" are still deemed an option by parties competing for power.
Thus, the context in which the UN provided assistance in the future will, most likely, be signifi-
cantly different to the parameters which shaped the planning and initiation of a UN mine action
programme in Mozambique. This could especially be the case if the UN considered lessons
learned in adapting their methodology and strategies accordingly.
The credibility, relevance and nature of the sources employed were viewed by the study to have
contributed to the reliability and validity of the findings of the research. However, two difficul-
ties were experienced in terms of the way in which the research had been planned, structured
and executed.
First, the vast and detailed nature of quality data on ONUMOZ and analysis of previous research
on the Mozambican peace process, including the deconstruction of the Rome Peace Accord
as well as the Mine Ban Treaty in order to provide sufficient and relevant grounds for the con-
clusion proved to be an extremely time consuming process. This was especially the case with
regard to UN documentation and the Ottawa process.
Second, the personal involvement of the author in the Mozambican peace and reconciliation
processes and interaction with the full spectrum of stakeholders, including the conflicting par-
ties, NGOs, the international community and the UN, brought to the fore the dilemma of objec-
tivity, which necessitated the author during the research design phase, to consider the factors
which could manifest themselves as bias and impact negatively on making valid inferences.
From an academic perspective the author therefore had to remain vigilant to exclude the selec-
tion of those views and arguments that supported the author's personal views or implicit preju-
dices. The author however noted that concepts with dual meanings had been used in the study
in an individualistic way based on the personal involvement of the author on the issue under
consideration.
Thirdly, the collaborative research project and the personal involvement of the author in South
Africa's bilateral assistance to Mozambique in mine action in relation to post-conflict recon-
struction provided a tangible and measurable dimension in terms of policy formulation and
academic research. In this regard the collaborative research project contributed to the transfor-
mation of the CND to the IND in pursuit of the establishment of a truly indigenous capacity to
address the long-term impact of landmines on Mozambique.
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Conversely, the research methods reflected a broad range of issues related to the focal point of
the study, which could warrant further academic scrutiny and analysis. These inter alia included,
but are not limited to, the following topics .
• In terms of the principles of non-interference and impartially the study observed that
peacebuilding should not be conceived by the internal actors as interference and that
every effort should be made by the UN to secure the consent, support and active partici-
pation in enabling national authorities to acquire the skills and international mechanisms,
which allow them to determine policy, to develop annual plans and mobilise resources,
to co-ordinate and regulate all mine action activities, and to ensure that priorities are
met in the most rational and cost-effective manner.In the interview with the Mozambican
Foreign Minister, Dr. L. Simao pointed out that the UNSC established ONUMOZ in
exercise of its powers granted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which obliged the
UN to operate with the consent of the parties. The Foreign Minister reiterated that the
Mozambican experience with ONUMOZ underlined the need for the UN to bear in mind
that peacekeeping forces operate on the basis of consent by the parties concerned. There-
fore, they must always act with impartiality and in accordance with their mandates. Fur-
thermore, they must respect and abide by the principles of independence, sovereignty,
territorial integrity and non-interference. Given the sacrosanct nature of the principles
of non-interference, ONUMOZ seemed to have clashed with the general authority of the
government, creating a legally questionable precedent in terms of interventionism. In
this context, the roles and obligations of the parties to a conflict needs further academic
scrutiny and analysis.
• From a lessons learned perspective, the study concluded that disarmament and control of
arms and the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants are central to effec-
tive conflict resolution, peace operations and long-term peacebuilding. Mozambique is
therefore a case study for demonstrating that weak disarmament components to peace
agreements and subsequent neglect by the UN of safety and security issues impact nega-
tively on long-term peacebuilding and security concerns.
• The role of the SRSG within a UN mandated peacekeeping operation needs further clari-
fication, especially in relation to overall leadership and co-ordination of peacebuilding
in terms of funding, the donor community, NGOs , the UNSC, UN Headquarters and
UN agencies and regional organisations. The question of a division of responsibilities
between the UNGA and UNSC with regard to peacebuilding and its funding also needs
to be examined.
• The achievement of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Produc-
tion, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction had been hailed by
UN Secretary General KofiAnan as "a landmark step in the history of disarmament" and
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"a historic victory for the weak and vulnerable of our world." Developed and negotiated
in just one year's time, signed by 122 nations in Ottawa, Canada, in December 1997, it
has been considered a remarkable achievement by most observers, setting a new norm in
international humanitarian law by banning completely a weapon already in widespread
use. Seventy-one nations, including Mozambique, have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty as
of 31 March 1999. This is believed to be the fastest entry into force of any major inter-
national treaty. The exceptional pace of ratification had been due largely to the campaign
of the ICBL and efforts by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
UNICEF. The ICBL was awarded the 1997 Nobel Prize for its efforts to focus the inter-
national response on the extreme socio-economic and humanitarian impact associated
with the indiscriminate use of landrnines. The roles ofNGOs and the UN in this process
deserve further academic analysis and interpretation.
• The study observed that the UN lacked the capacity and resources to perform well all the
peace-and security tasks that it has come to assume in recent years. An appropriate divi-
sion of responsibilities between the UN and other international actors in the sphere of
preventive actions, peacemaking, peacekeeping, enforcement action and peacebuilding
must therefore be developed to enable a more effective and comprehensive international
response to conflict situations around the world. Such a division of labour could take
advantage of the different capabilities and interests of regional organisations, national
governments and non-governmental organisations in order to identify areas of compara-
tive advantage and build around that a system of complementarity.In this context, the
role of regional organisations for assuming greater responsibility for peace and security
in terms of Chapter VIn of the UN Charter should be analysed taking into consideration
their general lack of relevant tradition, financial resources, political prestige and credibil-
ity, impartiality, and operational capacity. This places a particular responsibility on the
UN, the major powers, traditional peacekeeping countries, and other bilateral and multi-
lateral donors to work in a more concerted way to help build the capacities of regional
organisations. The study observed that the areas of comparative advantage for regional
organisations would seem to be preventive action, peacemaking and confidence-building
at the regional and sub-regional levels with a gradual expansion of peacekeeping capa-
bilities
• With reference to NGOs the study observed that the emergence of independent actors
from civil society can complement official efforts towards peace building. On account of
their informal and flexible character the study concluded that NGOs are not a monolithic
group and in Mozambique had been at the forefront in raising consciousness and defin-
ing what needed to be done. The role ofNGOs in post-conflict peacebuilding therefore
deserves further academic focus.
Finally, the study observed that the successes of UN peacebuilding of the early 1990s have made
way for unprecedented criticism and pessimism with regard to the UN's peace and security role
in the next century. This sentiment was best described by Michael Ignatieff in a New York Times
article "A Bungling UN is Undermining Itself' (2000: May). "The UN seems only to survive
by forgetting. By forgetting it manages to repress a legacy of shame. Institutional amnesia locks
the United Nations system into a fatal compulsion to repeat. An incorrigible moral narcissism
about its own good intentions makes it unable to recognise that its central ideal and instrument-
peacekeeping - is so flawed that it must be abandoned altogether. The largest lesson of all is that
peacekeeping is destroying the United Nations itself. If it still values its own survival it must
abandon an ideal it has so comprehensively betrayed."
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The study was constantly reminded however that the UN is not a world government but an asso-
ciation of sovereign states and, as such, the effectiveness of the organisation depends largely
on the role that the constituent governments entrust to it. In this regard, the UN cannot operate
solely on the basis of ideals and principles divorced from the realities of the world. It is within
this imperfect context that the UN must formulate a credible peace and security agenda for the
next century taking into account that its failures are merely the sum of our collective failings.
The UN and the international community need therefore to invest in preventive action going well
beyond the traditional notion of preventive diplomacy and preventive deployment to encompass
a broad spectrum of political, economic, social and humanitarian measures aimed at averting or
de-escalating the development of conflict. This could form the basis of the conceptual founda-
tions of long-term peacebuilding.
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